3. Since the provision in question did not cover delays in deliveries, it could not possibly be a reasonable forecast of just compensation for damage caused by breach of contract.

4. Congress did not expressly grant the power to impose penalties as sanctions to the program adopted pursuant to the Lend-Lease Act; and that power may not be implied.

Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Murphy agreed, filed a dissenting opinion, holding that the judgment of the Court of Claims should be affirmed.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter also filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Vinson joined.


ACT OF AUGUST 27, 1937.

See Taking V.

ACT OF JUNE 28, 1940

See Suit For Salary IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV.

See Suit For Salary XI.


I. Where the plaintiff California Zinc Company was the
owner of all of the stock of the plaintiff Eastern Rail-
way; and where all of the stock of the California Zinc
Company was owned by the Glidden Company, a
paint manufacturer, which operated the Zinc
Company in order to secure an adequate and continu-
ous supply of zinc and its derivatives; and where, in
turn, the Zinc Company operated the Railway
Company to transport the zinc from the mines to the
nearest common carrier and was the only means of
access to the mines; it is held that in the circumstances
plaintiffs are entitled to maintain the joint action in
the instant suit, for the taking of a part or all of the
property belonging to the two plaintiffs. California
Zinc Company Et Al., 440.

II. The operation of the zinc mines and the railroad
company was a single integrated enterprise, either
one of which was of little or no value without the
other, and plaintiffs are entitled to recover not only
the value of the part taken, if any, but also the
consequential damage, if any, to the remainder. See
United States v. Powelson, 118 F. (2d) 79, 88. Id.
III. Where it is necessary to do so in order to render justice,
the courts have not infrequently disregarded separate
corporate entities and treated two corporations as
one. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, and
cases there cited; Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247
U. S. 330; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U. S. 71.


See Eminent Domain I, II, III, IV, V.

109 C. Cls.



I. Where the Government draws specifications which
are fairly susceptible of a certain construction and
the contractor so construes them, justice and equity
require that construction to be adopted. Peter
Kiewit Sons' Company (No. 46432), 390.

II. Where one of the parties to a contract draws the docu-
ment and uses language which is susceptible of more
than one meaning, and the intention of the parties
does not otherwise appear, that meaning will be
given the document which is more favorable to the
party who did not draw it; and this rule is especially
applicable to a Government contract where the
contractor has nothing to say as to its provisions.
Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall. 407; Chambers v. United
States, 24 C. Cls. 387; Callahan Construction Co. v.
United States, 91 C. Cls. 538, 611; Blair v. United
States, 99 C. Cls. 71, 135; 321 U. S. 730. Id.

See Contracts XXXVIII, LXXVII.


See Personal Injury I, II, III.


See Taxes IV, V, VI.


See Contracts XV, XVI, XVII.


See Suit For Salary IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII,



See Taxes V.


See Suit For Salary XVI, XVII, XVIII.

See Suit For Salary XVIII.
See Taking II.


I. Whether or not the contract required plaintiff to pay
the increased wages to common laborers was not a
question of fact but of law; and the contract did not
require plaintiff to appeal to the contracting officer
a ruling of the project engineer on the legal inter-
pretation of the contract. Paretta Construction
Company, 324.

109 C. Cls.


II. The provision of the contract in suit that the decision
of the contracting officer as to the proper interpreta-
tion of all drawings and specifications should be final,
subject to appeal, cannot be employed to oust the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to construe the
legal effect of those provisions of the specifications
which are in seeming conflict and to determine the
question of law involved. Stafford, 479.


See also Contracts LXVII, LXXI, LXXVII.

I. Where contractor entered into a contract with the
Government for road construction, which it was
unable to complete within the specified contract time;
and where the Government did not terminate the
contract, as requested, but issued a suspension order,
and the contractor, after the suspension, resumed
performance and completed the performance; it is
held that the contract remained in force, including its
provision for liquidated damages, and plaintiff,
surety, is not entitled to recover. United States v.
American Surety Company, 322 U. S. 96, distin-
guished. Dineen, Supt., 18.

II. The difficulty of determining exact damages is the
reason and justification for the insertion of the
agreement for liquidated damages. See Lebanon
Woolen Mills, Inc. v. The United States, 99 C. Cls.


III. In a suit against the Government seeking a refund of a
portion of the transportation and marine insurance
charges on articles sold to defendant for shipment to
the Canal Zone, the Court of Claims takes judicial
notice that on December 30, 1941, when the invita-
tion for bids was issued, the United States was at war
with both Germany and Japan, and that German
submarines were at large in the Atlantic Ocean.
Ellicott Machine Corporation, 62.

IV. While the contract obligated plaintiff to include war
risk insurance as a part of the shipping costs, neither
the contract for shipper to supply dredging parts to
be delivered free of all charges at Cristobal, Canal
Zone, nor invitation for bids, nor change order issued
by the United States, on account of wartime sub-
marine menace to shipping, permitting delivery to
be made at shipper's plant instead of at Cristobal

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