Mr. W. said, it was not necessary for him to go into the argument which induced the Convention to fix the Treaty-making power; it need only be mentioned that they knew how and where that power was exercised in Great Britain; and, in order to avert the difficulties which had arisen there, the Convention vested the power with the PRESIDENT and Senate; and, to guard against undue influence, directed that two-thirds of the Senators present should concur with the PRESIDENT. The Convention had many difficulties to surmount in this article; they had to do away the equal power the small States shared, under the Confederation, with the large States. But, to do away the discordant interests of the different States and to give the small States satisfaction, agreed that all the States should be equally represented in the Senate. In the Treaty-making power each State hath an equal voice. To extend it further, for another check, without the consent of the smaller States, would be doing away, in part, that power which the small States had retained.

He read the observations of one of the Judges of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, when debating on the merits of the Constitution in the Convention held in that State, to prove that Treaties were considered to be paramount to any law. Among the several psssages from the debates of the Convention of New York, Mr. W. read the following proposed amendment by Mr. Lansing, who was a member of the Convention that formed the Constitution of the United States, whose abilities and candor were not doubted by any who knew him:

66

Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that no Treaty ought to operate so as to alter the Constitution of any State; nor ought any Commercial Treaty to operate so as to abrogate any law of the United States."

He believed that the amendments proposed in the Virginia Convention, arose from their considering that there was no check in that House: the contrary supposition, he said, would be like rowing a boat one way and looking another.

[H. of R

were therefore impliedly bound to carry it into effect.

His colleague denied that any danger lay in the popular part of the Government; he thought differently. To say there was more danger to be apprehended from the Executive than the Legislative branch of Government was unsound doctrine. He should enlarge on this subject when the Treaty came before the House, and he trusted he should clearly show that the greatest danger of abuse lay in that House. Have there not bills originated in this House which have caused the expenditure of much money to very little purpose? Is there not more responsibility in one man than in large bodies? and was not the member from Virginia [Mr. MADISON] of this opinion, as I have before stated?

Where have (said Mr. W.) the acts originated that have caused so much money to be expended, by reason of which the report of the Committee of Ways and Means states the necessity of borrowing such large sums to meet the necessary demands-the laying additional taxes and duties? Did these acts originate with the Executive? No. Where then? In this House. All money bills must originate in this House, being so directed by the Constitution.

Though his colleague represented Great Britain as being in chains, yet he was drawing precedents from their Government. At first, he thought he had fallen in love with the Government, but he afterwards found his mistake. In that Government, said Mr. W., one precedent creates another, and they soon accumulate and form laws; but his friend was drawing precedents from that nation to support the checks, which Mr. GILES said, had Government of the United States. He feared, if been for six years completely routed from the the gentlemen were permitted to take their course,

we should soon have a curious sort of Constitution.

But, to conclude, the ruin or prosperity of the nation depended much on the present Government. He said, if the people flourish and are happy; if they are industrious and at peace, they His colleagues read extracts from the Journals will not complain of their Government. If this to prove that the PRESIDENT had laid before that be the case, it will scarcely be admitted that the House instructions which he had given his Min-checks in the Government have been completely isters employed on the Treaty business. He be- routed for these six years; if they were, however, lieved, when much money was likely to be want- he thought the nation could not be better than ed, it was prudent and right to do so. It was as happy. if he asked that House whether it would agree to a proposed negotiation or declare war-as if he had said, "I cannot unlock your Treasury; which way would you have me act?" It was inconsistent to say that he had diminished his power by asking advice. Books, he said, might be produced without number; but nothing could be brought to justify the breaking of a contract constitutionally made. It has become the law of the land. The House has, indeed, the physical power to refuse to appropriate to carry such a Treaty into effect; but the Constitution meant that what was done by one branch of the Legislature should be confirmed by the others, except the act was unconstitutional. If a Treaty was Constitutional, they 4th CoN.-22

Mr. MILLEDGE observed, that as the hour of adjournment was drawing near, he would not detain the Committee long. The length of the debates, on both sides of the question, had left him little room for observation; but as a Constitutional question had been involved in the resolution before the Committee, and as all Constitutional questions were important in their nature, he could not think of giving a silent vote. He perfectly agreed with the gentleman who had spoken last, from the State of Connecticut, that we ought not to put our foot from off the Constitution, and on that, he said, he would stand. Nor did he think it necessary to resort to this or that Government to know their usages, or to know what was said

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Treaty with Great Britain.

[MARCH, 1796.

in this or that State, or what was written by this partment, and no instrument they can make can or that man-but, according to the common and operate the repeal of a law, the same force being most obvious meaning of words contained in the required for a repeal as to enact. The genConstitution, to draw our conclusion. That part tleman from Rhode Island observed, that if the of the Constitution which had been often men-House of Representatives was to have a control tioned, he begged that he might be permitted to over Treaties, small States might be injured in read-that all Treaties made by the authority of their commerce, because the representation on that the United States should be the supreme law of floor was unequal. Mr. M. observed, that though the land. He asked, what was the authority of his State was not a small State, yet it was small the United States? Powers derived from the in representation, but he apprehended no danger. Constitution. What are these powers? Legisla- Under the Articles of Confederation, it was a Gotive, Executive, and Judicial. The better to un- vernment of States; under the present Governderstand these, let us see, said he, in what order ment, it was a Government of departments, of they present themselves to us. In the Constitu- checks. He said, the local interest of one State tion we find that in the very first section all Le- was so blended with another that the security of gislative powers herein granted shall be vested in the one became the security of the whole, founda Congress of the United States, which shall con-ed on a proportion of sovereignty surrendered by sist of a Senate and House of Representatives. each to the whole, and each drawing from the This, then, is the Legislative power, the statute- whole its proportion of security. Let us then, making power, the ordaining power, the enacting said he, examine the compact made by each with power, or any other name by which it may be the whole on the score of commerce. Here he called. Now, then, said he, let us see the extent read part of the 9th section: No tax or duty shall of this power. In the 8th section, Congress shall be laid on articles exported from any State; no have power to make all laws. It would be neces- preference shall be given by any regulation of sary, he said, to attend to the monosyllable all. If commerce or revenue to the ports of one State the PRESIDENT and two-thirds of the Senate have over those of another. He said, the negotiators a right to make a law, do Congress make all laws? of the Treaty, in the 12th article, had laid a proCertainly not. hibition on the exportation of cotton to any part of the world, except in British vessels. Cotton, the growth of our own soil, an important staple in the two Southern States, particularly in the one he had the honor to represent. But it is said, and so we find it, that this article is suspended, and open to further negotiation. He called on the Committee for any member to deny that the principle did not still exist. He said, then, if a principle still exists in that Treaty which militates with a fundamental principle, a principle in the Constitution, he left to the Committee, which ought to yield. Was this principle to prevail, it would destroy a vital part of the Constitution, and injure the agriculture of the States. He called on that gentleman to beware of admitting such a principle; for, if once allowed, it would extend not only to the cotton of Georgia, but to the flaxseed of Rhode Island, the flour of Pennsylvania, and the tobacco of Virginia.

The Constitution being his guide, he felt supported by a just confidence in his opinion; but he would not say but he might be mistaken, and was unwilling to commit himself. It was his opinion, then, that Treaties ought to be bottomed on a law before they can have any binding influence. To elucidate this, he said, it would be necessary to read the whole of the clause: Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, (which are, he said, seventeen in number, particularly expressed,) and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. Here, again, he observed, we find the monosyllable all. What does it import? Every one-the whole. Of what? Of all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. What is the PRESIDENT and two-thirds of the Senate? The Treaty-making department. Therefore, being a department, whatever powers are vested in them by the Constitution cannot be carried into execution but by a law, otherwise the clause in the Constitution means nothing. What is a law? The will of the people made known. Where is that will to be found? In the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled. Are the PRESIDENT and two-thirds of the Senate Congress? No; therefore they cannot make a law.

The gentleman from New Hampshire asked, what do the PRESIDENT and two-thirds of the Sen ate operate upon? I answer, with him, on Treaties; but in their nature they are only a depart ment, and whatever a department does cannot, he repeated, be carried into execution but by a law. The Treaty-making power is an intermediate de

Mr. M. concluded by observing, that, from all he had said, it was to be understood that the powers of legislation were only with Congress, and that the House of Representatives could not, on the subject before them, legislate without information. Before he sat down, he could not help observing that it was somewhat strange that the first Treaty negotiated under the present Government with an European nation, should produce such a contrariety of sentiment on the meaning of the Constitution, and that he was reminded by this circumstance of the pertinent words of a celebrated writer:

"The works of human invention are progressive, and are not completed but by degrees. At the last improvement we are apt to sit down satisfied, and vainly imagine that we have accomplished the end we have proposed, but time soon unravels the fine-spun system, and we find ourselves ob

liged to interweave fresh materials to repair the disordered texture."

[H. OF R.

cerned should be submitted to their consideration, before it was carried into effect.

A great deal, he observed, had been said upon this subject, some things well said, and a good deal that might have been as well unsaid, for any good effect they were likely to produce. He was sorry to hear what had fallen from a gentleman from Rhode Island with respect to the interests of small States. He said he was himself a Representative of a small State, and he believed his constituents were well satisfied with the present distribution of power, and did not wish that of the PRESIDENT or Senate to be increased.

Mr. KITCHELL observed, that he could not think of giving a silent vote on so important a question as this had become; but he should not go into an argumentative discussion on the subject, nor should he inquire into the opinions held in different Conventions at the adoption of the Constitution, or refer to Great Britain for precedents. He would look at the Constitution alone, and see what were the powers given to the different branches of Government. When it says that such and such powers are vested in Congress, and such in the Executive, he would abide by that decision. Where He did not think what fell from his colleague, that instrument says Congress shall lay and col- when he said gentlemen wished to amuse the peolect taxes, regulate commerce with foreign na-ple with the cry of liberty, liberty, and spoke of tions, establish an uniform rule of naturalization, the groans of three or four hundred thousand provide for the common defence, &c., and that the slaves assailing his years, was meant as a reflecExecutive shall have power, by and with the con- tion upon any gentleman in that House who might sent of two-thirds of the Senate, to make Trea- hold slaves; but an earnest wish that the people at ties, appoint Ambassadors, &c., the directions of large might never bend their necks to slavery. the Constitution must be abided by.

He would inquire what Treaties could be entered into by the PRESIDENT and Senate, without infringing upon the powers placed in Congress? He believed Treaties of Peace, of Amity, and Friendship, could be made by them. If this could be done, he said, those were the powers meant to be vested in the PRESIDENT and Senate, and not that Treaties should embrace objects which are expressly appointed to the management of Congress. In this view, the PRESIDENT and Senate would not have the power to influence that House in their proceedings; but commercial or other Treaties which embraced objects the regulation of which was placed in Congress, must be laid before them for the purpose of their passing or refusing to pass laws to carry them into effect, in the same way as Treaties with the Indians had been laid before them.

He did not think the question of itself before the House important, as it related to the production of papers, but only as it involved in it an important principle, viz: that when Treaties were made by the PRESIDENT and Senate, and presented to that House, they had nothing to do but appropriate money to carry them into effect. It was true gentlemen had seemed willing to allow them what they called discretion; but it was such a sort of discretion as a criminal might be said to have, who was told he might choose this or that posture of suffering, but that he must die.

He did not think the subject of the Treaty at all before the House. He should give his vote for the papers; not so much on account of their being of great importance in themselves, but in order to repel the doctrine, that they had no right to discuss the merits of any Treaty whatever.

MARCH 22.-In Committee of the Whole on Mr. LIVINGSTON's resolution :

Mr. Corr said, the attention of the Committee was doubtless fatigued with the subject before it; to those gentlemen who had already delivered their sentiments upon the occasion, he need not make any apology; and to those who had not done so, he would assure them that he would not occupy much of their time.

Most of the gentlemen who had gone before him, he observed, had regretted that the debate had taken the turn it had, but he was happy it had taken such a turn. It appeared to him, that the motion was intended as a stepping-stone to a violation of the rights of the other branches of the Government by that House. It became him when he made a declaration of this kind to say, that he did not impute other than pure motives to any member of that House. He believed the general wish was to discover the true sense of the Constitution; yet it was not extraordinary if in doing this men were actuated by the sentiments which they had long been in the habit of considering as well-founded, to lean to that construction which most favored their favorite opinions. He had no idea that any gentleman meant to make inroads on the Constitution; but it was his opinion that if the doctrines now insisted upon prevailed, they would have that effect.

It had been said that the PRESIDENT and Senate were equally the Representatives of the people with that House. He would inquire how they became so? The Constitution has appointed that Representatives shall be chosen by the people in He was happy, for two reasons, that the true proportion to their population. Were the Senate ground of the present motion was made to appear. so chosen? No. The people have no vote at all Because, if the resolution had passed without disin choosing them. Are they amenable to the peo-cussion, the motives which led to it would not ple for their conduct? No. Therefore, in no shape can they be called the Representatives of the people. The Senate, he said, represented the several State Legislatures, and that House the people at large. He was sure, therefore, that every thing in which the interests of the people at large were con

have been seen; and because he wished the question of what were the powers of that House, with respect to Treaty-making, to be discussed, independent of the Treaty, which was likely soon to come before them. They stood now on the pure ground of an abstract Constitutional question.

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Treaty with Great Britain.

[MARCH, 1796.

Some obscurity, Mr. C. thought, had arisen from not distinguishing the application of arguments to the different principles on which the resolution had been advocated, which he should endeavor to avoid. He considered the Treaty-mak-nies which had been spread throughout the Union ing power as absolutely vested in the PRESIDENT and Senate; still, that when Legislative acts were necessary to carry a Treaty into effect, the Legislature were not without discretion in the passing of them; if the Legislature had a hand in making Treaties, there could be no question of the propriety of calling for papers; he should then, in the first place, examine the propriety of calling for papers, taking for granted that the Legislature had no hand in making Treaties.

obligation did not hold. It appeared to him that a Treaty might possibly be of so ruinous a nature, as to justify the refusing to carry it into effect. Nay, he would say, that if half the lies and calumwith respect to the late Treaty with Great Britain were true; if the negotiator had been bribed; if he had given up the rights of his country; if their liberty and independence had been sacrificed; if the PRESIDENT and Senate had been bribed by British gold; if he had any idea of that kind, he would not agree to carry the Treaty into effect: nor should he conceive the national faith bound by such an instrument; no matter what grounds were taken to justify the refusal, whether Constitutional or Revolutionary.

ing for papers. Why then, call for them? Gentlemen talked about impeachment? They might impeach without papers. But, did they want to bring forward an impeachment? No such thing; it was only to cover the real drift of the motion that this was mentioned.

If they were to consider the power by which a Treaty was made, there would be found two na- If these principles were just, he said, it would be tions concerned, whose consent would be also ne- allowed that that House had a discretionary powcessary to repeal it. But were there no other ways er with respect to appropriating to carry a Treaty of cancelling a Treaty? There were certainly into effect, though it had nothing to do with makways of breaking a Treaty. There were circum-ing it. No cause, he said, had been shown for callstances in which the breaking of a Treaty would be justifiable. For instance, if, before a Treaty was carried into effect, there was such a change of circumstances as to make it necessary to declare war; could they not discuss the subject, whether it were more advisable to carry into effect the Treaty, and keep at peace, or break it and declare war? If a question of this kind came up, there could be no impropriety in looking into it; not with an idea of having any concern in making the Treaty, but because such alterations had taken place in the state of affairs, as to make it necessary to discuss the propriety of going to war.

There was another point of view in which that House had a check on Treaties. Granting that a Treaty is completely made, the subject of appropriation must come before them. Gentlemen had been understood to say, that no discretion could be exercised in appropriating the necessary money for carrying a Treaty into effect. But he was of a different opinion; he believed, that though they had nothing to do with the making of Treaties, yet when they were called upon to appropriate, they must exercise their discretion. It was true, that in general when Treaties were made, it would be the duty of that House to carry them in to effect, in the same way as they found it their duty to carry into effect existing laws; but he said, there were justifiable grounds of refusing to appropriate money to carry into effect both laws and Treaties.

Mr. C. referred to the case of appropriations for the army. Suppose, said he, an army was raised for four years; at the end of two years a fresh appropriation is requisite to support it; but the Legislature has a discretion in doing this, or where was the use of the Constitutional regulation of confining appropriations to two years? He considered. that there was some analogy between such cases of appropriation, and those requisite for Treaties. When a Treaty is made, the nation is bound by it, and its organ has an obligation upon it to carry it into effect. It might, in general, be said that there was an absolute obligation; but still there were particular cases in which that

Did any gentleman think there was sufficient evil in the late Treaty with Great Britain to authorize them in refusing to carry it into effect? It appeared to him, that that House had a right to call for any papers which might throw light on their deliberations. But they must also consider, that there was a discretion to be used by the Executive in giving up papers in his hands. When there are papers in his hands which that House had real occasion for, it was important that they should be brought forward; but, he said, as long as a proper confidence subsisted between the two branches of the Government, if that House asked for papers which the PRESIDENT thought it improper to send them, he would decline doing it. But it is not contended, that the papers which are the object of the present resolution will be of any real use to the House. The gentleman who brought forward the motion had read them through, and the most that he said on the subject was, that the negotiator had not complied with some of the first instructions which were given to him. Another ground of calling for the papers, which was to him a pleasing ground, was that of publicity; for he fully agreed with the gentleman from Georgia, that the more public Governmental proceedings could with propriety be made, the better; but that House had not the right to direct the PRESIDENT on that head, they ought rather to leave it to him to publish the papers. or not, as he pleased; for, if they considered the PRESIDENT as attentive at all times to the duties of his office, it would be arrogancy in that House to attempt to influence him in that particular.

But the main point in dispute was the force and effect of the Treaty-making power. What were the powers and privileges of the House on the subject? In pursuing this inquiry, he was pleased with the remark of the gentleman from Georgia,