that the two vessels were approaching upon The officers of the schooner heard the sion. Messrs. Eugene P. Carver and Edward E. Blodgett, for Abram W. Hendry et al., appellants: The faults of the Chattahoochee other than those found by the court are: Changing her course under a port helm without knowing the location of the sailing vessel whose fog signal she heard. The City of New York, 147 U. S. 72, 37 L. cd. 84. Another cause of the collision was the fact that the steamship did not stop and did not reverse in time. The Edgar F. Luckenbach, 8 U. S. App. 9, 50 Fed. Rep. 129, 1 C. C. A. 489; The Midland, 48 Fed. Rep. 331; Bunge v. The Utopia, The schooner Golden Tule was without fault. What is a moderate rate of speed for a sailing vessel in a fog in the place where the collision took place? The master and lookout of the steamship heard the fog signal of the schooner about two minutes before the collision, apparently a point off their port bow. The order was immediately given and obeyed to stop and aft-1 Fed. Rep. 892. erwards to reverse, and the wheel was put hard aport in order to locate the sound. When they first saw the sails of the schooner they bore one and one-half points on the port bow of the steamer. During this time the helm of the steamer was hard aport. Upon seeing the schooner, the steamship, which was then swinging to starboard under In the case of The Nacoochee, 137 U. S. her port helm, ordered her engines full speed 331, 34 L. ed. 688, where the collision was ahead for the purpose of clearing the schoon-off Cape May, the schooner, with all sail set, er. The schooner kept her course and the vessels came together at an angle of four points, the steamship striking the schooner forward of the foremast on the starboard The district court was of opinion that both Damages were awarded to the libellants, as bailees for the owners of the cargo, to the amount of $17,215.17, and to the libellants, as owners of the vessel and for the value of certain personal effects of the crew, in one half the total amount of their loss, namely, $9,205.45; and it was further ordered that the owners of the steamship might recoup from the said amount of $9,205.45 the sum [543]of $8,607.58, being one half of the *total damages to the cargo. An execution was ordered against the claimants of the steamship and its stipulators for the sum of $597.87, this being the difference between half the value of the schooner and the personal effects of the crew and half the value of the cargo for which the schooner was thus held responsi ble. Upon appeal to the circuit court of appeals, that court affirmed the decree of the district court upon the merits; but modified the same with reference to the distribution between the owners and master of the Golden Rule on the one side and her mate and crew on the other, finding that, as neither the mate nor her crew were responsible for any fault in her navigation, the several sums awarded the mate and crew should have priority over the amounts awarded the owners and master. 33 U. S. App. 510. Whereupon an application was made to this court by the libellants for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. The N. Strong [1892] P. 105; The Elysia, 4 Asp. M. L. Cas. 540. was going 4 knots per hour, and the steam- ed. 862; The Beta, L. R. 9 Prob. Div. 134; But in cases of this kind much depends upon the density of the fog, and some things must be left to the judgment and discretion of the master. The Umbria, 166 U. S. 404, 41 L. ed. 1053. The speed of the schooner Golden Rule did not contribute to the collision. The Martello, 39 Fed. Rep. 509; The City of New York, 147 U. S. 72, 37 L. ed. 84; The Ludvig Holberg, 157 U. S. 60, 39 L. ed. 620; The Comet, 9 Blatchf. 323; The John King, 1 U. S. App. 64, 49 Fed. Rep. 469, 1 C. C. À. 319. The burden of proof is upon each vessel to establish fault on the part of the other. The Victory, 168 U. S. 410, 42 L. ed. 519. The fault of the schooner was slight in comparison with that of the steamship. Damages should be apportioned between vessels according to the degrees of fault. 12 Law Quarterly Review, 260; 13 Law Quarterly Review, 17, 241. The rule of equal division of damages where both vessels are to blame has been firmly established in England. Marsden, Maritime Collision, 3d ed. 154; The Milan, Lush. 388; De Vaux v. Salvador, 4 Ad. & El. 420; The Stoomvaart Maatschappy Nederland v. Peninsular & O. Steam Nav. Co. L. R. 7 App. Cas. 795. The United States courts sitting in admiralty have always divided the loss between both vessels in cases of mutual fault. The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 586; The Mary Ida, 20 Fed. Rep. 741; The Victory, 25 U. S. App. 271, 68 Fed. Rep. 395, 15 C. C. A. 490. The rule of damages in case of collision | quired by the special circumstances of the where there is mutual fault under the Har- case to prevent a collision. ter act. The Delaware, 161 U. S. 459, 40 L. ed. 771; The Silvia, 64 Fed. Rep. 607, 35 U. S. App. 395, 68 Fed. Rep. 230, 15 C. C. A. 362; The Carib Prince, 63 Fed. Rep. 266, 35 U. S. App. 390, 68 Fed. Rep. 254, 15 C. C. A. 385; The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24, 26 L. ed. 1001. Messrs. Arthur H. Russell and Charles Theodore Russell, for the Ocean Steamship Company, appellee: The two inferior courts agreed in substance in all findings of fact. Their concurrent decisions upon a question of fact are to be followed unless clearly shown to be er roneous. The Maria Martin, 12 Wall. 31, 20 L. ed. 251; The America, 92 U. S. 432, 23 L. ed. 724; The Sunnyside, 91 U. S. 208, 23 L. ed. 302; The Elizabeth Jones, 112 U. S. 514, 28 L. ed. 812; The Boanerges, 2 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 239; The Legatus, Holt, Adm. 217; Handayside v. Wilson, 3 Car. & P. 528; The Vindomora, L. R. 14 Prob. Div. 172. The time, the distance, the orders on board the steamship, all indicate attention and quick effort to avoid collision. The failure to hear the fog horn on the steamer, even if in fact it was blown, as required, is not necessarily negligence. The Annie Lindsley, 104 Ŭ. S. 185, 26 L. ed. 716; The Negaunec, 20 Fed. Rep. 918; The Lorenzo D. Baker, 24 Fed. Rep. 814; The Rosetta, 59 L. T. N. S. 344; Goslee v. Shute, 18 How. 463, 15 L. ed. 462; The Nevada, 106 U. S. 154, 27 L. ed. 149. Compania de Navigacion la Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U. S. 104, 42 L. ed. 398; The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 110, 41 L. ed. 937; The Richmond, 103 U. S. 540, 26 L. ed. 813. The speed of the schooner at the time and place and under the circumstances was immoderate and contrary to the articles of nav-requiring as between two tort-feasors in the igation. Act March 3, 1885, art. 13; The Martello, 153 U. S. 64, 38 L. ed. 637; The Nacoochee, 137 U. S. 330, 34 L. ed. 687; The Colorado, 91 U. S. 692, 23 L. ed. 379; The Michigan, 25 U. S. App. 1, 63 Fed. Rep. 280, 11 C. C. A. 187; The Umbria, 166 U. S. 404, 41 L. ed. 1053. There is no distinction in the application of the rule between a steamship and a sailing vessel. Lowndes, Collisions at Sea, 73; Spencer, Collisions, 50; The Johns Hopkins, 13 Fed. Rep. 185. A rate of speed at night, in a dense fog, which is immoderate and excessive for a steamer, is less justifiable in a sailing vessel under the same circumstances; and a speed of 7 miles an hour in a fog in Long Island sound is immoderate. The Rhode Island, 17 Fed. Rep. 554; The Louisiana, 2 Ben. 371; The Chancellor, 4 Ben. 153; The Colorado, 91 U. S. 692, 23 L. ed. 379; The Wyanoke, 40 Fed. Rep. 702; The Zadok, L. R. 9 Prob. Div. 114; The Beta, L. R. 9 Prob. Div. 134; The Dordogne, L. R. 10 Prob. Div. 6; The N. Strong [1892] P. 105; The Virgil, 2 W. Rob. 201; The Victoria, 3 W. Rob. 49; The Pepperell, Swabey, Adm. 12. The absence of the officer from the deck, and the consequent necessity of abandoning the lookout in order to take the wheel while the man at the wheel went below to call the officers, were gross negligence in the management and navigation of the schooner. Marsden, Maritime Collision, 439; The Arthur Gordon, Lush. 270; The Khedive, L. R. 5 App. Cas. 876; The Zadok, L. R. 9 Prob. Div. 114; Peck v. Sanderson, 17 How. 178, 15 L. ed. 205; The Charles L. Jeffrey, 5 U. S. App. 370, 55 Fed. Rep. 685, 5 C. C. A. 246; The City of Augusta, 50 U. S. App. 39, 80 Fed. Rep. 297, 25 C. C. A. 430. Even flagrant fault committed by one of two vessels approaching each other from opposite directions does not excuse the other from adopting every proper precaution re The equity of divided damage—that is, of admiralty as equal a distribution of the loss as can be decreed-is the settled equity of the English admiralty, and has been adopted in this country by many late decisions. The Woodrop-Sims, 2 Dodson, Adm. 83; Hay v. Le Neve, 2 Shaw, Sc. App. Cas. 395; Cayzer v. Carron Co. L. R. 9 App. Cas. 873; Marsden, Maritime Collision, 136; The Catharine v. Dickinson, 17 How. 170, 15 L. ed. 233; The Continental, 14 Wall. 355, 20 L. ed. 802; The Washington, 9 Wall. 513, 19 L. ed. 787; Atlee v. Union Packet Co. 21 Wall. 389, 22 L. ed. 619; The Sunnyside, 91 U. S. 208, 23 L. ed. 302; The Alabama, 92 U. S. 695, 23 L. ed. 763; The Juniata, 93 U. S. 337, 23 L. ed. 930; The Stephen Morgan, 94 U. S. 599, 24 L. ed. 266; The Virginia Ehrman, 97 U. S. 309, 24 L. ed. 890; The City of Hartford, 97 U. S. 323, 24 L. ed. 930; The Connecticut, 103 U. S. 710, 26 L. ed. 467; The Potomac, 105 U. S. 630, 26 L. ed. 1194; The Sterling, 106 U. S. 647, 27 L. ed. 98; The Franconia, 16 Fed. Rep. 149; Briggs v. Day, 21 Fed. Rep. 727; The Troy, 28 Fed. Rep. 861; The Britannic, 39 Fed. Rep. 395. This equity of equal division of the loss, when caused by mutual fault, is not affectleast not until the balance is struck between ed by statute limitation of liability,-at the two offending vessels. The North Star, 106 U. S. 17, 27 L. ed. 91; The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302, 23 L. ed. 863; The Manitoba, 122 U. S. 97, 30 L. ed. 1095; The Stoomvart Maatschappy Nederland v. Peninsular & O. Steam Nav. Co. L. R. 7 App. Cas. 795. *Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion[543] of the court: There can be no doubt whatever of the lia bility of the steamer, and as she did not appeal, of course she is estopped to deny such liability in this court. 1. Whether the Golden Rule was also liable for excessive speed is a question of more difficulty. She was a topsail schooner, rigged with twelve sails, all of which she was carrying, except one half her double square sail on the foremast, which had been taken | knot breeze, which would indicate a somein. She was sailing on her port tack with what lower rate of speed than in this case. the wind well abaft the beam, through a fog, In the case of The Itinerant, 2 W. Rob. 236, which did not admit of the hull of a vessel decided in 1844, Dr. Lushington was of opinbeing seen more than a few hundred feet ion that it was the duty of the shipmaster, distant. It appears to have been a surface whether in a dense fog or great darkness, to fog, as the crew of the schooner are confident exercise the greatest vigilance and to put his [544]they saw the masts of the steamer some vessel under cominand, although such pre2,000 feet away. The district court was of cautions might occasion delay in the proseopinion that as she was sailing free, with a cution of the voyage. "It may be," said he, fresh wind, her speed could not have been "that for such a purpose it would be his duty less than seven or eight knots an hour. The to take in his studding sails; but such is the court of appeals found only that she was constantly varying combination of circummaking substantially all the speed of which stances arising from locality, wind, tide, she was capable. Her master admits that number of vessels in the track, and other conshe was making from five to six knots; but siderations, that the court cannot venture to as her log, which was taken in at 4 o'clock, lay down any general rule which would abregistered twenty-eight miles for four hours, solutely apply in all cases." So, too, in The we think her speed may be safely estimated Pepperell, Swabey, Adm. 12, Dr. Lushington to have been seven miles an hour. While held a ship proceeding in the North Sea at the commerce in this locality was not as the rate of six and one-half knots an hour great as it was in Vineyard sound, it was during a night so dark that vessels could onnot unlikely that they would encounter other ly be seen at a distance of 100 to 200 yards, vessels coming down the coast. Was seven was in fault if she knew, or ought to have miles a moderate rate of speed under the cir- known, that she was crossing a fishing cumstances of this case? ground. See also The Lord Saumarez, 6 Notes of Cases, 600; The Juliet Erskine, Id. 633. Although the reports of the admiralty courts are extremely fertile of cases turning upon the proper speed of steamers in foggy weather, there is a singular paucity of such as deal with the speed of sailing vessels. Such as there are, however, point to a uniformity of regulation applicable to the two classes. The earliest of these cases is that of The Virgil (1843) 2 W. Rob. 201. This was a collision between two sailing vessels in a dark and hazy night, although there does not seem to have been a fog. As it appeared that the Virgil had the wind free, and was sailing under a full press of canvas, she was held in fault for too great speed. Her actual speed is not given. In the case of The Victoria, 3 W. Rob. 49, a vessel running before the wind on a dark and cloudy night at the rate of from five to six knots an hour off the English coast, was held to have been in fault for proceeding at that rate of speed. These cases were all decided before the new steering and sailing rules, which were first adopted in 1863 by a British Order in Council, and in 1864 by an act of Congress. The twenty-first of these rules, as they appear in the Revised Statutes, section 4233, requires that "every steam vessel shall, when in a fog, go at a moderate speed." No mention is made in this rule of sailing vessels, but the courts, both in England and America, so far as they have spoken upon the subject, have adhered to the rule laid down in the earlier cases above cited-that rates *of[546] speed which would be considered immoderate for steamers are open to like condemnation in the case of sailing vessels. See discussion in The Chancellor, 4 Ben. 153, 160. In The Thomas Martin, 3 Blatchf. 517, a schooner was condemned by Mr. Justice Nelson for racing on a night which was not unusually dark, yet was so overcast and cloudy that a vessel without lights could not be seen at a distance exceeding a half mile. The schooner had all her sails set, with a pretty fresh wind, and was running at a rate of speed that, under the circumstances, he thought could not well be justified considering the character of the night. Upon the other hand, in the case of The Morning Light, 2 Wall. 550 [17: 862], a brig running through Buzzards' Bay in a dark and rainy night, was held not to have been in fault for not shortening sail. The court, commenting on the case of the Virgil, observed: "But such a restriction," as was laid down in that case, "can hardly be applied to sailing vessels proceeding on their In the case of The John Hopkins, 13 Fed. voyage in an open sea. On the contrary, the Rep. 185, it was held by Mr. Justice Hargeneral rule is that they may proceed on lan and Judge Lowell that, in case of a fog their voyage although it is dark, observing and in a place much frequented by vessels, all the ordinary rules of navigation, and it was as much the duty of a sailing vessel [545]with *such additional care and precaution as to go at a moderate rate of speed as it was experienced and prudent navigators usually the duty of a steamer. In this case a brig, employ under similar circumstances. They sailing with the wind nearly aft and making should never, under such circumstances, haz-eight to nine knots through the water, with ard an extraordinary press of sail, and in case a current of two knots in her favor, off the of unusual darkness it may be reasonable to coast of Cape Cod, was held to have been in require them, when navigating in a narrow fault for a collision with a steamer in a pathway where they are liable to meet other dense fog. So in The Wyanoke, 40 Fed. Rep. vessels, to shorten sail if the wind and 702, it was held by Judge Brown, of the weather will permit." The actual speed of southern district of New York, that a schoonthe Morning Light is not given, although the er having nearly all her canvas set and runwind seems to have been blowing a five to sixning in a dense fog off Cape May at a speed of six knots an hour, was not going at the moderate speed required by law. In The Attila, Cook's Ca. 196, the vice admiralty court at Quebec condemned a sailing vessel for running at a speed of six or seven miles an hour, in a dense fog in the fairway from the Atlantic ocean, between Cape Ray and St. Paul's island into the Gulf and the lower waters of the St. Lawrence river, although there was abundance of evidence that this was the customary rate of speed during a fog in this locality. In 1879 a new Code was adopted in England, and in 1885 in this country, article 13 of which provides that "every ship, whether a sailing ship or steamship shall, in a fog, mist, or falling snow, go at a moderate speed." In the case of The Elysia, 4 Asp. M. L. Cas. 540, it was held by the admiralty court [847]and by the court of appeal in England, that a speed of five knots in the case of a sailing ship out in the Atlantic ocean in a fog, is a moderate speed, although at the time she was under all plain sail and going as fast as she could with the wind on her quarter. Lord Justice Brett was of opinion that a moderate speed was not absolutely the same with regard to a steamer as to a sailing vessel. "If you were to say that three knots were a moderate speed for a steamer in which to turn from one point to another when out in the ocean, that does not presume that that would be a moderate speed for a sailing vessel, because a steamer can reduce her speed to a knot and a half. It would, however, be very dangerous for a sailing vessel, under all circumstances, to reduce her speed to anything like three knots, because such a speed would, in certain circumstances, place her entirely out of command." In the Zadok, L. R. 9 Prob. Div. 114, which was a collision between a steamship and a barque in the English channel, it was held to have been the duty of the barque to reduce her speed so far as she could consistently with keeping steerageway, and as it was shown that she was carrying nearly all her canvas and proceeding at a speed of more than four knots an hour, she was held to be in fault and the steamer exonerated. A like ruling was made by the master of rolls, speaking for the court of appeal in The Beta, L. R. 9 Prob. Div. 134. The collision took place in a dense fog in the Bristol channel, and it was held that a vessel must not go faster than would enable her to be kept un der command. In the case of The N. Strong [1892] P. 105, which was a collision in the English channel, it was held that a sailing vessel which was making about four knots an hour in a fog was not proceeding at a rate of speed beyond what was necessary to keep her well under command. The cases in the American courts are of the same purport. In The Rhode Island, 17 Fed. Rep. 554, it was held by Judge Brown of the southern district of New York, that a speed of seven knots an hour in a foggy evening in Long Island sound was not a moderate rate of speed, although the twenty-first rule did not apply in terms to sailing vessels. The *No absolute rule can be extracted from[548] these cases. So much depends upon the density of fog and the chance of meeting other vessels in the neighborhood, that it is impossible to say what ought to be considered moderate speed under all circumstances. It has been said by this court, in respect to steamers, that they are bound to reduce their speed to such a rate as will enable them to stop in time to avoid a collision after an approaching vessel comes in sight, provided such approaching vessel is herself going at the moderate speed required by law. It is not perceived why the considerations which demand a slackening of speed on the part of steamers in foggy weather are not equally persuasive in the case of sailing vessels. principal reason for such reduction of speed is that it will give vessels time to avoid a collision after coming in sight of each other. If two steam vessels are approaching upon converging courses at a combined rate of speed of thirty miles an hour, and are only able to see each other three or four lengths off, it would be practically impossible to avert a collision; whereas, if each were going at the lowest rate of speed consistent with good steerageway, a collision might easily be avoided by stopping and reversing their engines, or by a quick turn of the wheel and an order to go ahead at full speed. While sailing vessels have the right of way as against steamers, they are bound not to embarrass the latter, either by changing their course or by such a rate of speed as will prevent the latter from avoiding them. There is also the contingency that a schooner sailing with the wind free, as in this case, may meet a vessel closehauled, in which case the latter has the right of way, and the former is bound to avoid her. Beyond this, however, a steamer usually relies for her keeping clear of a sailing vessel in a fog upon her ability to stop and reverse her engines; whereas, it is impossible for a sailing vessel to reduce her speed or stop her headway without maneuvers which would be utterly impossible after the two vessels come in sight of each other. Indeed she can do practically nothing beyond putting her helm up or down to "ease the blow" after the danger of collision has become imminent. The very fact that a sailing vessel can do "so little by man-[549] euvering is a strong reason for so moderating her speed as to furnish effective aid to an approaching steamer charged with the duty of avoiding her. In this case the Golden Rule, though not pursuing the most frequented path of coastwhere other vessels were frequently met, and wise commerce, was sailing through waters not far from the usual track of transatlantic steamers. Her foghorn was heard by the steamer but once, or possibly twice, while if the vessels had been proceeding at the speed required by law, their signals would have been exchanged so many times that the locality and course of each would have been clearly made known to the other. In other words, sufficient time would have been given for the steamer to have taken the proper steps to avoid the schooner. Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the courts below were right in condemning the schooner for immoderate speed. 2. An important question of damages remains to be considered. Libellants, as bailees for the owners of the cargo, proceeded against and were held entitled to recover of the steamship the entire value of the cargo, but the latter was allowed to recoup one half of this amount from one half the amount of damages suffered by the schooner. This appears to have been done upon the authority of The North Star, 106 U. S. 17 [27:91], in which it was held that, where a collision occurred through the mutual fault of two vessels, one of which was sunk and the other of which was damaged, the owners of the sunken vessel were not entitled under the limited liability act to an entire exoneration from liability, but that the damage done to both vessels should have been added together in one sum, and equally divided, and a decree should have been pronounced in favor of the vessel which suffered most against the one which suffered least, for half the difference between the amounts of their respective losses. A similar ruling was made in The Manitoba, 122 U. S. 97 [30: 1095], and in The Stoomvaart Maatschappy Nederland v. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nav. Co. L. K. 7 App. Cas. 795. But libellants insist in this connection that the act of February 13, 1893, known as [550]the Harter act, has modified the previous existing relations between the vessel and her cargo, and has an important bearing upon this branch of the case. By the third section of that act, the owner of a seaworthy vessel (and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a vessel will be presumed to be seaworthy) is no longer responsible to the cargo for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or management. This section is made applicable to "any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in the United States;" and we know of no reason why a foreign vessel like the Golden Rule, engaged in carrying a cargo from a foreign port to Boston, is not entitled to the benefit of this provision. Had the cargo of the schooner arrived at Boston in a dainaged condition, it is clear that the vessel might have pleaded the statute in exoneration of her liability, if the damage had occurred through a fault or error in navigation, such, for instance, as a collision due wholly or partly to her own fault. So, if a vessel and cargo be totally lost by such fault, we know of no reason why the owner of the vessel is not entitled to the benefit of this section, as well as to his exemption under the limited liability act. The reasons which influenced this court to hold in the case of The Scotland, 105 U. 8. 24 [26: 1001], that the limited liability act applied to owners of foreign as well as domestic vessels, and to acts done on the high seas, as well as in the waters of the United States, apply with even greater cogency to this act. "In administering justice," said Mr. Justice Bradley, p. 29 [26: 1003], "between parties, it is essential to know by what law, or code, or system of laws, their mutual rights are to be determined. When they arise in a particular country or state, they are generally to be determined by the law of that state. Those laws pervade all transactions which take place where they prevail, and give them their color and legal effect. But if a collision occurs on the high seas, where the law of no particular state has exclusive force, but all are equal, any forum called upon to settle the rights of the parties would prima facie determine them by its own law, as presumptively expressing the rules of justice; ..if it *be the legislative will that any particular [551] privilege should be enjoyed by its own citizens alone, express provision will be made to that effect. But the great mass of the laws are, or are intended to be, expressive of the rules of justice, and are applicable alike to all. . . . But there is no demand for such a narrow construction of our statute" (as was given by the English courts to their limited liability act), "at least to that part of it which prescribes the general rule of limited responsibility of shipowners. And public policy, in our view, requires that the rules of maritime law as accepted by the United States should apply to all alike, as far as it can properly be done. If there are any specific provisions of our law which cannot be applied to foreigners, or foreign ships, they are not such as interfere with the operation of the general rule of limited responsibility. That rule and the mode of enforcing it are equally applicable to all. They are not restricted by the terms of the statute to any nationality or domicil. We think they should not be restricted by construction." It will be observed that the language of the Harter act is more specific in its definition of the vessels to which it is applicable, than the limited liability act, which simply uses the words "any vessel," whereas, by the third section of the Harter act, it is confined to "any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in the United States." Where Congress has thus defined the vessels to which the act shall apply, we have no right to narrow the definition. It may work injustice in particular cases where the exemptions are accorded to vessels of foreign nations which have no corresponding law, but this is not a matter within the purview of the courts. It is not improbable that similar provisions may ultimately be incorporated in the general maritime law. Indeed, the act has been already held by this court applicable to foreign as well as to domestic vessels. (The Silvia, 171 U. S. 462 [ante, 241].) See also The Etona, 64 Fed. Rep. 880; The Silvia [35 U. S. App. 395], 63 Fed. Rep. 230. Assuming, then, that the Harter act applies to foreign vessels, we are next to inquire into its effect upon the division of damages in this case. It was held by this court in the case of The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302 [23:[552] 863]. that an innocent owner of a cargo is not bound to pursue both colliding vessels, though both may be in fault, but is entitled to a decree against one alone for the entire amount of his damages. It was held by the |
