In Pennsylvania a tenancy at will is construed to be a tenancy from year to year. Hey v. McGrath. 250
Where the sub-tenant purchases the title of the paramount landlord, he is invested with all the latter's rights, including the power to deter mine the original lease. Ib.
The provision of law that an agreement net to be performed within one year is void, does not apply to contracts for leasing lands. Reeder et al. v. Sayre, 253 Parol lease, how it affects tenant from year to year. Ib.
Tenant holding over; tenant sowed crop un- der an agreement; the landlord afterwards sold; tenant may reap. Ib.
Equity will relieve a lessee against forfeiture for breach of a covent to repair when the land- lord has by his conduct misled the lessee into supposing that the covenant would not be insis ted on. Hughes v. Metropolitan R. Co.
A parol lease vests in the lessee a present in terest in the premises from the time the lease is made. It is not an executory contract. Becar v. Fleres, exr., 421
Held, That a transmissible interest vested in the children upon the issuing of the policy, and that the child of the deceased child took by descent the interest of its parent, and was en- titled to the portion of the fund which the par- ent would have received if living. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer et al. 60
A life insurance policy, containing a clause providing it shall be void if the answers made to questions by the insured in his application are found to be false in any respect, is wholly avoided by a false answer whether it be material or not. The Etna Life Ins. Co. v. France. 82
In such case neither the court nor the jury can inquire into the materiality of either the question or answer. Ib.
A Court of Equity will reinstate the holder of a life insurance policy which has been forfeited by reason of non-payment of premiums, where payment of such premiums was impossible. Bird v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
It is not necessary that an applicant for life insurance should sign the application personal- ly; he may authorize any other person to sign for him. Stelwagen v. The Merchants Life Ins. Co.
Not stating in the application that the assured Fraud in executing lease will vitiate it al-had applied to another company for insurance though party injured had friends present who does not vitiate the policy. could read and who could examine lease. Ediek v. Dake.
Ib. A renewal of a life insurance policy, which had been forfeited by non-payment of premiums, As to damages for breach of covenants of procured by fraud, is void, and an offer of judg lease, see DAMAGES.
ment for the amount of the money received as premiums at the time of renewal, with interest
As to evidence in actions on lease, see EVI- and costs, after suit brought, is a sufficient ten- der to allow the company to disaffirm. v. The Equitable Life Ass. Soc. of U. S.
As to ejectment for non-payment of rent, see
Statements in the application for insurance in the declaration, or answers to the questions are As to leases by married women, see MARRIED either warranties or representations. If war-
As to release of sureties on lease, see PRINCI-
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. See EVIDENCE.
As to lien of mortgagor under a mortgage on the income and earnings of a railroad, see EXE-
A wife insured the life of her husband, the amount payable to herself if living, if not, to their children. She died before her husband, and one of the children before him, leaving a
ranties, then materiality, or want of materiality as to the risk, has nothing to do with the con- tract. The only question is, were they untrue, and if so, the policy is void. But if representa- tions, then to avoid the policy, they must be substantially and materially untrue, or made for the purpose of fraud. Buell v. The Conn. Mu- tual Life Ins. Co. 161
Whether or not a disease is "serious" within the meaning of a life insurance policy is a ques- tion of fact for the jury. Boos v. The World Mu- tual Ins. Co. 211
An agreement to issue a policy of life insur- ance is good, although the premium was paid by note, and the note was not paid at maturity, where the policy contains no condition avoiding policy unless the note is paid. Shaw v. The Re- public Life Ins. Co.
Where the administrator of the deceased had received the policy, but it was not in reality de- livered by the agent until after the death of the assured, and in ignorance of that event, no re- covery can be had unless a valid contract of in- surance existed between the insurer and the in-
sured before the latter's death, and the policy delivered in pursuance thereof. The Piedmont & Arlington Life Ins. Co, v. Ewing, Admr. 276
A life policy containing a clause making it void if the insured went south of certain limits without the consent of the company, is invalida- ted by the continued stay of the insured south of such limits, whither he went under consent of the company for a prescribed period. Evans v. The U.S. Life Ins. Co. 284
And where the company's officers, after such forfeiture, declined to receive further premiums unless 2 1-2 per cent. more was paid to cover the additional risk, and gave plaintiff's agent till next day to pay, agreeing to keep the policy in force and give credit for the premium and per centage, they have the right to abandon their agreement, and to refuse to receive the premium and percentage, and declare the policy forfeited. Ib.
That the insured was ill, and that it was highly inconvenient for him to return, affords no ground for relief, unless it appear that he was actually unable to travel, even by short stages and at great expense. Ib.
A false answer in an application for life insur- ance avoids the policy, whether the insurer knew its falsity or not, if the answer is a mate- rial one. Baker v. The Home Life Ins. Co. 366
When a party has a legal remedy, by action, against a town, a mandamus will not lie. Marsh v. Town of Little Valley. 48
What was once a claim against the County of New York, having become a liability of the city, the latter may be sued upon it and a mandamus Bank v. Board of Apportionment. will not lie. The People ex rel. Tenth National c4
If a true answer is given by the applicant to the company's agent who reduced the answer to writing, and in so doing modified or varied its A peremptory writ of mandamus, under Chap. meaning, the company is estopped from chal- 697, Laws of 1867, to compel Board of Assessors lenging its correctness. Ib. of New York City to assess damage to property, Authority to an agent to solicit applications caused by closing street, is proper upon their re for life insurance does not give him authority to fusal to act. The People ex rel. Carleton v. Board collect premiums. Howell v. Charter Oak Life of Assessors of New York City.
Where a bond is given by an agent, as a con- dition of his being retained as such agent, con- ditioned that he will pay over all moneys be longing to the company which he may receive, the sureties on such bond are not exonerated by the fact that the agent made a further agreement at the same time, as required by the company, that all his commissions thereafter earned should be applied to his past indebtedness to the company, of which they were ignorant. Magee et al. v. The Manhattan Life Ins. Co. 418
The mere relation of principal and surety does not require the voluntary disclosure of all the material facts in all cases. Ib.
The prompt payment of premiums, or of in- terest annually in advance on a premium note, where the policy by its terms requires such pay- ments, is a condition precedent to a recovery on the policy. Anderson et al. v. The St. Louis Mut. Life Ins, Co.
Dividends may be first credited on the princi-
Where a policy of marine insurance, by its terms, provides that the risk is to terminate at the place and at the time the voyage shall be stopped, in consequence of ice or the closing of navigation making a completion of the voyage impossible, and allows three days for a dis- charge of the cargo, the insured has the right to make every effort to continue the voyage, after stoppage, to a proper place to discharge the cargo and lay up the boat for the winter, not- withstanding it is apparent it could not be fin- ished by reason of obstruction by ice. Sherwood et al., exrs. v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co.
A married woman, living apart from her hus- band and having a separate property of her own, may be made liable for domestic work done for herself and children. Conlin v. Cantrell. 128
The rule may now be considered settled wher- ever the chancery jurisdiction exists, that a married woman is to be regarded as a femme sole in respect to her separate property; and that she may dispose of it as she pleases, unless her power of disposition is restricted or limited by the deed or will creating her interest. Smith v. Thompson et al.
Where the beneficiary in a trust deed is a married woman, and there is no restriction upon the mode in which she shall alienate the pro- perty, only that the trustee shall join in the deed, this limitation has no reference to a de- vise, and her testamentary capacity in regard to said property is complete. Ib.
By virtue of the act of Congress regulating the rights of property of married women, passed April 10, 1869, a married woman may dispose of her entire property, constituting her separate es- tate, whether such property was acquired before or after the passage of the act. Ib.
A married woman may deal through her hus- band as her agent, Crawford v. Everson et al. 168
The master is not liable for the willful and Ib. malicious act of the servant. It is in general sufficient to make the master A married woman is incapable of making a liable that he gave his servant authority or contract except in regard to her separate proper-made it his duty to act in respect to the business ty, but in reference to that she is treated as a femme sole; and if she gives a note, the law im- plies, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that she intends to bind her separate estate; but the intention must be manifested from the con- tract itself and cannot be shown by parol testi- mony. The Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor et al. 218
A married woman who signs a lease not for the benefit of her separate estate or business, and not containing a clause expressly charging her separate estate, incurs no liability. pere v. Ketchem et al.
in which he was engaged when the wrong was committed, and that the act complained of was done in the course of his employment.
The relation of master and servant exists be- tween the proprietor of a theatre and a star per- former, and the former is liable for the negli gence of the latter, whereby a spectator is in- jured. Fox v. Dougherty.
Where the person who was the immediate cause of an accident is a contractor engaged in performing a special work, the relation of mas- ter and servant does not exist, and the party employing him is not liable, unless the work contracted for is unlawful, or where an officer or public body charged with a certain duty com- mits its performance to another. King v. The 460 N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.
Whether bringing materials upon the prem-
Her contracts not for the benefit of her separises, and building a fence around the lot would Ib. be sufficient to establish a lien, quære. Middle- ate estate are void. town Savings Bank v. Fellowes.
As to when property of a married woman is liable for debts of her husband, see Muirhead v. Aldridge. 480
As to charging separate estate, see NEGOTIA- BLE PAPER.
As to release of dower, see DOWER.
When the owner of land permits the con- struction of a building on his land occupied by another, and for another's benefit, the statute permits a lien by a mechanic or person furn- ishing material. Nellis v. Bellinger. 213
Property held by the public for specific public uses, is held in trust for government purposes, and cannot be taken by an individual for the satisfaction of his private claim. Leonard v. Reyn olds et al. 327 Under a mechanic's lien the owner is not obliged to pay any greater sum than he agreed to pay the contractor nor more than was un- paid at the time of filing the lien. Before fore- closure the claimant should be able to show the inability of the owner to perform his promise or put him in default by demanding perform- ance. Miner v. Langan.
Where the defendant after commencement of the action pays a mortgage but not the costs, and sets up such payment by answer, it cannot be stricken out as sham. Wetmore v- Gale et al. 408
Costs in such an action are discretionary, and it is not certain that the plaintiff would be al- lowed costs. Ib. An agreement made prior to the bond in suit, although it refers to it, cannot control it. Smith v. Smith. 422
A junior mortgagee may redeem from a prior mortgage by paying the amount due thereon and the costs. Dings v. Parshall. 459
The tender of the amount due thereon by junior mortgagee for purposes of redemption is equivalent, if properly made, to the payment of the money, provided the money tendered is set Ib. apart and kept for such mortgagee.
The junior incumbrancer having paid the debt is entitled to subrogation. Ib.
A bona fide endorsee of a note acquires the same right in a mortgage given to secure it as the original payee would have had if no equi- ties had existed against the note. Logan v. Smith et al.
Where a life estate is left to a widow, with remainder to infants, she stands in a position of trust towards such infants. And where she sells a portion of the property (under a power in the will) for a very low price, and did not apply the proceeds on a mortgage on the property, but allowed it to be foreclosed, the decree of fore- closure is ineffectual to bar the equity of the infant remaindermen, who were defrauded thereby, and they can maintain an original ac- tion in equity to avoid it. McMurray et al. v. MeMurray. 543
The purchaser, the mortgagee, having taken it with full knowledge of all the facts, becomes merely a mortgagee in possession, and is bound to account to the infant remaindermen for their share of what he realizes over and above the mortgage. Ib.
A re-sale of premises under a decree of fore- closure will be directed upon equitable terms when the first sale is made in such manner as to prevent a fair competition, or where for any cause it would be inequitable to permit the sale to stand. Phillips et al. v. Cudlipp, impl'd 547
As to what is not a mortgage, see CONDI- TIONAL SALES.
As to effect of sale in partition upon mort- gage given by one co-tenant, see PARTITION.
As to mortgage on income and earnings of railroad, see EXECUTION.
As to priority of simultaneous purchase mon- ey mortgages, see PRIORITY.
The legislature of a State has authority to make a division of a municipal corporation, and upon such terms and under such regulations as it deems proper. Board of Co. Com'rs of Lara- mie Eo. v. Board of Com'rs of Albany Co. et al. 194 Accordingly where a legislature divided one county into three without providing for the pay- ment of the debts of the old county, the pre- sumption is that the old corporation is responsi- ble for all the debts contracted before the sepa- ration, and a bill in equity, on its behalf against the new to compel contributions for their pro- portion toward such indebtedness, cannot be maintained.
A municipal corporation is liable for injuries arising from the negligent construction of a work by one of its subordinate departments, although it may not have the power to appoint,
Section 104, of chap. 137, of the laws of 1870, with reference to founding contracts on sealed bids, considered and applied to a peculiar case. Leverich v. The Mayor, &c., of N. Y. 328
A substantial compliance with the 53d section of the charter of New York City, requiring heads of departments to certify to the necessity of the work, is sufficient to enable a party to recover a just claim against the city, even though there has not been a strict and formal compliance with the statute. Ib.
The Board of County Canvassers of New York City are organized as a distinct board for special service, and not as town officers, and have the right to designate the papers in which their proceedings shall be published. Harkens v. The Mayor, &c., of N. Y.
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