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In Pennsylvania a tenancy at will is construed
to be a tenancy from year to year. Hey v.
McGrath.
250

Where the sub-tenant purchases the title of
the paramount landlord, he is invested with all
the latter's rights, including the power to deter
mine the original lease.
Ib.

The provision of law that an agreement net
to be performed within one year is void, does
not apply to contracts for leasing lands. Reeder
et al. v. Sayre,
253
Parol lease, how it affects tenant from year to
year.
Ib.

Tenant holding over; tenant sowed crop un-
der an agreement; the landlord afterwards sold;
tenant may reap.
Ib.

Equity will relieve a lessee against forfeiture
for breach of a covent to repair when the land-
lord has by his conduct misled the lessee into
supposing that the covenant would not be insis
ted on. Hughes v. Metropolitan R. Co.

406

A parol lease vests in the lessee a present in
terest in the premises from the time the lease is
made. It is not an executory contract.
Becar v.
Fleres, exr.,
421

&c.

Held, That a transmissible interest vested in
the children upon the issuing of the policy, and
that the child of the deceased child took by
descent the interest of its parent, and was en-
titled to the portion of the fund which the par-
ent would have received if living. Continental
Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer et al.
60

A life insurance policy, containing a clause
providing it shall be void if the answers made
to questions by the insured in his application
are found to be false in any respect, is wholly
avoided by a false answer whether it be material
or not. The Etna Life Ins. Co. v. France. 82

In such case neither the court nor the jury
can inquire into the materiality of either the
question or answer.
Ib.

A Court of Equity will reinstate the holder of
a life insurance policy which has been forfeited
by reason of non-payment of premiums, where
payment of such premiums was impossible.
Bird v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co.

83

It is not necessary that an applicant for life
insurance should sign the application personal-
ly; he may authorize any other person to sign
for him. Stelwagen v. The Merchants Life Ins. Co.

125

Not stating in the application that the assured
Fraud in executing lease will vitiate it al-had applied to another company for insurance
though party injured had friends present who does not vitiate the policy.
could read and who could examine lease. Ediek
v. Dake.

559

Ib.
A renewal of a life insurance policy, which
had been forfeited by non-payment of premiums,
As to damages for breach of covenants of procured by fraud, is void, and an offer of judg
lease, see DAMAGES.

ment for the amount of the money received as
premiums at the time of renewal, with interest

Harris

As to evidence in actions on lease, see EVI- and costs, after suit brought, is a sufficient ten-
der to allow the company to disaffirm.
v. The Equitable Life Ass. Soc. of U. S.

DENCE.

As to ejectment for non-payment of rent, see

EJECTMENT.

156

Statements in the application for insurance in
the declaration, or answers to the questions are
As to leases by married women, see MARRIED either warranties or representations. If war-

WOMEN.

As to release of sureties on lease, see PRINCI-

PAL AND SURETY.

LEGACIES.
See WILLS.

LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
See EVIDENCE.

LIENS.

As to lien of mortgagor under a mortgage on
the income and earnings of a railroad, see EXE-

CUTION.

LIFE INSURANCE.

A wife insured the life of her husband, the
amount payable to herself if living, if not, to
their children. She died before her husband,
and one of the children before him, leaving a

child.

ranties, then materiality, or want of materiality
as to the risk, has nothing to do with the con-
tract. The only question is, were they untrue,
and if so, the policy is void. But if representa-
tions, then to avoid the policy, they must be
substantially and materially untrue, or made
for the purpose of fraud. Buell v. The Conn. Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co.
161

Whether or not a disease is "serious" within
the meaning of a life insurance policy is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. Boos v. The World Mu-
tual Ins. Co.
211

An agreement to issue a policy of life insur-
ance is good, although the premium was paid by
note, and the note was not paid at maturity,
where the policy contains no condition avoiding
policy unless the note is paid. Shaw v. The Re-
public Life Ins. Co.

212

Where the administrator of the deceased had
received the policy, but it was not in reality de-
livered by the agent until after the death of the
assured, and in ignorance of that event, no re-
covery can be had unless a valid contract of in-
surance existed between the insurer and the in-

sured before the latter's death, and the policy
delivered in pursuance thereof. The Piedmont
& Arlington Life Ins. Co, v. Ewing, Admr. 276

A life policy containing a clause making it
void if the insured went south of certain limits
without the consent of the company, is invalida-
ted by the continued stay of the insured south of
such limits, whither he went under consent of
the company for a prescribed period. Evans v.
The U.S. Life Ins. Co.
284

And where the company's officers, after such
forfeiture, declined to receive further premiums
unless 2 1-2 per cent. more was paid to cover the
additional risk, and gave plaintiff's agent till
next day to pay, agreeing to keep the policy in
force and give credit for the premium and per
centage, they have the right to abandon their
agreement, and to refuse to receive the premium
and percentage, and declare the policy forfeited.
Ib.

That the insured was ill, and that it was
highly inconvenient for him to return, affords
no ground for relief, unless it appear that he
was actually unable to travel, even by short
stages and at great expense.
Ib.

A false answer in an application for life insur-
ance avoids the policy, whether the insurer
knew its falsity or not, if the answer is a mate-
rial one. Baker v. The Home Life Ins. Co.
366

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When a party has a legal remedy, by action,
against a town, a mandamus will not lie. Marsh
v. Town of Little Valley.
48

What was once a claim against the County of
New York, having become a liability of the city,
the latter may be sued upon it and a mandamus
Bank v. Board of Apportionment.
will not lie. The People ex rel. Tenth National
c4

If a true answer is given by the applicant to
the company's agent who reduced the answer to
writing, and in so doing modified or varied its A peremptory writ of mandamus, under Chap.
meaning, the company is estopped from chal- 697, Laws of 1867, to compel Board of Assessors
lenging its correctness.
Ib. of New York City to assess damage to property,
Authority to an agent to solicit applications caused by closing street, is proper upon their re
for life insurance does not give him authority to fusal to act. The People ex rel. Carleton v. Board
collect premiums. Howell v. Charter Oak Life of Assessors of New York City.

Ins. Co.

383

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Where a bond is given by an agent, as a con-
dition of his being retained as such agent, con-
ditioned that he will pay over all moneys be
longing to the company which he may receive,
the sureties on such bond are not exonerated by
the fact that the agent made a further agreement
at the same time, as required by the company,
that all his commissions thereafter earned
should be applied to his past indebtedness to the
company, of which they were ignorant. Magee
et al. v. The Manhattan Life Ins. Co.
418

The mere relation of principal and surety does
not require the voluntary disclosure of all the
material facts in all cases.
Ib.

The prompt payment of premiums, or of in-
terest annually in advance on a premium note,
where the policy by its terms requires such pay-
ments, is a condition precedent to a recovery on
the policy. Anderson et al. v. The St. Louis Mut.
Life Ins, Co.

458

Dividends may be first credited on the princi-

118

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Where a policy of marine insurance, by its
terms, provides that the risk is to terminate at
the place and at the time the voyage shall be
stopped, in consequence of ice or the closing of
navigation making a completion of the voyage
impossible, and allows three days for a dis-
charge of the cargo, the insured has the right to
make every effort to continue the voyage, after
stoppage, to a proper place to discharge the
cargo and lay up the boat for the winter, not-
withstanding it is apparent it could not be fin-
ished by reason of obstruction by ice. Sherwood
et al., exrs. v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co.

MARRIAGE.

496

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A married woman, living apart from her hus-
band and having a separate property of her own,
may be made liable for domestic work done for
herself and children. Conlin v. Cantrell. 128

The rule may now be considered settled wher-
ever the chancery jurisdiction exists, that a
married woman is to be regarded as a femme
sole in respect to her separate property; and
that she may dispose of it as she pleases, unless
her power of disposition is restricted or limited
by the deed or will creating her interest. Smith
v. Thompson et al.

141

Where the beneficiary in a trust deed is a
married woman, and there is no restriction upon
the mode in which she shall alienate the pro-
perty, only that the trustee shall join in the
deed, this limitation has no reference to a de-
vise, and her testamentary capacity in regard to
said property is complete.
Ib.

By virtue of the act of Congress regulating the
rights of property of married women, passed
April 10, 1869, a married woman may dispose of
her entire property, constituting her separate es-
tate, whether such property was acquired before
or after the passage of the act.
Ib.

A married woman may deal through her hus-
band as her agent, Crawford v. Everson et al. 168

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The master is not liable for the willful and
Ib.
malicious act of the servant.
It is in general sufficient to make the master
A married woman is incapable of making a liable that he gave his servant authority or
contract except in regard to her separate proper-made it his duty to act in respect to the business
ty, but in reference to that she is treated as a
femme sole; and if she gives a note, the law im-
plies, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
that she intends to bind her separate estate; but
the intention must be manifested from the con-
tract itself and cannot be shown by parol testi-
mony. The Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor et al.
218

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A married woman who signs a lease not for
the benefit of her separate estate or business,
and not containing a clause expressly charging
her separate estate, incurs no liability.
pere v. Ketchem et al.

Eausta-

377

in which he was engaged when the wrong was
committed, and that the act complained of was
done in the course of his employment.

Ib.

The relation of master and servant exists be-
tween the proprietor of a theatre and a star per-
former, and the former is liable for the negli
gence of the latter, whereby a spectator is in-
jured. Fox v. Dougherty.

261

Where the person who was the immediate
cause of an accident is a contractor engaged in
performing a special work, the relation of mas-
ter and servant does not exist, and the party
employing him is not liable, unless the work
contracted for is unlawful, or where an officer
or public body charged with a certain duty com-
mits its performance to another. King v. The
460
N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.

MECHANICS LIEN.

Whether bringing materials upon the prem-

Her contracts not for the benefit of her separises, and building a fence around the lot would
Ib. be sufficient to establish a lien, quære. Middle-
ate estate are void.
town Savings Bank v. Fellowes.

As to when property of a married woman is
liable for debts of her husband, see Muirhead v.
Aldridge.
480

As to charging separate estate, see NEGOTIA-
BLE PAPER.

As to release of dower, see DOWER.

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When the owner of land permits the con-
struction of a building on his land occupied by
another, and for another's benefit, the statute
permits a lien by a mechanic or person furn-
ishing material. Nellis v. Bellinger.
213

Property held by the public for specific public
uses, is held in trust for government purposes,
and cannot be taken by an individual for the
satisfaction of his private claim. Leonard v. Reyn
olds et al.
327
Under a mechanic's lien the owner is not
obliged to pay any greater sum than he agreed
to pay the contractor nor more than was un-
paid at the time of filing the lien. Before fore-
closure the claimant should be able to show the
inability of the owner to perform his promise
or put him in default by demanding perform-
ance. Miner v. Langan.

482

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Where the defendant after commencement of
the action pays a mortgage but not the costs,
and sets up such payment by answer, it cannot
be stricken out as sham. Wetmore v- Gale et
al.
408

Costs in such an action are discretionary, and
it is not certain that the plaintiff would be al-
lowed costs.
Ib.
An agreement made prior to the bond in suit,
although it refers to it, cannot control it. Smith
v. Smith.
422

A junior mortgagee may redeem from a prior
mortgage by paying the amount due thereon
and the costs. Dings v. Parshall.
459

The tender of the amount due thereon by
junior mortgagee for purposes of redemption is
equivalent, if properly made, to the payment of
the money, provided the money tendered is set
Ib.
apart and kept for such mortgagee.

The junior incumbrancer having paid the
debt is entitled to subrogation.
Ib.

A bona fide endorsee of a note acquires the
same right in a mortgage given to secure it as
the original payee would have had if no equi-
ties had existed against the note. Logan v.
Smith et al.

509

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Where a life estate is left to a widow, with
remainder to infants, she stands in a position of
trust towards such infants. And where she sells
a portion of the property (under a power in the
will) for a very low price, and did not apply the
proceeds on a mortgage on the property, but
allowed it to be foreclosed, the decree of fore-
closure is ineffectual to bar the equity of the
infant remaindermen, who were
defrauded
thereby, and they can maintain an original ac-
tion in equity to avoid it. McMurray et al. v.
MeMurray.
543

The purchaser, the mortgagee, having taken
it with full knowledge of all the facts, becomes
merely a mortgagee in possession, and is
bound to account to the infant remaindermen
for their share of what he realizes over and
above the mortgage.
Ib.

A re-sale of premises under a decree of fore-
closure will be directed upon equitable terms
when the first sale is made in such manner as
to prevent a fair competition, or where for any
cause it would be inequitable to permit the sale
to stand. Phillips et al. v. Cudlipp, impl'd 547

As to what is not a mortgage, see CONDI-
TIONAL SALES.

As to effect of sale in partition upon mort-
gage given by one co-tenant, see PARTITION.

As to mortgage on income and earnings of
railroad, see EXECUTION.

As to priority of simultaneous purchase mon-
ey mortgages, see PRIORITY.

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The legislature of a State has authority to
make a division of a municipal corporation, and
upon such terms and under such regulations as
it deems proper. Board of Co. Com'rs of Lara-
mie Eo. v. Board of Com'rs of Albany Co. et al.
194
Accordingly where a legislature divided one
county into three without providing for the pay-
ment of the debts of the old county, the pre-
sumption is that the old corporation is responsi-
ble for all the debts contracted before the sepa-
ration, and a bill in equity, on its behalf against
the new to compel contributions for their pro-
portion toward such indebtedness, cannot be
maintained.

Ib.

A municipal corporation is liable for injuries
arising from the negligent construction of a
work by one of its subordinate departments,
although it may not have the power to appoint,

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Section 104, of chap. 137, of the laws of 1870,
with reference to founding contracts on sealed
bids, considered and applied to a peculiar case.
Leverich v. The Mayor, &c., of N. Y.
328

A substantial compliance with the 53d section
of the charter of New York City, requiring
heads of departments to certify to the necessity
of the work, is sufficient to enable a party to
recover a just claim against the city, even
though there has not been a strict and formal
compliance with the statute.
Ib.

The Board of County Canvassers of New York
City are organized as a distinct board for special
service, and not as town officers, and have the
right to designate the papers in which their
proceedings shall be published. Harkens v. The
Mayor, &c., of N. Y.

345

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