« ForrigeFortsett »
nually include such estimates in his esti- | diers, incorporated under said act, in and mates for his department. And no moneys over said territory." shall, after the first day of April, 1875, be drawn from the Treasury for the use of said home, except in pursuance of quarterly estimates, and upon quarterly requisitions by the managers thereof upon the Secretary of War, based upon such quarterly estimates, for the support of said home, for not more than three months next succeeding such requisition. And the managers of said home shall, at the commencement of each quarter of the year, render the Secretary of War an account of all their receipts and expenditures for the quarter immediately preceding, with vouchers for such expen-peace before whom he was tried. Upon the ditures; and all such accounts and vouchers hearing the court made an order discharging shall be authenticated by the officers of said appellee. 82 Fed. Rep. 304. The state appealed home thereunto duly appointed by said man- from that order to the circuit court of apagers, and audited and allowed as required peals for the sixth circuit, where it was af-[281) by law for the general appropriations and firmed (58 U. S. App. 431, 87 Fed. Rep. expenditures of the War Department." 453), and the state then appealed to this court.
Upon these facts the appellee was convicted by the magistrate before whom he was tried, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $50, and to be imprisoned until such fine was paid. He refused to pay the fine, and applied to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio, western division, for a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the state tribunal before which he was tried had no jurisdiction to try him. The writ was granted and the constable made return thereto, setting up that he held appellee under the mittimus from the justice of the
By the act (chapter 902) approved August 4, 1886 (24 Stat. at L. 222, at 251), it was also provided that "hereafter the estimates for the support of the Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers shall be submitted by items." Also by the act (chapter 1069) approved October 2, 1888 (25 Stat. at L. 505, at 543), it was "Provided further, That it shall be the duty of the managers of said home, on or before the first day of October in each year to furnish to the Secretary of War estimates, in detail, for the support of said home for the fiscal year commencing on the first day of July thereafter, and the Secretary of War shall annually include such estimates in his estimates for his department." Also by the act (chapter 420) approved June 11, 1896 (29 Stat. at L. 413, at 445), an appropriation was made for the support of the home at Dayton, Ohio, and for "the cost of all articles purchased for the regular ration, their freight, preparation, and serving."
Messrs. Charles H. Bosler and Otto J.
Messrs. Judson Harmon and D. W. Bow-
*Mr. Justice Peckham, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court:
The act of the legislature of the state of Ohio, passed May 16, 1868, ceding jurisdiction to the United States, if it had remained in force would have prevented the state of ficials from taking jurisdiction in this case. Congress, however, by the act of January 21, 1871, ceded back and relinquished the jurisdiction that had been granted, and provided that it would claim or exercise no jurisdicti n thereafter, except as therein mentioned.
The material portions of the acts of March 3, 1865, and March 21, 1866, have been enacted in the Revised Statutes of the United States, being sections 4825 to 4837, both inclusive.
On the third of April, 1867, the legislature of the state of Ohio passed an act ceding jurisdiction to the United States over the lands and their appurtenances within the state of Ohio, which might be acquired by donation or purchase by the managers of the National Asylum for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers within the state of Ohio, for the uses and purposes of the asylum.
By the act, chapter 24, approved January 21, 1871 (16 Stat. at L. 399), Congress ceded back to the state of Ohio jurisdiction over the place named, and relinquished such jurisdiction on the part of the United States, and the act contained the following: "And the United States shall claim or exercise no jurisdiction over said place after the passage of this act: Provided, That nothing contained in this act shall be construed to impair the powers and rights heretofore conferred upon the board of managers of the National Asylum for Disabled Volunteer Sol
If we assume, what the state court decided, that the provisions of the state statute relating to the sale of oleomargarine were intended to apply to and cover the soldiers' home, the question then arises whether the state had the power to legislate so as to control the governor of the home, acting under the direction of the board of managers and by the authority of Congress, in regard to the internal administration of the affairs of the home, and in respect to the conditions upon which an article of food might be provided by the governor under such directions and authority.
The home is a Federal creation, and is under the direct and sole jurisdiction of Congress. The board of managers have certain powers granted them (Rev. Stat. § 4825), and among other things to make by-laws, rules, and regulations not inconsistent with law for carrying on the business and government of the home..
home are "officers and soldiers who served
Under the statutes above cited, in which it is provided that the board of managers shall furnish to the Secretary of War, in each year,
estimates, in detail, for the support of the
From these facts the inference is plain This claim might be conceded and still the that oleomargarine had been included in the conviction of the appellee would be invalid, detailed estimates for rations to be furnished because we find in this record the authority the inmates, and that the appropriation for of the United States for the act of the govrations included oleomargarine as part there- ernor. The statutes above referred to, when of. Otherwise we should have to infer a taken in connection with the admitted facts, dereliction of duty on the part of the board of show an appropriation by Congress for the*[284 managers in not making out estimates in de- purchase of oleomargarine as part of the regtail, and we should adopt an inference con- ular rations of the inmates of the home. The trary to the admission, which states that the act of the governor in serving it was authoroleomargarine was furnished as food underized by Congress, and it was therefore legal, an appropriation of Congress. The appropria- any act of the state to the contrary notwithtion does not precede the detailed estimates, standing. but is made subsequently and is presumably enacted with reference thereto. Congress has therefore in effect provided oleomargarine as part of the rations for the inmates of the home. It is given them in the mess room of the institution and under the rules and regulations for feeding them there. In making provision for so feeding the inmates, the governor, under the direction of the board of managers and with the assent and approval of Congress, is engaged in the internal administration of a Federal institution, and we think a state legislature has no constitutional power to interfere with such management as is provided by Congress.  *Whatever jurisdiction the state may have over the place or ground where the institution is located, it can have none to interfere with the provision made by Congress for furnishing food to the inmates of the home, nor has it power to prohibit or regulate the furnishing of any article of food which is approved by the officers of the home, by the board of managers, and by Congress. Under such circumstances the police power of the state has no application.
We mean by this statement to say that Federal officers who are discharging their duties in a state and who are engaged, as this appellee was engaged, in superintending the internal government and management of a Federal institution, under the lawful direction of its board of managers and with the approval of Congress are not subject to the jurisdiction of the state in regard to those very matters of administration which are thus approved by Federal authority.
land, in opposition to the language of the act of Congress ceding back the jurisdiction the United States received from the state. The government is but claiming that its own officers, when discharging duties under Federal authority pursuant to and by virtue of valid Federal laws, are not subject to arrest or other liability under the laws of the state in which their duties are performed.
The claim is made that neither the board of managers nor the governor of the home can, through their officers or by himself, violate the statute law of a state having jurisdiction, when the acts constituting the infringement are not necessary for the government and management of the home for the purposes for which it was incorporated, or authorized by any act of the United States.
In asserting that this officer under such circumstances is exempt from the state law, the United States are not thereby claiming jurisdiction over this particular piece of
Under the facts herein the state court had no jurisdiction to try the appellee for the offense charged in the written complaint made to the magistrate. See authorities cited in Re Waite, 81 Fed. Rep. 359.
Assuming, in accordance with the decision of the state court, the act of the Ohio legislature applies in its terms to the soldiers' home at Dayton, in that state, we are of opinion that the governor was not subject to that law, and the court had no jurisdiction to hear or determine the criminal prosecution in question, because the act complained of was performed as part of the duty of the governor as a Federal officer, in and by virtue of valid Federal authority, and in the performance of that duty he was not subject to the direction or control of the legislature of Ohio.
The authorities cited in the case of Re Waite, supra, and those cited by the learned circuit judge in this case, fully support the view we have taken herein. The cases of Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 [25: 648], Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 394, 395 [25: 717, 725], Re Loney, 134 U. S. 372 [33: 949], Re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1 [34: 55], all concur in upholding the paramount authority of the Federal government under circumstances similar, in effect, to those set forth in this record.
Some of the same authorities also show that this is one of the cases where it is proper to issue a writ of habeas corpus from the Federal court, instead of awaiting the slow process of a writ of error from this court to the highest court of the state where a decision could be had. One of the grounds for making such a case as this an exception to the general rule laid down in Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 [29: 868], Whitten v. Tom
linson, 160 U. S. 231 [40: 406], and Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284 [42: 748], consists in the fact that the Federal officer proceeded against in the courts of the state may, upon conviction, be imprisoned as a means of enforcing the sentence of a fine, and thus the operations of the Federal government might in the meantime be obstructed. This is such a case. In Ex parte Royall it was stated by Mr. Justice Harlan, in naming some of the exceptions to the general rule there laid down, that "when the petitioner is in custody by state authority for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof; or where, being a subject or citizen of a foreign state, and domiciled therein, he is in custody, under like authority, for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission or order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations,-in such and like cases of urgency, involving the authority and operations of the general government, or the obligations of this country to or its relations with foreign nations, the courts of the United States have frequently interposed by writs of habeas corpus and discharged prisoners who were held in custody under state authority."
Such railroad accepted its charter subject to the condition that it would conform to such reasonable state regulations as were for the public interest and not in violation of the supreme law of the land.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
For the reasons herein given we think the order of the Circuit Court of Appeals, af Argued December 13, 1898. Decided Febru firming the Circuit Court, was right, and it must be affirmed.
ary 20, 1899.
LAKE SHORE & MICHIGAN SOUTHERN
STATE OF OHIO, ex rel. GEORGE
appropriate legislation to protect the publle health, the public morals, or the public safety.
(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 285-338.) Power of state to provide for the public convenience and public good-power of Congress-grounds of power of a state to provide for the public convenience-Ohio statute requiring railroad trains to stop at stations of over 3,000 inhabitants-condition of its charter-regulation of interstate commerce-U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5258.
'N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio to review a judgment of that court affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, affirming the judgment of the court of common pleas of said county against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company for the amount of the penalty prescribed by Ohio Rev. Stat. § 3320, requiring railroad companies to stop three, each way, of its regular passenger trains, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, at a station, city, or village, of over 3,000 inhabitants, to receive and let off passengers,-in an action brought by the State of Ohio ex rel. George L. Lawrence for the recovery of such penalty. Affirmed.
For decision of the Circuit Court of Cuyahoga County, see 8 Ohio C. C. 220.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. George C. Greene for plaintiff in er
1. The power exists in each state by appropriate enactments not forbidden by its own or the Federal Constitution, to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its jurisdiction so as to provide for the public convenience and the public good.
When Congress acts with reference to a matter confided to it by the Federal Constitution, then its statutes displace all state regulations touching that matter.
The Ohio statute (Ohio Laws 1889, p. 291, Rev. Stat. 1890, § 3220) requiring each railroad company whose road is operated within the state to cause three, each way, of its regular trains carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop at a station, city, or village containing over 3,000 inhabitants, long enough to receive and let off passengers, is for the public convenience, and is not a regulation of interstate commerce and unconstitutional when applied to the trains of a corporation of the state engaged in such commerce.
State legislation relating to commerce is not to be deemed a regulation of interstate commerce simply because it may, to some extent or under some circumstances, affect such
U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5258, authorizing railroad companies to carry government supplies, mails, etc.. from one state to another, does not prevent the state from enacting such regulations, with respect, at least, to a railroad corporation of its own creation, as are not di rected against interstate commerce, and are not regulations thereof, but only incidental,y or remotely affect it, and are designed to promote the public convenience.
Mr. W. H. Polhamus for defendant in error.
*Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opin- ion of the court:
This action was commenced before a justice of the peace of the county of Cuyahoga, Ohio, to recover the penalty prescribed by section 3320 of the Revised Statutes of that state.
3. The power of the state by appropriate leg. islation to provide for the public convenience stands upon the same grounds as its power by
That section is a part of a chapter relating to railroad companies, and, as amended by the act of April 13th. 1889, provides:
"Each company shall cause three, each
way, of its regular trains carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop at a station, city, or village containing over three thousand inhabitants, for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers; if a company, or any agent or employee thereof, violate, or cause or permit to be violated, this provision, such company, agent, or employee, shall be liable to a forfeiture of not more than one hundred nor less than twenty-five dollars, to be recovered in an action in the name of the state, upon the complaint of any person, before a justice of the peace of the county in which the violation occurs, for the benefit of the general fund of the county; and in all cases in The through trains that passed westwardwhich a forfeiture occurs under the provi-ly through West Cleveland on the 9th day of sions of this section *the company whose October, 1890, were a limited express train agent or employee caused or permitted such having two baggage and express cars, one violation shall be liable for the amount of passenger coach, and three sleepers, from the forfeiture, and the conductor in charge of New York to Chicago; a fast mail train havsuch train shall be held prima facie to have ing five mail cars, one passenger coach, and caused the violation." Laws of Ohio 1889, one sleeper, from New York to Chicago; and vol. 86, p. 291; R. S. Ohio 1890, § 3320. a train having one mail car, two baggage and express cars, four passenger coaches, and one sleeper, from Cleveland to Chicago. The trains running eastwardly on the same day through West Cleveland were a limited express train having one baggage and express car and three sleepers, from Chicago to New York; a train having one baggage and express car, three passenger coaches, and two sleepers, from Chicago to New York; a train having one mail car, two baggage and express cars, and seven passenger coaches, from Chicago to Buffalo; and a train having three mail cars and one sleeper, from Chicago to New York.
The case was removed for trial into the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county, in which a judgment was rendered against the railroad company for the sum of one hundred dollars. Upon writ of error to the circuit court of that county the judgment was affirmed, and the judgment of the latter court was affirmed by the supreme court of
The facts upon which the case was determined in the state court were as follows:
The plaintiff Lawrence is a resident of West Cleveland, a muncipal corporation of Ohio having more than three thousand inhabitants.
The defendant railway company is a corporation organized under the respective laws of Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois, and owns and operates a railroad located partly within the village of West Cleveland. Its line extends from Chicago through those states to Buffalo.
On the 9th day of October, 1890, as well as for some time prior thereto and thereafter, the company caused to run daily both ways over its road within the limits of West Cleveland three or more regular trains carrying passengers. And on that day (which was not Sunday) it did not stop or cause to be stopped within that village more than one of such trains each way, long enough to receive or let off passengers.
engers who had paid through fare, and
On or about the day named the company operated but one regular train carrying passengers each way, that was not engaged in carrying such through passengers, and that train did stop at West Cleveland on that day for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers.
The average time required to stop a train of cars and receive and let off passengers is three minutes.
The number of villages in Ohio containing three thousand inhabitants through which the above trains passed on the day named were thirteen.
The trial court found, as a conclusion of law, that within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States the statute of Ohio was not a regulation of commerce among the states, and was valid until Congress acted upon the subject. This general view was affirmed by the circuit court of Cuyahoga county and by the supreme court of Ohio.
The plaintiff in error contends that, as the power to regulate interstate commerce is vested in Congress, the statute of Ohio in its application to trains engaged in such commerce is directly repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
On the day above named and after that date the company was engaged in carrying both passengers and freight over its railroad, from Chicago and other stations in Indiana In support of this contention it insists and Michigan, through each of said several that an interstate railroad carrier has the states, to and into New York, Pennsylvania, right to start its train at any point in one and Ohio and to Buffalo, and from Buffalo state, and pass into and through another through said states to Chicago. It did not state without taking up or setting down on that day, nor shortly prior thereto, nor up passengers within the limits of the latter to the commencement of the present suit, run state. As applied to the present case, that daily both ways, or either way, over said contention means that the defendant comroad through the village of West Cleveland, pany, although an Ohio corporation deriving three regular trains, nor more than one reg- all its franchises and privileges from that ular train each way, carrying passengers state, may, if it so wills, deprive the people " which were not engaged in interstate com- along its line in Ohio of the benefits of intermerce, or that did not have upon them pass-state communication by its railroad: in
short, that the company, if it saw fit to do | the subject, state legislation interrupting in-
After observing that the argument in be
In the argument at the bar, as well as in the printed brief of counsel, reference was made to the numerous cases in this court adjudging that what are called the police pow-half of the defendant rested upon the erroers of the states were not surrendered to the neous assumption that the statute of Georgeneral government when the Constitution gia was such a regulation of interstate comwas ordained, but remained with the several merce as was forbidden by the Constitution states of the Union. And it was asserted without reference to affirmative action by with much confidence that while regulations Congress, and not merely a statute enacted adopted by competent local authority in or- by the state under its police power, and der to protect or promote the public health, which, although in some degree affecting the public morals, or the public safety have interstate commerce, did not go beyond the been sustained where such regulations only necessities of the case, and therefore was incidentally affected commerce among the valid, at least until Congress intervened, states, the principles announced in former this court, upon review of the adjudged cases, adjudications condemn as repugnant to the said: "These authorities make it clear Constitution of the United States all local that the legislative enactments of the states, regulations that affect interstate commerce passed under their admitted police powers, in any degree, if established merely to sub- and having a real relation to the domesserve the public convenience. tic peace, order, health, and safety of One of the cases cited in support of this their people, but which by their necessary position is Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. operation, affect to some extent or for 299, 303, 308, 317, [41: 166, 169, 171, 174], a limited time the conduct of commerce which involved the validity of a statute of among the states, are yet not invalid by Georgia providing that "if any freight train force alone of the grant of power to Conshall be run on any railroad in this state on gress to regulate such commerce; and, if not the Sabbath Day (known as Sunday) the obnoxious to some other constitutional prosuperintendent of such railroad company, or vision or destructive of some right secured the officer having charge of the business of by the fundamental law, are to be respected that department of the railroad, shall be in the courts of the Union until they are liable for indictment for a misdemeanor in superseded and displaced by some act of Coneach county through which such trains shall gress passed in execution of the power grantpass, and on conviction shall be punished. ed to it by the Constitution. Local laws of Provided, always, That whenever the character mentioned have their source any train on any railroad in this state, hav- in the powers which the states reserved and ing in such train one or more cars loaded never surrendered to Congress, of providing with live stock, which train shall be delayed for the public health, the public morals, and beyond schedule time, shall not be required the public safety, and are not, within the to lay over on the line of road or route meaning of the Constitution, and considered during Sunday, but may run on to the point in their own nature, regulations of interwhere, by due course of shipment or consign- state commerce simply because, for a limited ment, the next stock pen on the route may time or to a limited extent, they cover the be, where said animals may be fed and field occupied by those engaged in such comwatered, according to the facilities usually merce. The statute of Georgia is not diafforded for such transportation. And it rected against interstate commerce. It esshall be lawful for the freight trains on the tablishes a rule of civil conduct applicable different railroads in this state, running alike to all freight trains, domestic as well over said roads on Saturday night, to run as interstate. It applies to the transportathrough to destination: Provided, The time tion of interstate freight the same rule preof arrival, according to the schedule by which cisely that it applies to the transportation the train or trains started on the trip, shall of domestic freight." Again: "We are of not be later than eight o'clock on Sunday opinion that such a law, although in a limmorning." This court said: "The well-set-ited degree affecting interstate commerce, is tled rule is that if a statute purporting to not for that reason a needless intrusion uphave been enacted to protect the public on the domain of Federal jurisdiction, nor health, the public morals, or the public safe- strictly a regulation of interstate commerce, ty, has no real or substantial relation to but, considered in its own nature, is an orthose objects, or is a palpable invasion of dinary police regulation designed to secure rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the well-being and to promote the general the duty of courts to so adjudge, and thereby welfare of the people within the state by give effect to the Constitution." which it was established, and therefore not invalid by force alone of the Constitution of the United States."
The contention in that case was that the running of railroad cars laden with interstate freight was committed exclusively to the control and supervision of the national government; and that, although Congress had not taken any affirmative action upon
It is insisted by counsel that these and observations to the same effect in different cases show that the police powers of the states, when exerted with reference to mat