man informed the servant that the liability was limited to one hundred dollars was disputed but he inserted that valuation in the receipt. The trunk weighed 220 pounds and defendant was paid two dollars and fifty cents, the minimum charge, and under the filed tariffs the plaintiff was entitled to only the lowest liability, and a judgment in his favor should be modified by reducing the same to $110. Kolb v. Taylor, 220.
Actions Counterclaim Evidence
1. Of mortgages Trial Dismissal of complaint.-The defendant in a foreclosure action pleaded, as a counterclaim, that the mortgage was usurious in its inception and that plaintiff was a party to and profited by the transaction. On notice by plaintiff, who served no reply to the counterclaim, the case came to trial and a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that no cause of action had been proved, made after plaintiff had rested, having been denied, defend- ants introduced testimony which showed that there was no merit in their defense but offered no proof to sustain the counterclaim, and coupled a motion for judgment thereon with a statement that whether it was granted or denied they would offer no further proof. Held, that defendants had waived their right to insist that allegations of the counterclaim should be deemed admitted for failure to serve the reply and that it should be dismissed and plaintiff given judg- ment. Charlton v. Ward, 238.
2. Of mortgages Referee's fee on sale Real property-Costs Surplus Code Civ. Pro. §§ 3297, 3307 (7).-Under section 3297 of the Code of Civil Procedure the referee on a sale in fore- closure is entitled to the same fees and disbursement as are allowed to a sheriff on a sale of real property under a judgment, and where the property is sold for $10,000, or more, the limit of fifty dollars does not apply and the referee may receive such additional compensation as to the court may seem proper. Where premises sold in foreclosure are located in a county where the sheriff under section 3307 (7) of the Code of Civil Procedure is entitled to three per cent upon the proceeds of a sale of real property under a judgment not exceeding $250, and two per cent upon the residue of such proceeds, the referee to sell in the foreclosure action is entitled to the same amount to be computed only upon the cash received by him. Where the purchaser at a sale in foreclosure refuses to complete his purchase and there is a resale of the premises by order of the court he is liable for the costs and expenses of the resale, less the amount of the surplus arising thereon over that bid on the first sale. Palmatier v. Catskill Mountain R. Co., 571. See Mechanics' Liens; Receivers.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. See Deeds.
GARNISHEE.
See Motions and Orders.
GENERAL RULES OF PRACTICE.
See Depositions; Motions and Orders.
GRAND JURY.
See Indictment.
GREATER NEW YORK CHARTER.
See Boards of Health.
When plaintiff not entitled to recover upon Negotiable instru- ments Bankruptcy Waiver Appeal.-Upon the trial of an action to recover $300 upon a written guaranty to secure pay- ment for merchandise sold to defendant's brother, it appeared that after defendant had become liable to the extent of the guaranty he gave his brother a note for $324.81 upon the agree- ment that it would replace the guaranty but that plaintiff had no knowledge of this understanding; that when the note became due the defendant demanded, before paying said note, that the plaintiff surrender and cancel not only the note but the guaranty, as he refused to pay both liabilities and threatened to go into bank- ruptcy; that the plaintiff thereupon consented to the defendant's proposition and accepted payment, for the note and delivered to the defendant the note and surrendered the guaranty, both of which the defendant received and destroyed. Held, that defendant's waiver of his right to take benefit of the Bankruptcy Law was a good and valid consideration for the new agreement and full per- formance thereof was a bar to the present action; that plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the guaranty in suit which it sur- rendered at the time the note was paid and a judgment in its favor will be reversed and the complaint dismissed on the merits. Knit Goods Exchange, Inc., v. Kresoff, 156.
GUARDIANS.
See Accounting.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
See Transfer Tax.
1. Verdict Evidence Criminal law Jury.- The only fact necessarily determined in the defendant's favor by a verdict of not guilty is that the evidence before the jury was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his guilt of the crime charged by the indictment; it is not an acquittal of the crime. A verdict of not guilty rendered upon the trial of an indictment charging the defendant with robbery in the first degree by taking certain personal property from "Alexander Gebler" in the night- time of a certain day is not res adjudicata upon the trial of an indictment charging him with an attempt to commit robbery in the first degree from "Samuel Gebler" at the same time and place. People v. Rogers, 437.
2. For violation of Donnelly Anti-Trust Law Grand jury When motion to dismiss granted. Where an indictment charging defendants with a violation of the Donnelly Anti-Trust Law alleges that there were more than forty persons, firms and corporations separately engaged in competition with one another in the busi- ness of manufacturing "and selling what are commonly known as photo-engravings which are used for the purpose of printing illustra- tions and pictures, and which are articles and commodities in common use," and that these persons and corporations constituted a majority of all engaged in that business in New York county, where the indictment was found, and did collectively more than ninety per cent of said business in said county, the minutes of the grand jury disclose that there is not an item of evidence to sustain the allegations of the indictment that photo-engraving is an article or commodity in common use," a motion to dismiss the indictment will be granted. People v. Epstean, 476.
1. When denied Action to restrain pollution of stream attrib- uted to sewage discharge Water and watercourses Villages.- Where, in an action brought by various owners and occupants of farm lands along a stream below the point of sewer discharge from a village disposal plant to restrain the pollution of the stream attributed to the sewage effluent discharged from the dis- posal plant and consisting of about one-half domestic sewage and one-half tannery effluent received by the sewage of the village from the defendant mill, all of the waste therefrom consisting of scrapings of flesh, hair, lime and tan bark liquor being screened before entering the village sewers and chlorinated on its journey to the sewage disposal plant, it appears from the expert testimony that the stream is not presently polluted and the testimony of laymen as to its condition is in conflict, and the consequences of an injunc- tion would amount to a public calamity, the same will be denied. Driscoll v. American Hide & Leather Co., 612.
2. Elevated railways Sufficiency of consents of property owners Consent of municipality Railroad Law, § 171. Baker v. New York Municipal R. Corporation, 719.
Against loss by burglary, theft, etc. Fire in apartment below contributing to loss Defendant not liable. Where by a rider attached to a policy of insurance against burglary, theft or lar- ceny it was agreed that the insurer should not be liable for any loss from or contributed to by fire, water, etc., and in an action on the policy to recover for the loss of certain jewelry and silver- ware, a part of which was in a box in a locked dresser drawer in plaintiff's apartment, it was found as a fact that a fire which
INSURANCE (BURGLARY)—Continued.
broke out and was confined to the floor below plaintiff's apartment contributed to the loss, there can be no recovery and defendant is entitled to judgment. Sloan v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 412.
1. Action to recover on policy of Evidence Proofs of loss Trial Pleading. In an action begun in November, 1917, to recover on a fire insurance policy, a complaint alleging that in July, 1917, after the occurrence of a fire in January, 1917, which totally destroyed the insured property, the plaintiff "fully complied with the terms and provisions of the said policy, and did furnish to the defendant satisfactory proofs of the said loss, and the defendant accepted of the said proofs, and retained the same without objection as and for a full and complete compliance with the terms and provisions of the said policy, and that more than sixty days have elapsed since plaintiff furnished the said proofs of loss, etc.," is a sufficient statement of facts to enable plaintiff to offer proof at the trial as to whether defendant by retaining, without objection, the proofs of loss furnished waived the terms of the policy on the question of the sufficiency of the proofs of loss and the time of service thereof. Whether there was such a waiver is a question for the jury and should not be disposed of on the hearing of a demurrer to the complaint. Judgment in favor of plaintiff, overruling the demurrer, with leave to answer within twenty days on payment of costs. Miglier v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 461.
2. Reformation of policy of Condemnation pro- ceedings Title Statutes Stipulation Muncipal corpora- tions.--Where by the mistake of the insurer's agent, though he was told the names of all the persons interested in the property and what their respective interests were, the name of the life tenant, as owner, was written in a policy of insurance covering a building on the property devised, and the remaindermen and their attorney, all of whom were consulted as to the insurance before the policy was issued, failed to see to it that it was properly written, there can be no reformation of the policy on the ground of mutual mistake. In an action to recover on the policy for damage by fire to the building it appeared that the title to the devised property was just the same as it was when the policy was issued, because, though before the fire the property had been taken by the city for a public use and a certified copy of the order of confirmation of the award made to the owners had been recorded in the proper county clerk's office as required by the statute applicable in the condemnation proceedings, it was not until sometime after such recording that the fire occurred and subsequently thereto a trustee appointed for the purpose of receiving the proceeds of the award for the benefit of those interested therein. Held, that as the title to the property had not passed to the city and it had not before the fire entered upon the property as owner and was not entitled so to do under the statute, a contention that there had been a forfeiture of the policy because of a change in the title, interest or possession
of the insured building resulting in the order of confirmation of the award made in the condemnation proceeding, was untentable. Fort v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 584.
1. When reversed-Foreign corporations-Contracts-Appeal.— A judgment in favor of a foreign corporation, not authorized to do business in this state, for the purchase price of goods sold under a contract in this state, must be reversed and the complaint dismissed. Pittsburgh Electric Specialties Co. v. Rosenbaum, 520.
2. When reversed Usury Negotiable instruments Appeal. -Where upon a trial of an action on defendant's demand note given for a loan, the defense being usury, it clearly appeared that plaintiff's agents, with full authority to act and as a part of the same transaction, demanded and received from defendant usuri- ous interest and that the making of a third party payee of the note was a mere subterfuge, a judgment in plaintiff's favor will be reversed and the judgment directed in favor of defendant. Schultz v. Schaffer, 546.
3. Stipulation Appeal Trial Evidence panies.-Where, on the trial of an action to recover $370.81 charges for transmitting twenty-one cable messages between the city of New York and the island of Java, Japan, Egypt, England and towns on the continent of Europe, it was conceded that defendant was liable for six of said charges amounting in all to $112.05, and an operator for plaintiff testifies that he sent a message addressed to a certain person in Batavia over the wire to another employee of plaintiff at a certain place in Ireland from whence it had been delivered to another company and forwarded to its destination, and it is stipulated that similar testimony will be given as to the other messages, that plaintiff had no cable lines direct to the points of destination and that it was understood by defendant that plaintiff had to forward the messages over connecting lines, and no attempt was made to show that any of the messages except said six had ever been delivered, a judgment in plaintiff's favor for the full amount claimed will be reversed unless plaintiff stipulates to reduce the judgment to $112.05, in which event the judgment as reduced by stipulation will be affirmed. Commercial Cable Co. v. Bauer Co., 699.
See Default; Negligence; Negotiable Instruments; Physicians.
§ 770. Matter of Gumpel v. Gurvitch, 536. § 773. Houk v. Van Horn, 263.
1. Meaning of any equity jurisdiction” Depositions Constitutional law. The term any equity jurisdiction" as used in section 18 of article VI of the Constitution of 1894 must be construed to mean jurisdiction of proceedings and remedies which were recognized at the time of the adoption of said Constitution
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