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tract of land not held in severalty must therefore be subject to but one of the several cotenancies already named. It may be held by a mixed cotenancy, in which may be united all the common law cotenancies. Thus, if an estate be granted to A, B, and C and wife, it vests in them as jointtenants-A having one moiety, B another, and C and wife the other. But as between C and his wife, their moiety is by them held as tenants by entireties. If, however, A should convey his moiety to D, then the estate would be held as follows: by D as a tenant in common, by B as a joint-tenant, and by C and wife as tenants by entireties. So lands conveyed to a husband and wife may be the separate property of the husband so far as his separate estate contributed to their purchase, the separate property of the wife to the extent of the funds furnished by her, and the common property of both so far as they were paid for out of the community assets. A cotenancy may also be either imperfect or redundant: imperfect when it exists without some of the incidents usually connected with like tenancies, as in case of a joint-tenancy without the right of survivorship;' redundant when it possesses some attribute not ordinarily possessed by like tenancies, as in case of a tenancy in common to which the right of survivorship is attached.2
Doe v. Abey, 1 Maule & S., 428.
* Shanks v. Chambless, Walker, Miss., 249.
C. & P.-5
Definitions by Littleton and Blackstone, § 9.
Definitions by Kent and Preston, § 10.
Properties, § 11.
Survivorship, § 12
Survivorship in Equity, § 13.
Survivorship is Paramount to Dower and Curtesy, § 14.
Who may be Joint-Tenants, § 15.
What may be held in Joint-Tenancy, § 16.
Created by Joint Purchase, § 17.
Presumption in regard to Creation, § 18.
Presumption when Property is acquired in Trade, § 19.
Creating by Devise or Bequest, § 23.
Cases where Devises have been regarded as Joint, § 24.
Creation by Deed to Woman and her Children, § 26.
Executory Settlements, § 27.
Devise or Bequest in Joint-Tenancy does not Lapse on Death of one, § 28.
.Severance, means of, § 29.
Severance by act of either Cotenant, § 30.
Severance by Mutual Agreement, § 31.
Severance by a Course of Dealing, § 32.
Severance by Process against a Tenant, § 33.
Severance by one may leave the others Joint-Tenants, $ 34.
JOINT-TENANCY IN THE UNITED STATES.
Statutes Limiting or Abolishing, § 35.
Statutes Retroactive, § 36.
Creation, notwithstanding Statutes, § 37.
Not forbidden by Law, § 38.
Dower, where Survivorship is Abolished, $ 39.
Lapsing of Legacies and Devises, § 40.
To what kinds of Property Joint-Tenancy may still apply, § 41.
Mortgages, § 42.
Co-Trustees under American Statutes, § 43.
Co-Trustees are Joint-Tenants at Common Law, § 44.
Co-Trustees, Estate of, vests in those who Accept, § 45.
89. Definitions by Littleton and Blackstone.-The dis-, tinguishing characteristics of an estate in joint-tenancy are, no doubt, well understood; but, if we may judge from frequent attempts resulting in failures of like frequency, great difficulty has been experienced in embodying those characteristics in any single definition. Both Littleton and Blackstone content themselves by giving an instance or illustration of this estate. Neither attempts any precise or formal definition. The former says: "Joyntenants are, as if a man be seized of certaine lands or tenements, &c., and enfeoffeth two, three, or four, or more, to have and to hold to them for terme of there lives, or. for terme of another's life, by force of which feoffment or lease they are seized, these are joyntenants." According to Blackstone, "An estate in joint tenancy is where lands or tenements are granted to two or more persons to hold in fee-simple, fee-tail, for life, for years, or at will."2 Each of these illustrations shows rather how a joint-tenancy may be created, than what its peculiar incidents are after its creation. The words of Littleton may be misprinted. If not, his definition is more objectionable than Blackstone's, because it involves the idea that joint-tenancies cannot be of estates in fee, but are confined to estates for life. Both illustrations are alike faulty in implying that a joint-tenancy must necessarily be created by a feoffment or grant, and that it does not include personal property. They are also liable to the further objeetion of assuming that a grant to two or more is the chief feature of joint-tenancy, whereas a tenancy by entirety was also created by a grant to two (they being husband and wife); and a tenancy in common arose from a grant to two or more, when the grantor inserted words indicating an intent to create a several instead of a joint estate. Mr. Cruise, in treating of joint-tenancy, avoids this last objection when he states that "where lands are granted to two or more persons, to hold to them and their heirs, or for term of their lives, or for term of another's life, without any restrictive, exclusive, or explanatory words, all the persons named in such instrument
Litt. sec. 277.
2 Bl. Comm. 180.
See note Co. Litt. 180 a.
to whom the lands are so given, take a joint estate, and are called joint-tenants."1
10. Definitions by Kent and Preston.-"Joint-tenants," according to the definition of Chancellor Kent, "are persons who own lands by a joint title, created expressly by one and the same deed or will. They hold uniformly by purchase." This definition has the vice of implying that joint-tenancy does not apply to chattels, and that it could not exist in title by prescription. A better definition than either of those heretofore alluded to is that of Mr. Preston, viz., "Jointtenancy is when several persons have any subject of property jointly between them, in equal shares, by purchase." This definition, as well as that of Chancellor Kent, is too broad, in this, that it embraces tenancy by entireties, as well as joint-tenancy. It is doubtful, too, whether joint-tenants necessarily hold in equal shares. Thus, if A, B and C be joint-tenants, and C alienate one-half of his moiety to D, A, B and C remain joint-tenants, though the interest of C is no longer equal to that of A or B. Perhaps, however, after such alienation, the estate would be held as follows: one-half by A, B and C as joint-tenants; one-third by A and B as jointtenants; and one-sixth by D as a tenant in common. Viewed in this light, the alienation would create two joint-tenancies, in one of which the interests of the cotenants A and B would be equal, and in the other the interests of the cotenants A, B and C would also be equal; and thus the correctness of this feature of Mr. Preston's definition would be established. If this definition were modified so as to exclude tenancies by entireties, and by inserting two or more in the place of "several," we should feel inclined to accept it as correct. It would then stand as follows: "Joint-tenancy is when two or more persons, not being husband and wife at the date of its acquisition, have any subject of property jointly between them in equal shares by purchase."
2 Greenl. Cruise, 364.
4 Kent's Comm. 357.
31 Preston on Estates, 136.
For discussion of difference between joint tenancy and tenancy by entireties, see 66 64 and 71.
11. Properties of a Joint-Tenancy.-"The properties of a joint estate are derived from its unity, which is fourfold: the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of time, and the unity of possession; or, in other words, joint-tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession." All these properties usually belong to a joint-tenancy, but it must not be inferred that all are indispensable. Joint-tenants may have different estates. Thus, two persons may have an estate in joint-tenancy for their lives, and yet have several inheritances; and a fee may be limited by the same conveyance to two persons and to the heirs of one of them.2 Lord Coke says: "If
a rent-charge be granted to A and B, to have and to hold to
12 Bl. Comm. 180; 4 Dane's Ab. 758.
"For instances of joint-tenants having different estates, see 4 Kent Comm. 357; note to 2 Bl. Comm. 181; Co. Litt. 184 a; Crary v. Willis, 2 P. Wms. 530; Cook v. Cook, 2 Vern. 545.
3 Co. Litt. 180 b.
* On this subject generally, consult 4 Kent Comm. 358; Schouler on Personal Property, 192.
5 Stratton v. Besi, 2 Bro. 240. A testator devised a tract of land to his brother's two eldest sons, "in case of their coming to Canada and claiming the same." The Court held that each devisee had his entire lifetime in which to come and claim his estate; that if they came separately, their estates must vest in them at different dates,