13T Law of New Zealand. DIGEST.

LAW of NEW ZEALAND.—See New Zealand.
LAW of PENANG.— See Penano.
LAW of SCOTLAND.—See Scotland.
LAW of VICTORIA.—See Victoria.
LAW, QUESTION of.—See Fishery, 4.
LAY DAYS.—See Shipping.

LEASE.— See Bankruptcy, 35—37, 50; Landlord And
Tenant (ireland), 1—5, 7, 9.


1. Death of trustee pending completion of saleAppointment of new trusteeLost order.—Pending the proceedings for carrying out a sale directed by an order made under the Settled Estates Act, one of the trustees, who were the conveying parties, died.

The court directed a petition to be presented for the appointment of a new trustee in the place of the deceased trustee.

An original order directing the payment of the dividends of a sum of consols to the tenant for life was lost. The dividends had never been paid, but were represented by a sum of cash.

The court directed that the Record Office should issue a new office copy of the lost order upon the. production of a short affidavit of the loss.—Scott v. Heisch, Ch.div. V.c.b. 108—33 L. T. 498.

2. Disentailing deed on payment out to tenant in tail. —No disentailing deed is required on payment out of court under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act of a fund to a party who would have been in the position of tenant in tail of the land represented by the fund.—In re Woods Settled Estates,—L. R. 20 Eq. 372.

3. Disentailing deed on payment out to tenant in tail. —Upon the payment out of court of the proceeds of sale of settled estates to a person who was tenant in tail of the estates, he was directed to execute a disentailing deed.—Re Broadwood's Settled Estate, Ch.div. M.r. 108—L. R. 1 Ch. D. 438; 45 L. J. Ch. 168.

4. Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Amendment Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 33), ss. 2, 3—Consent to application for salePower of court to dispense with Notice.—Section 3 of the Leases and Soles of Settled Estates Amendment Act, 1874, does not enable the court to dispense with any consent to an application under the principal Act without notice of the application being given, in manner provided by the 2nd section of the Amendment Act, to the person whose consent is required by the principal Act.—Be Bylar, Ch.div. M.r. 949.

5. Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 120), s. 17—Consent to application for saleTrustee for sale.—Where an estate was limited to A. for life, and after her decease upon trusts for sale (with the power to give receipts) and to divide the proceeds in six shares, the beneficial interest being vested,

Held, that the concurrence of the persons beneficially interested in the proceeds was required under section 17 of the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act, for au application for sole under that Act.

Be Pott's Estate, 15 W. R. 29, L. R. 16 Eq. 631, not followed.

Eyre v. Saunders, 4 Jur. N. S. 830,6 W. R. Ch. Dig. disapproved.—Bailey v. Holmes, Ch.div. M.r. 1068.

6. Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 120), s. 14—Cost of making roadsMoney to be invested in landPermanent improvementsConstruction of Act of ParliamentMarginal note.—The

Licensed House, 138

court has no power under the Leases and Sales and of Settled Estates Act, a. 14, to direct be raised by mortgage of an estate for the purpose of making streets upon the estate to be dedicated to the public; and

Semble, the court has no power under that section to direct the making of streets.

The rule which permits the application of a fund in court liable to be laid out in land, to the erection of new buildings upon lands subject to the same uses, is exceptional, and does not extend to permanent improvements generally.

Semble, the marginal note to a section of a statute in the Queen's printers' copy is now an integral part of the statute.—Be Venour's Settlement, Venour v. Sellon, Ch.div. M.r. 752—L. R. 2 Ch. D. 522, 45 L J. Ch. 409.

7. PetitionPersons entitled to presentTenant for lifeConcurrence of parties interested—19 & 20 Vict, c. 120, ss. 2, 16—37 & 38 Vict. c. 33, s. 3.—An order under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Acts can only be made upon the petition of a person who is, within the meaning of the Acts, "entitled to the possession or the receipt of the rents and profits" of the settled estate, and if there is no such person, no order can be made.

The court will not dispense with the concurrence of persons opposing an application under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Acts, if their number and the value of their interests are nearly equal to those of the persons supporting the application.—Taylor v. Taylor, Taylor y.Keily, Ex parte Taylor, Ch.div. M.r. —L. R. 1 Ch. D. 426.

8. PetitionServiceExamination of married woman by commissionerAttestation of signatures.— On a petition by a married woman and her children and others under the Settled Estates Acts,

Held, that an infant born after the presentation of the petition need not be served ; and

Held (contrary to a dictum of Kindersley, V.C., in Be Bendyshe, 5 W. R. 816), that the fact that the signatures of the married woman and the commissioner to her examination had been attested by the husband's solicitor, was no objection to the admission of the certificate.—In re Lewis's Settled Estates, Ch.div. 103.

See also Partition, 2.

LEAVE to AMEND.—See Effing Forest; Practice, 169—171.

LEAVE to DEFEND.—See Practice, 130, 131.

LEAVING SERVICE.—See Master And Servant, 14— 17.

LEGACY DUTY—See Revenue, 4.

LEGITIM.—See Scotland, Law Of, 2.

LETTERS under SIGN MANUAL.—See AdministraTion, 2.


1. Addition to public- liouseLicence—35 & 36 Vict, c. 94, s. 3.—A publican made additfons to his house, and continued his business without a fresh licence.

An information being laid against him under 35 & 36 Vict c. 94, s. 3, for selling liquor without a licence on the additional premises,

Held, that in such a cose it is a question of fact for the magistrates whether the house as altered is substantially the same as the premises already licensed, or whether it is so far a new house as to require a new licence

The court will not interfere with the magistrates' discretion in such a matter unless their decision is 139

Licensed Souse.


Licensed Souse. 140

glaringly wrong.—The Queen v. Raffles and others, Q.b.div. 536—L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 207; 45 L. J. M. 0. 61; 34 L. T. 180.

2. Addition to public-houseRenewal of licenceForm of renewalRestrictions of licence to original •premisesWhether restrictions may be indorsed on renewal licenceLicensing Act, 1872, ss. 42, 48.—By section 48 of the Licensing Act, 1872, "every licence granted after the commencement of the Act shall be in such form as may from time to time be prescribed by the Secretary of State," and " a renewal of a licence may be made by an indorsement on the licence or by the issue of a copy of the old licence."

For some time previously to February, 1874, an inn called "Newill's Hotel" was kept by N., part of the ground floor being let off as a shop. In February, 1874, N. transferred the licence of "Newill's Hotel" to S., who had become tenant of the whole house, including the shop.

In July, 1874, S. took in the shop to the inn, and in August applied for a renewal of his licence. The renewal was not opposed, nor was S. required to attend at the licensing meeting. The justices renewed the licence, but described the licensed premises thereon as "Newill's Hotel," consisting of such parts of the premises as were lately in the occupation of N., "and used by her under and for the purposes of the licence granted to her in renewal of which this licence is granted."

S. appealed to quarter sessions against the insertion of the description.

Held, upon a case stated by quarter sessions, that the licence was not irregular, and that judgment ought to be for the respondents.—Stringer v. Justices of Huddersfield, Q.b.div.—33 L. T. 568.

3. Bona fide travellerNearest public thoroughfare FerryRoad roundLicensing Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 49), «. 10.—The nearest public thoroughfare within section 10 of the Licensing Act, 1875, is rightly calculated across an arm of the sea, across which there is a ferry with a landing place at which persons are entitled to land from their own boats on payment of a tell.—Coulbert v. Troke, 41—L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 1; 45 L. J. M. C. 7; 33 L. T, 340.

4. Carrying on the trades of draper and grocer in adjoining shops with communication betweenSelling intoxicating liquors in the grocer's shopClosing grocer's shop at tenKeeping open draper's shop after ten—Licensing Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 49), «s. 3, 9.—B. carried on business as a draper and grocer in two adjoining shops with communication between them, and an entrance to each from the dwelling part of the premises. He held a licence to sell wine and spirits, which he sold in the grocer's shop, and he regularly closed that shop at the time directed by the Licensing Act, 1874, shutting off all communication between it and the adjoining shop. The draper's shop he kept open later.

Held, that he was not liable to be convicted under an information charging him with having his premises open at a time at which they were directed by law to be closed.—Brigden, Appellant, v. Heighes, Respondent, Q.h.div. 272—45 L. J. M. C. 58; 34 L. T. 2~43.

5. Excise prosecution Notice of appealExcise Acts, G Geo. 4, c. 81, s. 26; 7 * 8 Geo. 4, c. 53, ss. 82, 83; 4 <fe 5 117//. 4, c. 51, s. 23—The Licensing Act, 1872 (35 <t 36 Vict. c. 94), s. 52.—On an excise prosecution under 6 Geo. 4, c. 81, s. 26, the procedure on nppeal by the officer of excise to the court of quarter sessions is regulated by 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 53, ss. 82, 83, and not by section 52 of the Licensing Act, 1872; and it is not required that the notice of such appeal should state the grounds of appeal, or that the

appellant should enter into recognizance or give security by deposit of money or otherwise.—The Queen v. Finucane, Ex. (Ir.)—I. R. 9 C. L. 408.

6. General annual licensing meetingAdjournment Renewed application for licence—Qualification subsequent to original application and previous to renewed applicationLicensing Act, 1872 (35 <fe 36 Vict. c. 94), ss. 68, 69.—M. applied, after giving the requisite notices, at the general annual licensing meeting of the 27th of August, for a licence to sell spirits, &c, by retail not to be consumed upon the premises; the licence was refused on the ground that he did not hold a dealer's licence from the excise. The meeting; was adjourned to the 30th of September. In the interval M. gave fresh notices, and took out a spirit dealer's licence, and at the adjourned meeting renewed his application. The justices refused to entertain the application, on the ground that it was not competent to M. to make a second application at the same annual licensing meeting.

Held, upon a rule for a mandamus to the justices to hear and determine M.'s application, that there had not been any hearing yet, and that the rule must be made absolute.—The Queen v. Justices of Lancashire, Kirhdale Division, Ex parte John Maughan, Q.B.Drv. 205—L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 49; 45 L. J. M. C. 26; 33 L. T. 603.

7. Mandamus—Beerhouse licenceRefusal to grant under 32 & 33 Vict. c. 27, s. 8—Ground of refusal not stated.—Where magistrates refuse to grant a beerhouse licence under 32 & 33 Vict. c. 27, s. 8, they must state upon which of the four grounds specified in that section their refusal is based.

Though there is no appeal against a decision of the magistrates under the Act, yet, if they refuse to give the ground of their decision, a mandamus will lie against them " to hear and determine" the application; the hearing and determining not being complete unless the ground is stated.—The Queen, on the Prosecution of Matthew Sykes, v. D. Sykes and others, Justices of Huddersfield, Q.b.div. 141—L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 52; 45 L. J. M. C. 39.

8. Mandamus—Licensing Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict, c. 27), 8. 8, sub-section 4—"Duly qualified as bylaw required"—26 & 27 Vict. c. 33,8. 1—Non-residence. —The 4th sub-section of section 8 of the Licensing; Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 27), does not make it necessary for an applicant for licences or certificates to hold additional excise licences to sell by retail beer, wine, and spirits to be consumed off the premises, to reside upon the premises in respect of which such licences or certificates are applied for, and personally conduct the business, when he already holds a strong beer dealer's licence.

A mandamus was accordingly granted to justices to hear and determine an application as above, which they had refused on the ground that the applicant did not intend to reside on the premises.—The Queen v. De Rutzen and another, Justices of Glamorganshire, Q.b.div. 343—L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 55; 45 L. J. M. C. 57; 33 L. T. 726.

9. Occasional licence for sale of intoxicating liquorsConsent of justiceIrregularity in obtaining licence—IS & 26 Vict. c. 22, s. 13—26 & 27 Vict. c. 3 3, 8. 20, sub-section 1.—By 25 & 26 Vict. c,,22, s. 13, and 26 & 27 Vict. c. 33, s. 20, sub-section 1, an occasional licence for the sale of intoxicating liquors is to be granted by an officer of excise upon H /ritten consent of a justice "usually acting at th. .ty sessions for the petty sessional division within which the place of Bale is situate." The appellant obtained from a duly authorized officer of excise an occasional licence for the sale of intoxicating liquors; the justice ■who signed the written consent did not usually act for : the petty sessional division within which the place of sale was situate. The appellant having sold intoxicating liquors at the time and place mentioned in th e occasional licence, was convicted by justices of selling intoxicating liquors without a licence. It was not proved that the appellant had acted otherwise than bond fide.

141 Licensed House. DIGEST.

Held, that although an irregularity had been com mitted in obtaining the licence, yet it protected the appellant from penal consequences, and that the conviction was wrong.—Stevens v. Emson, App.—L. E. 1 Ex. D. 100; 45 L. J. M. C. 63; 33 L. T. 821.

10. Refreshment houseLicensing—23 Vict. c. 27, s. £Shop kept open for "refreshment, resort, and entertainment."—The plaintiff kept a shop, consisting of one room, open in front, for the supply to persons who frequented the shop of ginger-beer and lemonade, to be drunk by them at the counter, and kept the same open for the above purpose till two or three o'clock in the morning.

Held (Baggallay, J.A., diss.), that the shop was a place kept open for "public refreshment, resort, and entertainment" within the meaning of 23 Vict. c. 27, s. 6, and required a licence under that statute.

Decision of the court below, reported 24 W. E. 407, affirmed.—Howes v. Board of Inland Revenue, App. 397.

11. Suffering drunkenness EvidenceLicensing Act, 1872, s. 13.—A licensed person may be convicted for permitting drunkenness on his premises upon evidence that a person who had been drinking on such premises was found drunk at some distance from them. —Ethelstane, Appellant, v. The Justices of Oswestry, Respondents, a.B.Div.—33 L. T. 339.

12. Suffering gaming in an hotelLicensing Act' 1872 (35 & 30 Vict. c. 94), s. 11—Knowledge of landlordActual or constructive.—In order to convict a licensed person of suffering gaming on his premises, mere proof of the gaming taking place is not sufficient; but it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge on the part of the licensed person, though there must be some sort of constructive knowledge shown.— Bosley v. Davies, Q.b.div. 140—L. E. 1 Q. B. D. 84; 45 L. J. 31. C. 27; 33 L. T. 528.

13. Suffering gaming by connivance of servantLicensing Act, 1872, s. 16, sub-section 1—Evidence of connivance.—In order to convict a licensed person of suffering gaming within the meaning of the 16th section of the Licensing Act, 1872, it is not necessary to

.show actual knowledge. It is enough to show connivance, and the connivance of the servant is the connivance of the master.

E. kept an hotel at Epsom, in which a gentleman from Newmarket took three rooms, and invited a trainer and a jockey to stay with him. E. went to bed at eleven p.m., leaving a hall porter in charge of the house.

The porter retired to the extreme end of the house for the night. While the porter was so stationed the guests above mentioned played cards for money, with much noise, but no interruption on the part of E. The justices drew the inference that the porter had retired at the instigation of E., and in order that he might not hear what passed.

Held, that it could not be said that there was no evidence from which the justices might draw such inference, and a conviction ot E. for suffering gaming ■affirmed.—Redgate, Appellant, v. Haynes, Respondent, Q.b.div.—L. E. 1 Q. B. D. 89; 45 L. J. M. C. 65; 33 L. T. 779.

14. Suffering gaming—Conviction under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109.

Lien. 142

Held, that service of information and summons is necessary to render valid, under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, a conviction for permitting gaming and wagering.— Blake v. Beech, App. From Inf.cts.—45 L. J, If, C. Ill; 34 L. T. 764.

15. Suffering gamingPublic billiard-room belong, ing to licensed victuallerLodgers playing after closing hours—Statutes 8*9 Vict. c. 109, and 37 & 38 Vict, c. 49, e. 10—By 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 13, the holder of a victualler's licence who keeps a public billiard > table, and allows persons to play thereon when the premises are not allowed to be open for the sale of wine, &c, is liable to a certain penalty. By 37 & 38 Vict. c. 49, s. 10, a person licensed to sell any intoxicating liquor, to be consumed on the premises, may sell such liquor at any time to persons lodging in his house. The appellant held a victualler's licence for a certain house at H. The closing hour at H. on weekdays is eleven p.m., and after that time two gentlemen, lodgers in the house, were found playing billiards. The justices thought that 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 13, absolutely prohibited all persons without exception from playing at a public billiard table during closing hours, and that such prohibition was not affected by 37 & 38 Vict. c. 49, s. 10. Accordingly, the appellant was convicted, but the justices stated a case.

Held, that the conviction was right.—Ovenden v. Raymond, App. From Inf.cts.—34 L. T. G98.


1. Sale of goodsLien of unpaid vendor upon insolvency of vendee while goods in carrier's possessionAttornment by carrier to vendeeAttornment conditional on delivery order being properly stampedStamp Act (33 * 34 Vict. c. 77), ss. 24, 89, 91.—Goods were consigned to the plaintiffs order to a station on the defendants' railway, and the usual advice note was sent them by the defendants. On the 12th of April the plaintiffs sold these goods to one J., payment half by; cash, half by bill at three moutks due the 13th of July and handed over the advice note to J. with an indorsement directing the defendants to deliver the goods to J.'s order. On the 24th of April, J. handed over this delivery order to D. as collateral security for the payment of money advanced to him by D., with a second indorsement ordering the defendants to deliver the goods to D.'s order. But neither this delivery order nor that made by the plaintiffs was stamped in accordance with section 89 of the Stamp Act, 1870. J. becoming insolvent, D. on the 14th of May wrote the defendants, inclosing the delivery order, and directing them to hold the goods to his order. To this he received the following reply from defendants' goods manager dated the 15th of May : "I have yours of yesterday inclosing transfer of rails, and beg to say I hold them to your order; but you will please produce this order when applying for the rails, and which order must also bear a transfer stamp by both parties transferring the goods, in accordance with the Act of Parliament. You will be aware they remain here at owner's risk and subject to our usual rent-charges." On the 19th of May, D. affixed an adhesive stamp to each transfer, but omitted to cancel the stamps as required by sections 24 and 89 of the Act, and the same were never up to trial so cancelled. On the 23rd of May the defendants wrote to plaintiffs asking if they consented to the goods being delivered to D., to which the plaintiffs replied on the 23rd and 30th of Juue giving defendants formal notice to hold them to their (plaintiffs') order; but upon indemnity being given by D. the goods were handed over to D. The bill given to the plaintiffs by J. in part payment of these goods not being met at maturity, the plaintiffs claimed the goods as partial unpaid vendors, and brought an action against the defendants for wrongfully parting with the possession of them.



DIGEST. Lord Mayor's Court. 144

Held, that the condition in the defendants' letter of the 15th of May as to thetransferstamp was no qualification of their admission that they held the goods to D.'s order; that the letter was an absolute attornment by the defendants to D., by which the plaintiffs' right of possession as unpaid vendors was destroyed, and that the plaintiffs were, therefore, not entitled to recover. —Pooley and another v. The Great Eastern Railway Company, Ex.div.—34 L. T. 537.

2. Sale of goodsVendor's lienUndertaking to deliverEstoppel.—An undertaking by the vendor to deliver goods sold, addressed to the purchaser, does not amount to such a representation that the purchaser is entitled to delivery as to estop the vendor from asserting his right of lien against a sub-purchaser.

Defendants sold goods to B., and gave a document, undertaking " to deliver to your order twenty-five tons off your contract of this date" addressed to B. Before delivery B. became insolvent. Plaintiffs, who had purchased the goods from B., sued defendants in detinue.

Held, that defendants were not estopped from asserting their lien on the goods against plaintiffs.— Farmiloe and another v. Bain and others, C.f.div.— 45 L. J. C. P. 264; 34 L. T. 324.

See also Banker, 2 ; Bankruptcy, 51—54; Company, Principal And Agent, Cs; Shipping; Solicitor.

LIFE ASSURANCE—See Insurance (life).

LIGHT and AIR.—See Building Covenant, 2.

LIMITED ADMINISTRATION.—See Administration, Letters Of, 2, 4; Bankruptcy, 89.

LIS PENDENS.—See Practice, 132.


1. LimitationDebt upon a statuteConcurrent remedy with summary proceedings—11 if; 12 Vict, c. G3, «. 69—24 & 25 Vict. c. 61, s. 24.—By section 09 of the Public Health Act, 1818, a local board can recover expenses, to be paid by owners in default, in a summary manner, the limitation for such recovery being, by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11, six months.

By section 24 of a similar Act of 1861, proceedings for the recovery of demands below £20 may, at the option of the local board, be taken in a county court as upon a debt.

Held, upon appeal from a county court, that proceedings under the last-mentioned section are barred by a six months' limitation, in the same way as if they were taken in a summary manner.—West Ham Local Board v. Maddams, Q.b.div.—33 L. T. S09.

2. Paving and sewering of streetPublic highway —1 Vict. c. 33, s. 18.—By a Birkenhead local Act of 1838, commissioners aro required to cause all such parts o£ the streets, ways, or places within the said township, not being public or common highways, which are now in the estimation of the commissioners fully built upon, but not sufficiently paved or put in good condition, and all such streets, ways, or places as nre now making or may hereafter be made within the said township, although not fully built upon, to be made, paved, and cleansed as to the commissioners shall seem necessary; the expenses to be paid by the frontagers.

Defendant occupied a house in a street formed about seventeen years ago, and ever since used by the public.

Held, that defendant was liable to contribute to the making and sewering of this street lately resolved upon by the commissioners. — Birkenhead Pmprovement Commissioners v. Sansom, Q.b.div.—34 L. T. 175.

3. Bepeal of statute.Repeal with saving of things "duly Clone"Mistaken reference in rate to repealed

Act—Public Health Act, 1875 (38 <fc 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 343.—Notice was given by a local board of health of intention to make a rate under the Public Health Act, 1848, and amending Acts. Before the notice had expired these Acts were repealed by the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), which contained a saving of " anything duly dono" under the repealed enactments, and gave power to make a similar rate upon giving a similar notice. The board, in ignorance of the repeal, made a rate purporting to be made under the repealed Acts.

Held, that the rate was valid, the notice being a "thing duly done," and the accidental reference in the rate to the repealed Acts being immaterial to its validity.—The Queen v. Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, Q.b.div.—L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 220; 45 L J. M. C. 97.

See also Highway, 11. LOCAL VENUE.—See Venue.


1. Foreign attachmentCorporation.—A debt due from a corporation cannot bo attached in the Mayor's Court of London by virtue of the custom of foreign attachment, nor can there be a writ of fieri facial against the goods of a corporation as garnishees.

Semble, that a corporation cannot be defendants in an action in the Mayor's Court.—London Joint StocJ: Bank v. Mayor of London, C.p.div.—L. R. 1 C. P. D. 1; 45 L. J. C. P. 213; 33 L. T. 781.

2. JurisdictionAppeal from demurrer in the Mayor's Court—20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii., s. i—Judicn. ture Act, 1873, ss. 18 and 45—Ord. 58, r. 1—CostsNumber of counsel.—This court lias no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a judgment of the Mayor's Court upon a demurrer to pleadings.

Upon motion in such an appeal this court has jurisdiction over the costs.

This court will hear two counsel on the same side in an appeal, if the case be of sufficient magnitude.— Mors le Blanche v. Renter's Telegram Company {Limited), C.p.div.—34 L. T. 691.

3. JurisdictionProhibitionAbandonment of several itemsDiscretion of the superior courts.—An action having been brought in tho Mayor's Court, London, upon a guarantee given by the defendants for an attorney's bill, upon showing cause against a rule for a prohibition obtained (before declaration) on the ground that the whole of the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise within the City of Loudon, certain of the charges in the bill being for attendances at Westminster, the plaintiff consenting altogether to abando: his claim in respect of those items,

The court discharged the rule, but without costs.Ellis v. Fleming, C.p.div.—L. R. 1 C. P. D. 237; & L. J. C. P. 512.

4. Jurisdiction Prohibition Account statd — Concessit solvere — Letter stating account, write* and posted out of the jurisdiction received ty plaintiff within.—A superior court is not bouml to prohibit an action in the Lord Mayor's Court unless it is satisfied that no one entire cause of action arose within the jurisdiction; and it makes no difference in law whether the application for such a prohibition be made before or after verdict.

A sale had been effected and the goods delivered outside the jurisdiction; but a promise to pay for them, writteu outside, had been received by the plaintiff within the jurisdiction.

The court refused to prohibit an action brought for goods sold and delivered and on accounts stated, since it was not clear that the Mayor's Court had noc 145 Lord Mayor's Court.

DIGEST. Lunacy. 146

jurisdiction to bear and determine the concessit solvere.

Eoans v. Nicholson, 32 L. T. 778, and Wallace v. Allan, 23 W. E. 703, explained.—Taylor v. Nicholls, C.p.div. 673—L. R. 1 G. P. D. 242; 45 L. J. C. P. 455.

5. JurisdictionProhibition-Cheque payable at a place out of the jurisdiction where the drawer (the defendant) has no effects.—The plaintiff sued the defendant in the Mayor's Court, London, as drawer of two cheques upon the Hudderafield branch of the Midland Banking Company. In answer to a rule for a prohibition, it was sworn that the cheques were drawn and indorsed by the payee to the plaintiff in Iiondon, that the drawer had no effects in the hands of the Midland Banking Company, and that he had long since had notice from the bank that cheques drawn by him would not be paid unless previously provided for.

Held, that, there being no obligation on the plaintiff to prove presentment and dishonour, there was no ground for a prohibition.— Wirth v. Austin, c.r.— L. R. 10 C. P. 689.

6. Jurisdiction—ProhibitionDebtors Act, 1869. —The Lord Mayor's Court, aud other inferior courts, can only enforce judgments of superior courts, under the Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), s. 5, against debtors resident or carrying on business within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court so enforcing.— Washer v. Elliott, C.p.div. 432—L. R. 1 C. P. D. 169; 45 L. J. C. P. 144; 34 L. T. 56.

7. Jurisdiction Prohibition Mayor's Court Procedure Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii.), ss. 12, 15. —The intention of section 12 of the Mayor's Court Procedure Act, 1857, is to give tho Lord Mayor's Court absolute jurisdiction in cases coming within that section, and a superior court cannot issue a writ of prohibition.

Judgment of the Common Pleas Division reversed. —Hawes v. Pavely, Ait. 895—L. R. 1 C. P. D. 418; 34 L. T. 836.

8. JurisdictionLetter posted within jurisdiction of inferior court by defendant to plaintiff outsideTime of appeal from chambers Practice Ord. 54, r. 6; ord. 57, r. 3.—The defendant posted a letter at a post-office within the jurisdiction of the Lord Mayor's Court of London addressed to, and received by, the plaintiff outside the jurisdiction. This letter contained the following order:—"Please send in at once (to office for us to pack) 4cwt. old brown "Windsor soap." The plaintiff did not reply accepting the offer, but sent the goods ordered to the defendant's office within the jurisdiction.

Held, that tho contract was made within the jurisdistion, and that the posting of the order within the jurisdiction was the making of the offer within, and delivery of the goods within the acceptance of it within.

By ord. 54, r. 6, every appeal to the court from any decision at chambers shall be made within eight days after the decision appealed against. ,

By ord. 57, r. 3, where the time for doing any act or taking any proceeding expires on a Sunday or other day on which the offices are closed, and by 1 reason thereof such act or proceeding cannot be done or taken on that day, such act or proceeding shall, so far as regards the time of doing or taking the same, be held to be duly done or taken, if done or taken on the day on which the offices shall be next open.

Held, that where the last of the eight days would be a Sunday, an appeal from chambers to the court might

be made on the Monday following.—Taylor v. Jones, Cp.div.—L. R. 1 C. P. D. 87; 34 L. T. 131.

9. JurisdictionProhibitionRemoval of judgmentInferior courtMayor's Court of London, Procedure Act, 1857, s. 48.—Where a judgment is removed under the Mayor's Court of London Procedure Act, 1857, s. 48, into the superior court for execution, and it appears to the superior court that there was no jurisdiction in the Mayor's Court to entertain the action in which the judgment was obtained, the superior court will set aside the judgment so removed, and will prohibit the Mayor's Court from proceeding farther in the action.

Held, also, that a defendant can himself apply to the superior court to prohibit the Mayor's Court from proceeding farther in an action where the Mayor's Court is proceeding without jurisdiction.

Jacobs v. Brett, L. R. 20 Ex. 1, 44 L. J. Ch. 377, 32 L. T. 522, followed.—Bridge T. Branch, Cp.div.—34 L. T. 905.

10. Strangers, application byDiscretion.—When a writ of prohibition has been issued to restrain proceedings in the Mayor's Court on the application of a stranger to the suit, it cannot be sustained unless he can show that the court has exceeded its jurisdiction both with reference to the facts and the law, and then it is a matter of discretion with the superior court whether or not to set it aside.

Worthington v. Jeffries, L. R. 10 C. P. 379, not followed.—Chambers v. Green, M.r.—L. R. 20 Eq. 552; 44 L. J. Ch. 600.

LOSS of LUGGAGE.—See Railway Company, 7—9, 16, 17.

LOSS of WRIT after RENEWAL.—See Phactice, 49.


1. Criminal lunaticInquiry by magistrates into last settlementBy whom inquiry is to be made—3 & 4 Vict. c. 54, 8. 2—28 & 29 Vict. c. 126—Contract between authorities of two prisons.—By 3 & 4 "Vict. c. 54, s. 1, it is enacted that if any person while imprisoned in any prison under any sentence of death, transportation, or imprisonment . . . shall appear to be insane, it shall be lawful for any two justices of the peace of the place where such person is imprisoned to make inquiry as to the insanity of such person.

By section 2, in all such cases as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for such two justices, or any other two justices for the county, city, borough, or place where such person is imprisoned, to inquire into and ascertain, by the best evidence or information that can be obtained under the circumstances, the personal legal disability of such person, the place of the last legal settlement, and the pecuniary circumstances of such person.

By section 1 of 27 & 28 Vict. c. 29, section 1 of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 54, is repealed, and by section 2 such inquiry is to be made, on a representation of such j ustices, by order of the Secretary of State.

By section 66 of 28 & 29 Vict. c. 126, where a prison authority (in this section called the contracting authority) has contracted with any other prison authority (in this section called the receiving authority) that the receiving authority is to receive into and maintain in its prison any prisoners maintainable at the expense of the contracting authority, the prison of the receiving authority shall, for all the purposes ■ of and incidental to the commitment, trial, detention,, and punishment of the prisoners of the contracting authority, or any of such purposes, according to the tenor of such contract, be deemed to be the prison of the contracting authority, except that the contracting authority shall have no right to interfere in

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