mean the same thing as personal representa- absolute, but may be subjected to the re- 366 [42: 780]; St. Louis & S. F. Railway Company v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1 [41: 611]. Gulf, Colorado, & Santa Fé Railway Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 [41: 666], is not to the contrary, and was properly distinguished from this case by the supreme court of Arkansas. There a state statute provided for the assessment of an attorney's fee of not exceeding ten dollars against railroad companies for failure to pay certain debts, and the exaction was held to be a penalty, although no specific duty was imposed for the nonperformance of which it was inflicted. [410]This court said: "The statute arbitrarily singles out one class of debtors and punishes it for the failure to perform certain duties -duties which are equally obligatory upon all debtors; a punishment not visited by reason of the failure to comply with any proper police regulations, or for the protection of the laboring classes, or to prevent litigation about trifling matters, or in consequence of any special corporate privileges bestowed by the state." The conclusion was that the subjection of railroad companies only, to the penalty, was purely arbitrary, nct justifiable on any reasonable theory of classification, and that the statute denied the equal protection of the law demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case the act was passed "for the Protection of Servants and Employees of Railroads," and was upheld as an amendment of railroad charters, such exercise of the power reserved being justified on public considerations, and a duty was specially imposed for the failure to discharge which the penalty was inflicted. The penalty was sustained because the requirement was valid. Judgment affirmed. 6, 1899. peals of the State of New Jersey to review a decree of that court affirming the decree of the Chancery Court of that State that the defendants, children and heirs of Rodman M. Price et al., be perpetually enjoined from demanding or receiving from the United States or any officer of the Treasury any money remaining in the Treasury of the United States which was awarded to Rodman M. Price, deceased, under the act of February 23, 1891. Affirmed. N ERROR to the Court of Errors and Ap See same case below, 52 N. J. Eq. 16, 31, 53 N. J. Eq. 693, 54 N. J. Eq. 669. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. John C. Fay and Flavel McGee for plaintiffs in error. Messrs. Cortlandt Parker, R. Wayne Parker, and Frank W. Hackett for defendants in error. *Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opin-[411] ion of the court: The ultimate question in this case is whether the plaintiffs in error, as heirs of Rodman M. Price, are entitled to receive from the United States the amount standing to the credit of the deceased on the books of the Treasury, and which represents the balance of a sum found in his lifetime under the authority of a special act of Congress to be due him upon an adjustment of his accounts as a Purser in the Navy. The facts out of which arise the questions of law discussed by counsel are as follows: In the year 1848 the decedent was assigned to duty on the Pacific coast in California as Purser and Fiscal Agent of the *United States[412] for the Department of the Navy. He acted in that capacity until about December, 1849, or January, 1850, when he was detached from such service and ordered to transfer all public money and property remaining in his Gov-hands to his successor, or to such other disbursing officer of the Navy as might be designated by the commanding officer at the naval station at California, and immediately RODMAN M. PRICE, Madeline Price, v. ANNA M. FORREST and Charles Borcher- after such transfer to report at the city of ling. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 410-430.) Appointment by state court of a receiver of 1. Washington for the purpose of settling his A. M. Van Nostrand was his successor, in About December 31st, 1849, Commodore Van Nostrand to receive from Price all books, papers, office furniture, and funds on An order of a state court having jurisdic-hand belonging to the Purser's department tion of the parties. appointing a receiver of a claim against the government, and ordering the claimant to assign the same to such receiver to be held subject to the order of the court for the benefit of those entitled thereto, is not prohibited by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3477. 2. The words "or his heirs," in the act for the relief of Rodman M. Price, must be held to at that city. Thereupon Price turned over to Van Nostrand as Acting Purser of the Navy at San Francisco, forty-five thousand dollars, that being all the public money remaining in his hands. Subsequently on the 14th day of January, 1850, and out of his private funds alone, San Francisco, January 14th, 1850. Received from Rodman M. Price, Purser U. S. Navy, seventy-five thousand dollars, for which I hold myself responsible to the United States Treasury Department, $75,000. (Duplicate.) A. M. Van Nostrand, Acting Purser. This money was so advanced without the approval and signature of Commodore Jones. Van Nostrand never returned the $75,000 or any part of it to Price, nor did he account for it to the government. Price advanced to Van Nostrand seventy-appointed and qualified as administratrix of Price insisted that the United States should reimburse him for the amount so advanced by him, but the officers of the government denied its liability to him on that account. In an elaborate opinion, given March 12th, 1854, Attorney General Čushing held that while the appointment of Van Nostrand as Acting Purser was lawful and valid under the circumstances, the government could not be charged with the private funds paid to him by Price, although the [413]latter believed at the time that his advance of money to the former was an accommodation to the government in the then unsettled condition of California. 6 Ops. Atty. Gen. 357. Finally, by an act approved February 23d, 1891, entitled "An Act for the Relief of Rodman M. Price," the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States was "authorized and directed to adjust upon principles of equity and justice the accounts of Rodman M. Price, late Purser in the United States Navy and acting Navy Agent at San Francisco, California, crediting him with the sum paid over to and receipted for by his successor, A. M. Van Nostrand, Acting Purser, January 14th, 1850, and pay to said Rodman M. Price, or his heirs, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, any sum that may be found due him upon such adjustment." 26 Stat. at L. 1371. Under the authority conferred by that act the Secretary of the Treasury in August, 1892, adjusted the accounts of Price; and in that adjustment he was credited with the sum advanced to Van Nostrand, leaving due to him from the government the sum of $76,204.08, which of course included the above sum of $75,000. In order that the precise questions to be determined upon this writ of error may be clearly apprehended we must now refer to certain matters occurring in the courts of New Jersey both prior to and shortly after the passage of the above act of February 23d, 1891. In the year 1857 Samuel Forrest recovered in the Supreme Court of New Jersey a judgment against Rodman M. Price, for the sum of $17,000 and costs. Execution upon that judgment was returned unsatisfied. For rest died in 1869 intestate. In 1874 his wife, one of the present defendants in error, was The defendants to that bill were Price and his wife and son, the latter being alleged to claim some interest in the property described in the bill. They appeared and filed an answer, Price denying that any part of the properties mentioned in the bill belonged to him, or that he had any interest in them. After the filing of that answer the cause slept until August 9th, 1892, when Mrs. Forrest, as administratrix of the estate of her husband, filed a petition stating that since the filing of her bill of complaint in that cause no payment had been made on the judgment against Price, and that neither she nor her solicitors had been able to find any personalty or real estate belonging to Price by levy upon and sale of which any part of the amount due on the judgment could be obtained; that it had lately come to her knowledge that about $45,000 was about to be paid to Price by officers of the Treasury of the United States as the sum found to be due him by an accounting then lately had between him and the government: that that sum was to be paid by the delivery to Price or to his attorneys of a draft of the Treasurer of the United States or some other negotiable security made or issued by its financial officers and drawn payable to[415] his order, the rules of the Department forbidding that it be made payable to the order of any other person or that said sum should be paid in any other way, and that said draft or negotiable security was to be made and the transaction closed on the 15th day of August thereafter; and that if Price obtained said money from the United States he would, unless restrained, put the same he caused a copy of the above order to be served upon Price, and demanded compliance with its provisions. In 1892, the particular day not being On the presentation of the petition with A duly certified copy of that order, pur- It is stated that the balance due on the settlement of Price's accounts, about $31,000 was withheld by the officers of the gov ernment in the belief that there was a counterclaim against Price. But, it having been determined to pay such balance, the chancery court made another order on the 18th day of May, 1894, by which Price was[417] directed to execute two instruments in writ ing, which he had been previously required by the court to sign, seal, and deliver, one of them consenting that the balance from the government should be paid to the receiver, such consent to be filed with the Treasurer of the United States, and by the other assigning all his property, real and personal, and all his rights and credits. as in case of intestacy. But letters of administration ad prosequendum were granted by the prerogative court of New Jersey to Allen L. McDermott. These last two orders were served upon On the 10th day of October, 1892, Charles Price while he was sick, and he died June Borcherling was appointed by the chancery 8th, 1894, without complying with either of court receiver in said cause of the property them. So far as was known, he left no will, and things in action belonging or due to or and no application had been made for the apheld in trust for Price at the time of is-pointment of an administrator of his estate, suing said executions, or at any time afterwards, and especially of said four drafts, with authority to possess, receive, and sue [416]for such property and things in action and the evidence thereof; and it was made the The present bill was filed in the chancery duty of the receiver to hold such drafts sub-court July 5th, 1894, in the name of the adject to the further order of the court. The ministratrix of Samuel Forrest and of the receiver was required to give bond in the receiver Borcherling. The principal defendsum of $40,000 conditioned for the faithful ants are the children and heirs of Rodman discharge of his duties. At the same time M. Price. The other defendants are John Price was ordered to convey and deliver to C. Fay and McDermott, the latter as adminthe receiver all such property and things in istrator ad prosequendum. action and the evidence thereof, and especially forthwith to indorse and deliver the drafts to him, and he and all agents or attorneys appointed by him were enjoined and restrained from intermeddling with the receiver in regard to said drafts, and ordered, if in possession or control thereof, to deliver them to the receiver with an indorsement to that officer or to the clerk of the court for deposit; provided, the order should be void if the drafts other than the one for $9,000 were delivered with Price's indorsement to the clerk, the proceeds to be deposited to the credit of the cause. Price was expressly enjoined from making any indorsement or appropriation of the drafts other than to the receiver or the clerk for deposit. The receiver gave the required bond, and having entered upon the duties of his office, That bill alleged that on the 9th day of June, 1894, the defendants executed powers of attorney to the defendant Fay, who was one of the attorneys in the litigation respecting the drafts, authorizing him to apply to the Secretary of the Treasury to pay to them the balance to the credit of Price under the act of February 23d, 1891,-they claiming that such balance belongs to his heirs, and not to the receiver. It appears from the bill that in addition to the above four drafts, the United States paid to Price and his attorneys the further sum of $9,000, reducing the balance apparently on the books of the Treasury under the above settlement to the sum of about $23,000. It was further alleged that the officers of the Treasury Department were desirous of doing right and justice in the premises; that demand had been made by error cannot take anything under the orders adjudging that Borcherling, the receiver appointed by the state court, was entitled as between him and the heirs of Price to receive the money remaining to his credit on the books of the Treasury. the receiver upon the Treasurer of the Unit- New Jersey, (56 N. J. Eq. —), fand the ed States for the payment to him of said bal- judgment of affirmance is here for review. ance of money, and that the Treasurer neither 1. The first proposition of the plaintiffs consented nor refused to do so, but awaited in error is that consistently with the stat 418]the determination *by some lawful tribunal | utes of the United States the defendants in of the right of the receiver in the premises. The relief asked was: 1. That the cause commenced by the bill of 1874 be revived, and the administrator ad prosequendum be adjudged a proper party thereto. 2. That the defendants, the children and heirs of Rodman M. Price, together with Fay, be perpetually enjoined from making any demand upon or application to the United States or from receiving any part of the money awarded to the deceased then remaining in the Treasury of the United States. 3. That the parties above named be decreed to pay to the plaintiff Borcherling, receiver, to be by him disposed of under the orders of the court, any part of the money they might have respectively received or might receive. 4. That the administrator ad prosequendum, or any executor or administrator of Price thereafter admitted as defendant in the cause, deliver to the receiver all the property of the deceased, whether in possession or action, which might come to their hands. The heirs of Price filed pleas asserting their right to the benefit of the act of February 23d, 1891. The case was heard upon the bill and pleas, and the pleas were overruled by Chancellor McGill. The defendants were thereupon ordered to answer the bill. Upon appeal to the court of errors and appeals, the orders of the chancery court were affirmed, and the cause was remitted to that court with directions to proceed therein according to law. Price v. Forrest, 54 N. J. Eq. 669. The heirs then filed an answer, in which they denied that there was any jurisdiction in the chancery court to sequester the moneys in dispute in the Treasury of the United States, and insisted that whatever amount remained in the Treasury as the balance due on the adjustment of the accounts of Rodman M. Price belonged under the act of Congress to the defendants as his heirs. The case was heard upon bill and answer, and the chancery court was of opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief asked so far as it related to the collection by the defendants of the moneys men1419]tioned in the bill of complaint and still in the Treasury of the United States. It was therefore ordered and decreed, that the said defendants and each of them be and they are hereby perpetually enjoined and restrained from making any demand upon or application to the government of the United States, or the Secretary of the Treasury cf the United States or any officer of the said Treasury, or from receiving from the United States, or its said Secretary of the Treasury or any officer thereof, any part of the money remaining in the Treasury of the United States at the time of filing said bill of complaint, and which was awarded to Rodman M. Price, deceased, as in the said bill stated, or now there remaining." This judgment was affirmed by the court of errors and appeals of This contention is based upon section 3477 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, providing that "all transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United States, or of any part or share thereof, or interest therein, whether absolute or condi tional, and whatever may be the considera tion therefor, and all powers of attorney, orders, or other authorities for receiving pay. ment of any such claim, or of any part or share thereof, shall be absolutely null and void, unless they are freely made and executed in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment of the amount due and the issuing of a warrant for the payment thereof. Such transfers, assignments, and powers of attorney must recite the warrant for payment, and must be acknowledged by the person making them, before an officer having authority to take acknowledgments of deeds, and shall be certified by the officer; and it must appear by the certificate that the officer, at the time of the acknowledginent, read and fully explained the transfer, as-[420] signment, or warrant of attorney to the person acknowledging the same." It is insisted that the orders in the state court assume to transfer or assign Price's claim against the United States in violation or without regard to the requirements of that statute, in that no assignment of the claim has ever been freely made; that no warrant for the payment thereof had been issued when those orders were made; and that the indorsement or assignment that Price was ordered to make did not fall within any of the established exceptions under section 3477, such as assignments in bankruptcy and insolvency, and assignments by operation of law. Are these propositions supported by the decisions of this court in which it has been found necessary to construe that section? In United States v. Gillis, 95 U. S. 407, 416 [24: 503, 506], the question was as to the validity of a voluntary transfer of the legal title to a claim under the abandoned †This case has not been reported. The opin lon is as follows: Lippincott, J: This appeal from the final decree of the court of chancery, in this cause, brings up for decision the rights of the parties under the act of Congress set out in the pleadings, and under § 3477 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. These questions having been passed upon in the opinion of this court, on the appeal from the decree of the chancellor, overruling the pleas of the defendants in this cause (54 N. J. Eq. 669). the decree now appealed from, for the reasons there given, must be affirmed, with costs. and captured property act of March 12th, 1863, for the proceeds of certain cotton seized by the military forces of the United States. The suit was brought by the transferee in the court of claims which found in his favor. By this court it was adjudged that he could not maintain the action. While holding that the act of February 26th, 1853, chap. 81, 10 Stat. at L. 170, from which section 3477 was taken, was of universal application and covered all claims against the United States in every tribunal in which they might be asserted, this court stated that "there are devolutions of title by force of law, without any act of parties, or involuntary assignments compelled by law," to which the statute did not apply. In Erwin v. United States, 97 U. S. 392, 397 [24: 1065, 1067], which was also an action to recover the proceeds of certain cotton captured by the military forces of the United States, it appeared that the original claimant became a bankrupt, and assigned his property to an assignee in bankruptcy. One of the questions was whether the claim for these proceeds, even if it constituted a demand against the government, was capable of assignment under the above statute. This [421] court said: "The act of Congress of February 26th, 1853, to prevent frauds upon the Treasury of the United States, which was the subject of consideration in the Gillis Case, applies only to cases of voluntary assignment of demands against the government. It does not embrace cases where there has been a transfer of title by operation of law. The passing of claims to heirs, devisees, or assignees in bankruptcy are not within the evil at which the statute aimed; nor does the construction given by this court deny to such parties a standing in the court of claims." In Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556, 560 | be embarrassed by such an assignment. The While the present case differs from any As this court has said, the object of Congress by section 3477 was to protect the gov 48 753 |
