« ForrigeFortsett »
PRODUCTION CREDIT CORPORATIONS
The Central Bank for Cooperatives, the Production Credit Corporations, Production Credit Associations, and Banks for Cooperatives, organized under the act, and their obligations, shall be deemed to be instrumentalities of the United States, and as such, any and all notes, debentures, bonds, and other such obligations issued by such banks, associations, or corporations, shall be exempt both as to principal and interest from all taxation (except surtaxes, estate, inheritance, and gift taxes) now or hereafter imposed by the United States
*. Such banks, associations, and corporations, their property, their franchises, capital, reserves, surplus, and other funds, and their income, shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States
; except that any real property and any tangible personal property of such banks, associations and corporations shall be subject to Federal
taxation to the same extent as other similar property is taxed. The exemption provided herein shall not apply with respect to any Production Credit Association or its property or income after the stock held in it by the Production Credit Corporation has been retired, or with respect to the Central Bank for Cooperatives, or any Production Credit Corporation or Bank for Cooperatives, or its property or income after the stock held in it by the United States has been retired. (June 16, 1933, c. 98, $ 63, 48 Stat. 267.) (U. S. C., Title 12 | 1138c.)
RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION
Any and all notes, debentures, bonds, or other such obligations issued by the corporation shall be exempt both as to principal and interest from all taxation (except surtaxes, estate, inheritance, and gift taxes) now or hereafter imposed by the United States
*. The corporation, including its franchise, its capital, reserves, and surplus, and its income shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States
(Jan. 22, 1932, c. 8, § 10, 47 Stat. 9.) (U. S. C., Title 15, 8 610.)
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any privilege or consent to tax expressly or impliedly granted thereby, the shares of preferred stock of national banking associations, and the shares of preferred stock, capital notes, and debentures of State banks and trust companies, heretofore or hereafter acquired by Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the dividends or interest derived therefrom by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, shall not, so long as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation shall continue to own the same, be subject to any taxation by the United States,
(Mar. 20, 1936, c. 160, § 1, 49 Stat. 1185.) (U. S. C., Title 12, § 51d.)
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
All of such bonds so issued and sold shall have all the rights and privileges accorded by law to Panama Canal bonds authorized by section 8 of the Act of June 28, 1902, chapter 1302, as amended by the Act of Dec. 21, 1905 (ch. 3, sec. 1, 34 Stat. 5), as now compiled in section 743 of title 31 of the United States Code. (May 18, 1933, c. 32, § 15, 48 Stat. 67.) (U. S. C., Title 16, 88 831 and 831n.)
NOTE.- Panama Canal bonds issued as above were exempt from all taxes and duties of the United States. Under interpretative authority such exemption does not extend to estate, inheritance or gift taxes.
UNITED STATES HOUSING AUTHORITY
The Authority, including but not limited to its franchise, capital, reserves, surplus, loans, income, assets, and property of any kind, shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States
Obligations, including interest thereon issued by public housing agencies in connection with low-rent-housing or slum-clearance projects, and the income derived by such agencies from such projects, shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States. (Sept. 1, 1937, c. 896, § 5 (e), 50 Stat. 890.) (U. S. C., Title 42, § 1405 (e).)
Such obligations issued shall be exempt, both as to principal and interest, from all taxation (except surtaxes, estate, inheritance and gift taxes) now or hereafter imposed by the United States
(Sept. 1, 1937, c. 896, § 20 (b), 50 Stat. 898.) (U. S. C., Title 42, § 1420 (b).)
UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION
They shall be exempt, both as to principal and interest, from all taxation (except surtaxes, estate, inheritance, and gift taxes) now or hereafter imposed by the United States,
(Merchant Marine Act, 1936, sec. 1105 (c), 52 Stat. 972, as added by June 23, 1938, c. 600, sec. 46.)
NOTE.—The instruments referred to are mortgage debentures issued under section 1105 (a) of the Act of June 23, 1938. 98907_-39-Pr, 1-45
WAR FINANCE CORPORATION
Any and all bonds issued by the corporation shall be exempt, both as to principal and interest, from all taxation imposed by the United States except (a) estate or inheritance taxes, and (b) graduated additional income taxes, commonly known as surtaxes, and excess-profits and war-profits taxes, now or hereafter imposed by the United States upon the income or profits of individuals, partnerships, corporations, or associations. The interest on an amount of such bonds the principal of which does not exceed in the aggregate $5,000, owned by any individual, partnership, corporation, or association, shall be exempt from the taxes referred to in clause (b). The corporation, including its franchise and the capital and reserve or surplus thereof and the income derived therefrom, shall be exempt from all taxation imposed by the United States
(Apr. 5, 1918, c. 45, g 16, 40 Stat. 511.) (U. S. C., Title 15, $ 344.)
(C) INSULAR AND PANAMA CANAL BONDS; ANNUITIES
PANAMA CANAL BONDS OF 1961
and the bonds herein authorized shall be exempt from all taxes or duties of the United States
(Aug. 5, 1909, c. 6, § 39, 36 Stat. 117.)
Bonds issued prior to March 24, 1934, exempt
All bonds issued by the government of the Philippine Islands, or by its authority, shall be exempt from taxation by the Government of the United States
(Feb. 6, 1905, c. 453, § 1, 33 Stat. 689.) (U. S. C., Title 48, $ 1193.)
Bonds issued after March 24, 1934, not exempt
There shall be no obligation on the part of the United States to meet the interest or principal of bonds or other obligations of the government of the Philippine Islands or of the provincial and municipal governments thereof hereafter issued during the continuance of United States sovereignty in the Philippine Islands: Provided, That such bonds and obligations hereafter issued shall not be exempt from taxation in the United States or by authority of the United States. (Mar, 24, 1934, c. 84, 9, 48 Stat. 463.) (U. S. C., Title 48, § 1239.)
PUERTO RICO BONDS
all bonds issued by the government of Puerto Rico, or by its authority, shall be exempt from taxation by the Government of the United States (Mar. 2, 1917, c. 145, § 3, as amended by Aug. 26, 1937, c. 831, § 1, 50 Stat. 844.) (U. S. C., Title 48, 8 745.)
ANNUITIES OF RAILROAD EMPLOYEES
No annuity or pension payment shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever
(Aug. 29, 1935, c. 812, § 12, as amended June 24, 1937, c. 382, Part I, § 1, 50 Stat. 316.) (U. S. C., Title 45, $ 2281.)
NOTE.—The same provision appeared in the 1935 Act (declared unconstitutional). By Sec. 204 of the 1937 Act the old act was continued in force and effect with respect to the rights of individuals granted annuities prior to the date of the enactment of the latter act. (U. S. C., Title 45, $ 224.)
ANNUITIES OF RETIRED FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
SEC. 18. None of the moneys mentioned in this Act shall be assignable, either in law or in equity, or be subject to execution, levy, or attachment, garnishment, or other legal process. (May 29, 1930, c. 349, sec. 18, 46 Stat. 479.) (U. S. C. Title 5, 8 729.)
Part IV–Digest of Opinions Construing the Repeal
Provisions of the Revised Statutes
Sec. 5595. The foregoing seventy-three titles embrace the statutes of the United States general and permanent in their nature, in force on the 1st day of December one thousand eight hundred and seventythree, as revised and consolidated by commissioners appointed under an act of Congress, and the same shall be designated and cited as The Revised Statutes of the United States.
U.S. v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508 Bowen, a Civil War veteran, was drawing a pension for service in the United States Army, during which certain deductions were made from his pay. On September 13, 1876, he entered the Soldiers' Home. This action was to recover the amount of the pension from the time he entered the home until he left it, December 4, 1877. Judgment was rendered in his favor in the United States Court of Claims for $264.60, and the Government appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. The act of 1851 founding the institution provided that pensioners were entitled to the privileges of the home upon transferring their pension for the period they were in it to the Soldiers' Home; and the act of 1859 changing the name to the "Soldiers' Home" provided for such transfer. R. S. 4820 provided: “*
the fact that one to whom a pension has been granted for wounds or disability received in the military service, has not contributed to the funds of the Soldiers' Home, shall not preclude him from admission thereto; but all such pensioners shall surrender their pensions to the Soldiers' Home during the time they remain therein and voluntarily receive its benefits.” It was held the word "such” above quoted distinguished those who had not contributed to the funds of the Soldiers' Home from those who had so contributed. Bowen by his pay reductions while in the service had contributed to the funds of the home. Therefore, he was in the class that were not required to surrender their pensions. The court said: “The Revised Statutes must be treated as the legislative declaration of the statute law on the subjects which they embrace on the 1st day of December, 1873. When the meaning is plain the courts cannot look to the statutes which have been revised to see if Congress erred in that revision, but may do so when necessary to construe doubtful language used in expressing the meaning of Congress." See also Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392, where the court said, “No reference
can be had to the original statutes to control the construction of any section of the Revised Statutes, when its meaning is plain, although in the original statutes it may have had a larger or more limited application than that given to it in the revision," citing U. S. v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508, 513.
Dwight v. Merritt, 140 U. S. 213 Action by an importer against a collector of customs to recover alleged excess duties on a shipment of iron rails from Russia. The collector assessed a duty on the merchandise at 70 cents per hundred pounds under Schedule E, section 2504, Revised Statutes, as "iron bars for railroads or inclined planes.” The importer claimed the merchandise was dutiable at only $8 per ton under the following provision of the same schedule: “Wrought scrap iron of every description: eight dollars per ton. But nothing shall be deemed scrap iron except waste or refuse iron that has been in actual use, and is fit only to be remanufactured.” The importer paid the duty assessed under protest and brought this action to recover the difference between the amount paid and what he claimed he should have paid, or $2,880.65. The jury, under instructions from the court that the only question to be considered was whether the rails had been in actual use, found for the collector. Writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. Judgment affirmed. Before the Supreme Court the importer contended the action of the collector was illegal in assessing as "iron bars for railroads or inclined planes” old iron rails which were not adapted to any such use, but which were imported solely for remanufacture. The law as it stood prior to enactment of the Revised Statutes read: “On all iron imported in bars for railroads or inclined planes made to patterns and fitted to be laid down upon such roads or planes without
further manufacture.” It was contended that no meaning should be attached to the Revised Statutes different from that in the tariff acts. As to this codtention, the court said: “The Revised Statutes are not a mere compilation and consolidation of the laws of Congress in force on the 1st of December, 1873. The object of that revision was to simplify and bring together all statutes and parts of statutes which, from similarity of subject, ought to be brought together, to expunge redundant and obsolete enactments, and to make such alterations as might be necessary to reconcile contradictions and amend imperfections in the original text of the preexisting statutes. All those statutes were abrogated by section 5596." They may be referred to and considered in order to interpret the meaning of obscure and ambiguous phrases in any section of said revision; but no such reference is necessary or proper in order to modify, under the color of interpretation, any phrases the meaning of which is clear and free from any doubt, except what the terms of the statute invoked may suggest. “The title of the Revised Statutes headed 'Duties Upon Imports' is manifestly intended to be a complete system of tariff legislation, and to embrace and provide for every class of imported articles subject to import duties. The clause
(in Schedule E, section 2504)
is in clear, explicit and intelligible language. There is nothing in that clause or in any other clause in that section, or in any other section in that title, which renders the meaning of this particular phrase doubtful or leaves room for interpretation or the interpolation of words taken from other preceding statutes upon the subject."
The Marine City, 6 Fed. Rep. 413 Libel in Admiralty to recover for loss of baggage against a steamship company. Defense was there was no allegation that the loss was caused by design or neglect of the company. R. S. 4282 provided no recovery could be had against owners of vessels for loss or damage to “merchandise” by fire unless such fire is caused by design or neglect of owner. The act of 1851, from which R. S. 4282 was taken, used the term “any goods or merchandise whatsoever.” The court, in determining whether baggage is merchandise within the meaning of the law said the courts could not interpolate words omitted in the revision; and that although the commissioners preparing the Revised Statutes may have thought the word "merchandise” broad enough to include “any goods or merchandise whatsoever,” it did not do so. The court said further: "That the revision ought to be construed not simply as declaring what was the law on the 1st of December 1873, but as changing the law in certain cases, was evidently the opinion of my learned predecessor in Gillet v. Pierce (Brown, Adm. 553), in which he had occasion to hold that the revision expressly gave the right of trial by jury in certain admiralty cases arising upon the Lakes, notwithstanding it had never before existed. It is true the revision was designed simply as a reenactment or codification of the whole body of the national statutory law, but if the legal effect of each section is to be determined by an examination of the original law from which such section was taken, it might as well never have been adopted. Errors and inadvertent omissions are inevitable in a codification of this extent. Many of them were corrected by the act of February 1875, and in the practical application of the revision others will undoubtedly be discovered; but the remedy is with Congress and not in subtle and forced judicial construction
* U. S. v. Moore, 26 Fed. Cas. 15,804 An indictment and plea in abatement that one of the persons composing the grand jury indicting defendant was disqualified by reason of the fact that he had without duress and coercion served in the Confederate Army. The language of the section was contained in an act of 1862, which was repealed by an act of 1871, but was carried into the Revised Statutes as section 820. Held, the juror was not disqualified. The language relied on was not the law on December 1, 1873, having been repealed. The language of this section does not enact or reenact anything as law which was not the law on the 1st day of December 1873, and the carrying into the Revised Statutes of a section of an act which had been expressly repealed prior to that date does not reenact such section.
Wade v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 141 This case was filed May 24, 1872, to recover the proceeds of property under the Abandoned or Captured Property Act of 1863. It was dismissed for want of prosecution May 8, 1876. It again came before the Court of Claims on motion to reinstate it for the purpose of raising on trial the question that the 2 years' limitation on filing suits in the above act was repealed by the Revised Statutes, leaving applicable thereto only the general limitation of 6 years provided for in section 1069.
It was held that R. S. 1069 could not be held to repeal the Abandoned or Captured Property Act, the provisions of that act having been carried into the Revised Statutes as section 1059. Instead of reenacting the full language, for condensation and conciseness, the Revised Statutes merely provided that the
Court should have jurisdiction of "all claims for the proceeds of captured or abandoned property, as provided in the act of Mar. 12, 1863.” The court examined the legislative history and concluded that it was not the intention of Congress to open the jurisdictional limitation of the Abandoned or Captured Property Act by the adoption of the Revised Statutes, and stated: “Where the language of the revision is ambiguous and uncertain, arising from condensation or otherwise, the well-settled meaning, object, and policy of the preexisting laws revised and reenacted therein must be held to be continued as the true interpretation of the legislative will."
SEC. 5596. All acts of Congress passed prior to said first day of December one thousand eight hundred and seventy-three, any portion of which is embraced in any section of said revision, are hereby repealed, and the section applicable thereto shall be in force in lieu thereof; all parts of such acts not contained in such revision, having been repealed or superseded by subsequent acts, or not being general and permanent in their nature: Provided, That the incorporation into said revision of any general and permanent provision, taken from an act making appropriations, or from an act containing other provisions of a private, local, or temporary character, shall not repeal, or in any way affect any appropriation, or any provision of a private, local or temporary character, contained in any of said acts, but the same sha remain in force; and all acts of Congress passed prior to said lastnamed day no part of which are embraced in said revision, shall not be affected or changed by its enactment.
U. S. v. Claflin, et al., 25 Fed. Cas. 14,799 Action brought in the District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover a penalty of double the value of goods alleged to have been bought, concealed and illegally imported. Certain counts of the declaration were based on Section 2 of the act of March 3, 1823 (3 Stat. 781). To these defendants demurred on the ground that this section had been repealed. The court sustained the demurrer, saying: “It is quite clear that the 2d section of the act of March 3, 1823 must be regarded as having been repealed by section 5596 of the Revised Statutes (even if it had not been previously repealed), on the ground that some portion of that act is embraced in the Revised Statutes, the provisions of the first section of that act being embraced in section 3099 of the Revised Statutes, and the provisions of the 2d section of that act not being embraced in any section of the Revised Statutes. The effect of such repeal is to destroy the right of the plaintiffs to recover under said 2d section in respect of any acts done after the enactment of the Revised Statutes. Therefore, counts 7, 9, 11 and 13 of declaration No. 2 are bad." The judgment of the District Court was affirmed by the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York and by the United States Supreme Court, which held (97 U. S. 546) that the 2d section of the act of March 3, 1823 was repealed by the act of July 18, 1866 (14 Stat. 179).
U. S. v. Webster, 21 Fed. Rep. 187 One count of an indictment charged the defendant with unlawfully withholding from its owner a discharge paper. This count was based on the act of May 21, 1872 (c. 178, 17 Stat. 137) which consisted of one section and prescribed punishment for withholding of discharge papers and land warrants. Defendant moved the court to instruct the jury that the law on which this count was based had been repealed, contending
that R. S. 5485 embraced only the portion of the act of May 21, 1872 with respect to land warrants and that by R. S. 5596, therefore, the other portion had been repealed. The motion was denied, the court holding that the act of May 21, 1872 with respect to discharge papers was still in force notwithstanding the enactment of the Revised Statutes. The portion of the act of May 21, 1872 with respect to land warrants was repealed by section 31 of the act of March 3, 1873 (c. 234, 17 Stat. 566, 575) but the portion with respect to discharge papers was not repealed. R. S. 5485 was taken from section 31 of the act of March 3, 1873. The portion of the act of May 21, 1872 with respect to discharge papers which was in force on December 1, 1873, was not carried into the Revised Statutes. Section 5596 of the Revised Statutes provides that acts of Congress passed prior to December 1, 1873, no part of which is embraced in the Revision, shall not be affected or changed by its enactment. No part of the portion of the act of May 21, 1872, with respect to discharge papers having been embraced in the Revised Statutes, it was still in force.