foreign tribunals in their relations to the state courts, they are tribunals of a different sovereignty, exercising a distinct and independent jurisdiction, and are bound to give to the judgments of the state courts only the same faith and credit which the courts of another state are bound to give to them." 95 U. S. 732 [24: 572). ruled that "neither the constitutional pro- | States are not required to give effect to But while these propositions are conceded, it is insisted that the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Texas was bound to treat this judgment rendered by one of the courts of the state of Texas as if it were strictly a domestic judgment drawn in question in one of those courts, and to hold that it therefore could not be assailed collaterally. And in Goldey v. Morning News, where the authorities are extensively cited, Mr. Justice Gray said: "It is an elementary principle of jurisprudence, that a court of justice cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person torial jurisdiction, except by actual service[568] of notice within the jurisdiction upon him or upon someone authorized to accept service in his behalf, or by his waiver, by general appearance or otherwise, of the want of due service. Whatever effect a constructive service may be allowed in the courts of the same government, it cannot be recognized as valid by the courts of any other government. For example, under the provisions of one who has no residence within its terri If a judgment is rendered in one state against two partners jointly, after serving notice upon one of them only, under a statute of the state providing that such service shall be sufficient to authorize a judgment against both, yet the judgment is of no force or effect in a court of another state, or in a court of the United States, against the partner who was not served with process. We are of opinion that this contention cannot be sustained, and that the courts of the of the Constitution of the United States and United States sitting in Texas are no more the acts of Congress, by which judgments of shut out from examining into jurisdiction the courts of one state are to be given full than if sitting elsewhere, or than the courts faith and credit in the courts of another of another state. A domestic judgment is the state, or of the United States, such a judgjudgment of a domestic court, and a domestic ment is not entitled to any force or effect, court is a court of a particular country or sov- unless the defendant was duly served with ereignty. Undoubtedly the judgments of notice of the action in which the judgment courts of the United States are domestic was rendered, or waived the want of such judgments of the nation, while in the partic- notice. [567]ular *state in which rendered they are entitled to be regarded as on the same plane in many senses as judgments of the state; and so the judgments of the courts of the several states are not to be treated by each other or by the courts of the United States as in every sense foreign judgments. But the courts of the United States are tribunals of a different sovereignty, and exercise a distinct and independent jurisdiction from that exercised by the state courts, and this is true in respect of the courts of the several states as between each other. And the courts of the United States are bound to give to the judgments of the state courts the same faith and credit that the courts of one state are bound to give to the judgments of the courts of her sister states. The same rule applies to each, and the question of jurisdiction is open to inquiry even when the judgment of the court of a state comes under consideration in a court of the United States, sitting in the same state. Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290 [18: 475]; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350 [21: 959]; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 [24: 565]; Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151 [28: 101]; Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518 [39: 517]. In Pennoyer v. Neff, Mr. Justice Field, after discussing the question how far a judgment rendered against a nonresident, without any service upon him, or his personal appearance, was entitled to any force in the state in which it was rendered, said: "Be that as it may, the courts of the United So, a judgment rendered It must be remembered that this action was far to defeat that right if it should be held | that he was cut off in the circuit court from proving that he was not a citizen and resident of Texas when the controverted action was commenced, and that he had not authorized any attorney to appear for him in that action. As any provisions by statute for the rendition of judgment against a person not a citizen or resident of a state, and not served with process or voluntarily appearing to an action against him therein, would not be according to the course of the common law, it must follow that he would be entitled to show that he was not such citizen or resident, and had not been served or appeared by himself or attorney. Accordingly, it was held in Needham v. Thayer, 147 Mass. 536, that a defendant in an action brought in Massachusetts on a judgment in personam in that state, might set up in defense that he was at the time the original action was brought a nonresident, and neither was served personally with process nor appeared therein. And so in New York, when a judgment of a court of that state was drawn in question, which had been entered against a nonresident, who was not, during the pendency of the proceedings, within the jurisdiction of the state. Vilas v. Plattsburgh & Montreal Railroad Company, 123 N. Y. 440 [9 L. R. A. 844]. There the rule that domestic judgments against a party not served, but for whom an attorney appeared without authority, cannot be attacked collaterally, was adhered to; yet the court of appeals declined to apply it to a case where the defendant was a nonresident and not within the jurisdiction during the pendency of the proceedings, such judgments being held to be not strictly domestic but to fall within the principle applicable to judgments of the courts of other states, in respect of which Andrews, J., delivering the opinion of the court said: "It is well settled that in an action brought in our courts on a judgment of a court of a sister state the jurisdiction of the court to render the judgment may be assailed by proof that the defendant was not served and did not appear in the action, or where an ap[570]pearance was entered by an attorney, that the appearance was unauthorized, and this even where the proof directly contradicts the record." * We do not understand any different view to obtain in Texas. In Fowler v. Morrill, 8 Tex. 153, it was held that the acceptance of service of process by an attorney is only prima facie evidence of his authority. In Parker v. Spencer, 61 Tex. 155, the court decided that a judgment did not affect a party who had not been served, but who, on the record, appeared by an attorney not authorized to so appear, and it was said: "And as he had not been made a party to the suit by any of the modes known to the law, he would not be bound by the judgment. But he had the option either to have it vacated by direct proceedings or else to treat it as void in any collateral proceeding where rights might be asserted against him by reason of the same." In Bender v. Damon, 72 Tex. 92, which is much in point, Chief Justice Stayton states the case as follows: "The petition alleges substantially the facts necessary to be alleged in an action of trespass to try title, and the petition was sc indorsed. Had it done this and no more, there could have been no ground for controversy in the court below as to its jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause, nor as to the sufficiency of the petition on general demurrer. The appellant, however, sought to remove cloud from his title, which a judg ment in his favor in an action of trespass to try title would have accomplished as against the defendants, and to obtain this relief he undertook to show that appellees were claiming under a sheriff's sale and deed under an execution issued from the district court for Navarro county, on a judgment rendered by that court against him and in favor of S. J. T. Johnson, all of which he claimed were invalid. "Some of the facts which he alleged to show the invalidity of that judgment, execution, and sale, were such as might entitle him, by a proper proceeding, to have had them vacated, but not such as to render them void. "The petition, however, went further, and alleged facts which, if true, would render the judgment void. It alleged that the plaintiff was a nonresident of this state; that he never was cited to appear, and did[571] not appear in person or by attorney in the proceeding in which the judgment in favor of Johnson and against himself was dered; and that appellees claimed through an execution and sale made under a judg ment so rendered. If these averments be true the judgment was void, and no one could acquire rights under it." ren We think the circuit court was clearly right in admitting evidence to contradict the recital that Newell was a citizen and resident of Texas, and to show that the attorney had no authority to represent him. Nor can this judgment be held conclusive on the theory that the suit of McGrael v. Newell was in the nature of a proceeding in rem. The property was not taken into custody by attachment, or otherwise, and the suit depended entirely on the statutes of Texas providing the procedure for the trial of the title to real estate, which contained at that time no particular provision for bringing in nonresidents of the state. There was a statute providing generally that in suits against nonresidents service could be had by publication, and that statute provided that if the plaintiff, or his agent, or attorney, when the suit was instituted, or during its progress, made affidavit before the clerk of the court that defendant was not a resident of the state of Texas, or that he was absent from the state, or that he was a transient person, or that his residence was unknown, then a citation should issue which should be published in a newspaper. Tex. 1848, 106, chap. 95. This statute was applicable to all suits, and so far as actions against nonresidents were personal, judg ment on citation by publication would not be conclusive. And the law also required Acts that where any judgment was rendered on 691, 699]; Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 3. a A suit brought by a receiver appointed by Federal court, to accomplish the ends sought by the suit in which the appointment was made, is ancillary so far as the jurisdiction of the Federal court is concerned; and where the jurisdiction of the main suit depends on diverse citizenship, and the decree of the circuit court of appeals is therefore final therein, the judgment and decree of the ancillary litigation are also final. Moreover, the record in McGrael v. Newell shows that the suit was not brought as against a nonresident of the state, it being alleged in plaintiff's petition that defendant resided in Brazoria county, Texas. So that even if it were held that the statutes of the state, taken together, authorized suits of this character to be brought against nonresidents as proceedings in rem, this cannot be asserted as to this suit; and it affirmatively appeared that no citation by publication could have been had. The citation prayed for was to be addressed to the proper officer of Brazoria county, to be served on defendant as a resident of that county; no citation by Submitted January 30, 1899. Decided publication was asked for, and no record of the facts on which the case was The mere order of a Federal court appointIng a receiver does not enable the receiver to invoke Federal jurisdiction, independently of the ground of jurisdiction of the suit in which the order was entered. [No. 303.] April 3, 1899. PPEAL from a decree of the United tried was kept as required by statute, A States Circuit Court of Appeals for the and the whole case was tried as a case Treated as a personal action, brought as against a resident, when the facts appeared that defendant was not a resident of the state of Texas and was not served in that state, and had not appeared by attorney, then the judgment ceased to be binding. The result is the same if the suit were regarded as brought under a statute making provision for the bringing of suits to settle the title to lands in Texas, since that proceeding would have been purely statutory, and not according to the course of the common law, and the record did not show that it was instituted in the manner required by the stat[573]ute, or appearance *had or waived as re quired, or that the jurisdiction of the court in fact so attached as to authorize the court to render the judgment. Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350 [21: 959]. It follows that the question propounded must be answered in the affirmative. the District of Indiana in favor of Charles E. Pope, receiver of the Chicago & South Atlantic Railroad Company in a suit in equity brought by him against the Louisville, New Albany, & Chicago Railway Company, defendant, to recover certain property and property rights, held and claimed by defendant. The decree of reversal by the Circuit Court of Appeals gives instructions to dismiss the suit. On motion to dismiss the appeal. Dismissed. See same case below, 53 U. S. App. 332; also same case, 169 U. S. 737, 42 L. ed. 1216. Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: Ball and Pettit filed their bill in the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois alleging that Ball was a citizen of Indiana and that Pettit was a citizen of Wisconsin, and that defendants were citizens of Indiana and Illinois, which suit was discontinued as to Ball, leaving I'ettit, a citizen of Wisconsin, the sole complainant. Pope was appointed, in substitution for one Fish, receiver of the *Chicago & [574) South Atlantic Railroad Company of Illinois, the order containing, among other things, the following: "And it is further ordered that the defendant, the said Chicago & South Atlantic Railroad Company, or whoever may have possession thereof, do assign, transfer, and deliver over to such receiver under the direction of Henry W. Bishop, a master in chancery of this court, all the property, real and personal, wheresoever found in this district, and all contracts for the purchase of land, and all other equitable interests, things in action, and other effects which belonged to, or were held in trust for, said defendant railroad company, or in which it had any beneficial interest, including the stock books of said railroad company, in the same condition they were at the time of exhibiting the said bill of complaint in this cause, except as far as necessarily changed in the proper management of said road, or in which it now has any such interest, and that said defendant, Chicago & South Atlantic Railroad Company, deliver over, in like manner all books, vouchers, bills, notes, contracts, and other evidences relating thereto, and also the stock books of said railroad company. "And it is further ordered that the said receiver have full power and authority to inquire after, receive and take possession of all such property, debts, equitable interests, things in action, and other effects, and for that purpose to examine said defendant, its officers, and such other persons as he may deem necessary on oath before said master from time to time." Afterwards a further order was entered, nunc pro tunc, as follows: Atlantic Railroad Company, and who is a The cause went to hearing, and a money decree was rendered by the circuit court in favor of Pope, receiver, against appellee, which appellee was adjudged by that decree to pay. An appeal having been prosecuted to the circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit, a motion was made to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, and the motion, overruled. On final hearing the decree of [57] the circuit court was reversed by the circuit court of appeals, with instructions to dismiss the amended bill. The opinion of the circuit court of appeals was filed June 12, 1897. 53 U. S. App. 332. Thereafter a petition for a rehearing was filed and denied. Subsequent"And now comes the receiver, Charles E. ly Pope, receiver, applied to this court for a Pope, of said Chicago & South Atlantic Rail-writ of certiorari, which application was deroad Company, and on his application it is nied March 7, 1898. 169 U. S. 737 [42: ordered and directed that said receiver have 1216]. On March 23 Pope moved the circuit full power and authority to bring and prose-court of appeals for leave to file a second pecute any and all necessary suits for the col-tition for rehearing, and the motion was overlection of any claims, choses in action, and ruled. Pope then applied to the circuit court enforcement of any and every kind and nature, and to defend all suits and actions touching the rights or interests of the property or effects of any kind in his possession or under his control as receiver. This order to be entered now as of the date of his appointment and qualification as receiver." [575] *Soon after, Pettit filed his bill in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Indiana, averring that he was a citizen of the state of Wisconsin, against "the said Chicago & South Atlantic Railroad Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Indiana and state of Illinois, by the consolidation of an Illinois corporation of the same name of defendant herein, and an Indiana corporation known as 'the Chicago & South Atlantic Railroad Company of Indiana.'" L'ope was appointed receiver on that bill, the order being similar in its terms to that entered in the circuit court for the northern district of Illinois. After such appointment, and on July 12, 1881, Pope, as receiver, filed his bill of complaint in the circuit court for the district of Indiana, seeking to recover certain property and property rights held and claimed by certain of the defendants which appellant claimed belonged to the Chicago & South Atlantic Railroad Company and to the ownership of or right to which he had succeeded as such receiver. The amended bill on which the cause was heard stated that "your orator, Charles E. Pope, who is receiver of the Chicago & South of appeals for an appeal to this court which Messrs. Henry W. Blodgett, G. W. Kretzinger, and E. C. Field, for appellee, in favor of motion to dismiss: This suit is ancillary to the Pettit suits. White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36, 40 L. ed. 67; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 16 L. ed. 749; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, 28 L. ed. 145: Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co. 123 U. S. 329, 31 L. ed. 179; Re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 37 L. ed. 689; Root v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 401, 37 L. ed. 1123; Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47, 39 L. ed. 341; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 216, 21 L. ed. 452; Carey v. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 161 U. S. 115, 40 L. ed. 638; Gregory v. Van Ee, 160 U. S. 643, 40 L. ed. 566; Pacific R. Co. V. Missouri P. R. Co. 111 U. S. 522, 28 L. ed. 504; Borgmeyer v. Idler, 159 U. S. 413, 40 L. ed. 201; Smith v. Rackliffe, 59 U. S. App. 427, 87 Fed. Rep. 964, 31 C. C. A. 328; Brisenden v. Chamberlain, 53 Fed. Rep. 310; Davies v. Lathrop, 12 Fed. Rep. 353. As to jurisdiction resting upon Federal questions. Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 164 U. S. 105, 41 L. ed. 367; Ex parte Jones, 164 U. S. 693, 41 L. ed. 601. Mr. John S. Miller, for appellant, in opposition to motion: | was made final by the act of March 3, 1891, this appeal must be dismissed; and it was so made final if the jurisdiction of the circui court depended entirely on diverse citizen This appeal lies as of right under cl. 3, The equitable title to real interests, as well as the title to personal property and equitable interests, passes to the receiver, and in suits in equity by the receiver no assignment is necessary. The order of the court is the effective thing. Mann v. Pentz. 2 Sandf. Ch. 257; Iddings v. Bruen, 4 Sandf. Ch. 417; Albany City Bank v. Schermerhorn, Clarke, Ch. 298; Porter v. Williams, 9 N. Y. 142, 59 Am. Dec. 519; Atty. Gen. v. Atlantic Mut. L. Ins. Co. 100 N. Y. 282. The jurisdiction in this case was not dependent entirely on diverse citizenship. Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L. ed. 257; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. ed. 97; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 37 L. ed. 867. This suit by a receiver of a Federal court is a case arising under the laws of the United States. Stuart v. Boulware, 133 U. S. 78, 33 L. ed. 568; Union Bank v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U. S. 223, 34 L. ed. 341; Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322, 15 L. ed. 164; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 21 L. ed. 447; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 36 L. ed. 829; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 18 L. ed. 257; Feibelman v. Packard, 109 Ú. S. 421, 27 L. ed. 984; Bock v. Perkins, 139 U. S. 628, 35 L. ed. 314; Keihl v. South Bend, 44 U. S. App. 687, 76 Fed. Rep. 921, 22 C. C. A. 618, 36 L. R. A. 228; Jewett v. Whitcomb, 69 Fed. Rep. 417; Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375, 37 L. ed. 209; Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Texas C. R. Co. 137 U. S. 171, 34 L. ed. 625; Benjamin v. New Orleans, 169 U. S. 161, 42 L. ed. 700. The orders appointing complainant receiver and authorizing him to bring this suit "were entered, and all action of the court in the premises taken, by virtue of judicial power possessed and exercised under the Constitution and laws of the United States." Teras & P. R. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 36 L. ed. 829; White v. Ewing, 31 U. S. App. 178, 66 Fed. Rep. 2, 13 C. Č. A. 276, 159 U. S. 36, 40 L. ed. 67; Price v. Abbott, 17 Fed. Rep. 506; Armstrong v. Trautman, 36 Fed. Rep. 275. The complainant, receiver herein, is as much an officer of the court under and by virtue of the Constitution and laws of the United States as are the receivers of national banks. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, [576] Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court: If the decree of the circuit court of appeals The circuit courts of the United States have original jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature, at law or in equity, by reason of the citizenship of the parties, in cases between citizens of different states, or between citizens of a state and aliens; and, by reason of the cause of action, "in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made or which shall be made under their authority," as, for instance, suits arising under the patent or copyright laws of the United States. Press Publishing Company v. Monroe, 164 U. S. 105 [41: 367]. Diversity of citizenship confers jurisdiction, irrespective of the cause of action. But if the cause of action arises under the Con-[577] stitution, or laws, or treaties, of the United States, then the jurisdiction of the circuit court may be maintained irrespective of citizenship. The circuit court undoubtedly had jurisdiction of this suit on the ground of diversity of citizenship, not only because that fact existed in respect of complainant and defendants, but because the suit was ancillary to those in which the receiver was appointed. When an action or suit is commenced by a receiver, appointed by a circuit court, to accomplish the ends sought and directed by the suit in which the appointment was made, such action or suit is regarded as ancillary so far as the jurisdiction of the circuit court as a court of the United States is concerned; and we have repeatedly held that jurisdiction of these subordinate actions or suits is to be attributed to the jurisdiction on which the main suit rested; and hence that where jurisdiction of the main suit is predicated on diversity of citizenship, and the decree therein is, therefore, made final in the circuit court of appeals, the judgments and decrees in the ancillary litigation are also final. Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47 [39: 341]; Gregory v. Van Ee, 160 U. S. 643 [40: 566]; Carey v. Houston & T. C. Railway Company, 161 Ú. S. 115 [40: 638]. It is true that Rouse v. Letcher and Gregory v. Van Ee were proceedings on intervention, but Carey v. Houston & T. C. Railway Company arose on an original bill in the nature of a bill of review. In that case we took occasion to quote from the opinion of Mr. Justice Miller in Milwaukee & Minnesota R. Company v. Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Company, 2 Wall. 609 [17: 886], in which the distinction is pointed out between sup plemental and ancillary, and independent and original, proceedings, in the sense of the rules of equity pleading, and such proceedings "in the sense which this court has sanctioned with reference to the line which divides the jurisdiction of the Federal courts from that of the state courts." Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276 [28: 145]; Pacifio Railway Co. v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. 111 U. S. 505 [28: 498], and other cases were cited the bill held to be ancillary to the suit the decree in which was attacked; and the |