[232] *Mr. Justice White, after making the | This contention, apparently, is not that due foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court: In order to clearly present the simple is sue arising on this record for decision, we have been obliged to make the foregoing lengthy statement of the facts which are involved in this unnecessarily protracted litigation. When the allegations of the complaint by which this action was commenced are ultimately resolved, all the rights which they assert are embraced within the following propositions: 1. A contention that the water supply company, by virtue of its acquisition from Andrews & Whitcomb, was a mere successor corporation of the original water company, and became bound for all its indebtedness, including, of course, the debt due the pipe works, and this irrespective of the existence of a mechanics' lien; 2. A claim that in virtue of the sale made in the mechanics' lien suit after the decision of the circuit court of appeals in the creditors' suit and the final entry and execution of the mandate, the pipe works became the owner of the waterworks plant, entitled to the possession of the same, with a right, however, in the defendant, as a junfor lienholder, to redeem by paying the indebtedness due the pipe works; and 3. An assertion that if the pipe works had not become the owner of the waterworks plant in virtue of the sale made as just stated, that corporation, in any event, in virtue of its asserted mechanics' lien, had heen vested with a paramount right as against the water supply company, which it was the duty of a court of equity to en force by compelling payment by the defend ant. In effect, these questions were all conclud. ed adversely to the plaintiff in error by the court below, the rights embraced in the first proposition were decided to be without merit because the facts disclosed the water supply company to be an independent corporation and not bound as a successor company for the indebtedness of the original water company. As this proposition does not involve a Federal question, we may not review it. Indeed the finality of the decision below [233] on the subject is "recognized by the plaintiff in error, since the assignment of error made in this court seeks to raise no question on such subject. All the rights asserted by the plaintiff in error which are embraced in the second and third propositions were decided adversely below, on the ground that they were not open to inquiry, because concluded by the presumption of the thing adjudged, arising from the final decree in the creditors' suit. And it is upon the asserted erroneous application by the court below of the plea of res judicata that all the Federal questions urged must in effect depend. The proposition is that the court below denied due effect to a decree of the Federal court, by maintaining the plea of res judimata predicated on a decree of such court. effect was denied to the decrees of a Federal court, but that too great an effect was given. When. however, the proposition is stripped of the seeming confusion which arises from the form in which it is stated, it becomes clear that, ultimately considered, it really involves the assertion that the court below refused to give due effect to the decree of a Federal court. This is so because the proposition on substantially is that the state court, in maintaining the plea of res judicata resulting from the decree in the creditors' suit, denied the rights which were vested in the pipe works by virtue of the decree in the mechanics' lien suit. The argument in substance is therefore that, as the rights under the mechanics' lien decree were not impaired or destroyed by the decree in the creditors' suit, the consequence of erroneously deciding that they were obliterated by the decree in the creditors' suit was to refuse to give due effect to the rights vested in the water company as a result of the decree in its favor in the mechanics' lien suit. As it is thus demonstrated that the determination whether the court below correctly applied the plea of res judicata necessitates our deciding whether due effect was given to the decree in the mechanics' lien suit, a Federal question is presented which it is our duty to determine. Jacobs v. Marks, 182 U. S. 583, 587, 45 L. ed. 1241, 1244, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865; Hancock Nat. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 645, 44 L. ed. 619, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506; *Pittsburgh, C. C. & St.[234] L. R. Co. v. Long Island Loan & T. Co. 172 U. S. 493, 507, 43 L. ed. 528, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 238, and cases cited. In order to correctly decide what was concluded by the decision of the circuit court of appeals in the creditors' suit and the final decree entered in such cause, it must be ascertained who were the parties to that cause, what were the issues therein presented for adjudication, and what was decided thereon. It is elementary that if from the decree in a cause there be uncertainty as to what was really decided, resort may be had to the pleadings and to the opinion of the court, in order to throw light upon the subject. Baker v. Cummings, 181 U. S. 117, 45 L. ed. 776, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578; Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co. 157 U. S. 684, 688, 39 L. ed. 859, 862, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 733. Conceding for the present present that the face of the final decree in the creditors' suit leaves uncertain exactly what was concluded, we will resort to the means of elucidation just referred to, viz., the pleadings and opinions rendered, in order to ascertain who were the opposing parties, what were the issues joined between them, and the matters finally determined in the cause. So doing, it appears that the parties to the cause were the pipe works on the one side and Andrews & Whitcomb and the water supply company and others on the opposing side. It also appears that the following, among other con troversies, were directly at issue in the cause: 1. Had the pipe works, as to Andrews & Whitcomb and their privies, a lien upon the plant and franchise of the waterworks, arising from the sale of the pipe, the recording of the claim for a lien, and the recognition of such lien in the decree of the circuit court of the United States in the mechanics' lien suit, and this although the plant and franchise had come into the possession of Andrews & Whitcomb under the sale in their mortgage foreclosure suit? 2. Was the mortgage referred to a valid instrument? and, 3. Was title vested in Andrews & Whitcomb to the waterworks plant and franchise by reason of the sale to them under the decree in the mortgage foreclosure suit? Between the parties we have named and upon the issues just stated it is free from doubt that it was decided that Andrews & [235]*Whitcomb were lawfully in possession in virtue of the sale made in the mortgage foreclosure, and that under the law of Wisconsin there was no lien in favor of the pipe works, as against Andrews & Whitcomb or their assigns, upon the franchise and plant in question, arising either from the law of that state, the recording of the alleged lien, or the decree rendered in the mechanics' lien suit. It hence results that every claim of a Federal right here asserted is without merit, and that the court below, in enforcing the principle of the thing adjudged, did not err, and of course did not refuse to give due effect to the mechanics' lien suit decree. It is insisted, however, that although these conclusions may be inevitable from a consideration together of the pleadings, the opinions, and the final decree in the creditors' suit, the contrary result is impelled if merely the final decree entered by the circuit court upon the mandate of the circuit court of appeals is taken in view. The argument is that as the decree is unambiguous it is the law of the case, and resort cannot be had to other sources of information. In effect, the contention comes to this, that although it may be patent that the issues between the parties, as above stated, were determined, yet, as the decree entered by the circuit court failed to express such conclusion, the parties are bound by the decree as entered, as they did not avail themselves of a proper remedy, by mandamus or otherwise, to correct the frustration of the results of the decisions of the circuit court of appeals, which the argument necessarily assumes must have been brought about by the decree made by the circuit court. But the decree of the circuit court does not support the contention based upon it. That decree in express terms dismissed the creditors' bill as to Andrews & Whitcomb and the water supply company, for want of equity, without any qualification or reservation whatever. It in express terms passed the legal title to the real estate upon which was located the pumping station and wells of the water company to the water supply company, as the assignces of Andrews & Whitcomb, such transfer of title being de clared to be made by virtue of the mortgage to Andrews & Whitcomb and the sale to them in *their mortgage foreclosure suit. It [236] is true that in the clause making this transfer it was declared that it was "without prejudice to any right which said plaintiff may have under their mechanics' lien decree or otherwise to redeem from said instruments of mortgage, or either of them, or from the sale under the proceedings to foreclose the same." But this was a mere reservation of the right to redeem, if any existed. It left the pipe works in the position where, if its right had not been foreclosed as the necessary consequence of the dismissal of the bill for want of equity, it would not be so foreclosed in consequence of the specific direction for the transfer of the legal title to the property. In other words, the circuit court, in complying with the positive directions of the circuit court of appeals, but refused to interpret specifically the scope and effect of the mandate of the appellate court, and left that mandate to operate in its own language. At best, the reservation, when considered in connection with the other portions of the decree, can only have the effect of creating an uncertainty as to what was intended; and, this being the case, resort to the proper sources of information, to which we have already alluded, dispels the doubt, and leaves the matter free from difficulty. And this conclusion is equally made imperative by a consideration of the memorandum opinion of the circuit court-set out in our statement of the case-relating to the drawing of the proposed final decree. From that document it is made clear that the circuit court simply declined, in drawing the decree, to construe the opinions of the circuit court of appeals, and therefore deemed that it discharged its duty by obeying the mandate to dismiss the bill for want of equity, without adding any provision which might be construed as adding to or taking away from either of the parties to the record any right which had been established in virtue of the judginent of the circuit court of appeals. Another contention remaining to be considered is that, even though the court below correctly applied the principle of res judicata, it yet, in granting affirmative relief, declined to give due effect to the decree in the mechanics' lien suit. On this subject the argument is that although, as regards Andrews & Whitcomb *and the water supply [237] company, it be recognized that it had been conclusively determined that the pipe works had no mechanics' lien whatever, yet, as such lien was finally decreed in the creditors' suit as against the water company, because of the thing adjudged arising from the decree in the mechanics' lien suit, therefore a right to redeem from the sale to Andrews & Whitcomb existed, and such right was nullified by the broad grant of affirmative relief made in this cause by the court below. Whether the pleadings in the cause justified a grant of affirmative relief, considered as a mere question of practice, pre sents no Federal question. The claim that because by the thing adjudged it is indisputable that the pipe works had a lien against the water company, it therefore follows that there is still a right to redeem as against Andrews & Whitcomb and the water supply company, even although it was established by the effect of res judicata arising from the creditors' suit that the lien as to the parties named was inoperative and a nullity, -is but another form of asserting that the decree in the creditors' suit was not res judicata between the pipe works 2. 'The commerce clause of the Federal Consti and Andrews & Whitcomb and the water state court ousting a corporation from its franchise for violation of the statutes of the state relating to the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine will not be dismissed on the ground that adequate support for the judgment, irrespective of any substantial Federal question, is afforded by the finding of the state court that the corporation had violated a statute in refusing to furnish samples as therein required, where the judgment of the court was based upon the consideration given by it to all the asserted violations of the statutes jointly, which statutes were contended to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. supply company. In conclusion we need only remark that the observations just made are equally applicable to the elaborate contention, in the 3. The equal protection of the laws is not de tution is not violated by the provisions of the statutes of Ohio relating to the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine within the state by a corporation created by its laws. brief of counsel, that as the mechanics' lien suit was pending in a Federal court when Andrews & Whitcomb instituted their foreclosure proceedings in the state court, the Federal court had exclusive jurisdiction of the res, and the state court was without nied an Ohio corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine within the state of Ohio, by the statutes of that state forbidding the manufacture or sale of any oleomargarine which contains any coloring matter, although by the Ohio statutes harmless coloring matter may be used in butter. power in the premises. The validity of the 4. An Ohio corporation engaged in the manu title claimed by Andrews & Whitcomb to have resulted from the sale to them in the mortgage foreclosure suit having been an issue and decided in the creditors' suit, the contention now being noticed, and all other grounds supposed to establish the invalidity of such title, should have been presented in facture and sale of oleomargarine within the state of Ohio is not deprived of its property without due process of law by the statutes of that state which forbid the manufacture or sale of any oleomargarine which contains any coloring matter, aithough by the Ohio statutes harmless coloring matter may be used In butter. the creditors' suit, and such as were not 5. A general statement in the answer to quo warranto proceedings in a state court to for feit the franchise of a corporation for its violation of a state statute, that the proper remedy is by a criminal prosecution, and that "this proceeding is in violation of the Constitution of the United States," is not sufficient to raise a Federal question, where no specification is made as to the particular clause of the Constitution relied upon, and there is nothing in the record to show that the attention of the state court was directed to that question. [238] CAPITAL CITY DAIRY COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF OHIO ex rel. ATTORNEY (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 238-249.) Error to state court-dismissal validity of state statute restricting manufacture and sale of oleomargarine-commerce clausedue process of law equal protection of the laws-Fedcral question. 1. A writ of error to review a judgment of a NOTE.-On Federal jurisdiction over state courts; necessity of Federal question-see notes to Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 37 L. ed. U. S. 267, and Kipley v. Illinois ex rel. Akin, 42 L. ed. U. S. 998. As to what is a Federal question; when considered-see note to Re Buchanan, 39 L. ed. U. S. 884. On state regulation of interstate or foreign commerce-see notes to Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Com. (Va.) 13 L. R. A. 107; McCanna & F. Co. ▼. Citizens' Trust & Surety Co. 24 C. C. A. 13; Ratterman v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 32 L. ed. U. S. 229; Harmon v. Chicago, 37 L. ed. U. S. 216; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 38 L. ed. U. S. 1041; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 39 L. ed. U. S. 311. As to constitutional equality of privileges, [No. 45.] Argued April 19, 22, 1901. Decided Janu ary 6, 1902. IN ing a corporation of its franchise for its immunities, and protection-see Louisville Safety Vault & T. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 14 L. R. A. 579, and note. As to the validity of class legislation-see State v. Goodwill (W. Va.) 6 L. R. A. 621, and note: State v. Loomis (Mo.) 21 L. R. A. 789, and note. As to what constitutes due process of lawsee Kuntz v. Sumption (Ind.) 2 L. R. A. 655, and note; Re Gannon (R. I.) 5 L. R. A. 359, and note; Ulman v. Baltimore (Md.) 11 L. R. A. 224, and note; Gilman v. Tucker (N. Y.) 13 L. R. A. 304, and note. And see notes to People v. O'Brien (N. Y.) 2 L. R. A. 258; Pearson v. Yewdall, 24 L. ed. U. S. 436; Wilson v. North Carolina ex rel. Caldwell, 42 L. ed. U. S. 865. See same case below, 62 Ohio St. 350, 57 House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Re Ν. Ε. 62. The facts are stated in the opinion. cause and filed a brief for plaintiff in error: Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 22 L. ed. 429; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. New Orleans, 181 U. S. 277, 45 L. ed. 859, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 646; Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 9 L. ed. 458; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44, 19 L. ed. 370. Statutes, apparently for the mere regulation of an industry, may desire to, and may in fact, destroy it. Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30, 43 L. ed. 60, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 768. The direct and necessary result of a statute must be taken into consideration in deciding as to its validity, even if that result is not in so many words either enacted or distinctly provided for. In whatever language a statute may be formed, its purpose must be determined by its natural effect. Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. ed. 543; Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 U. S. 455, 30 L. ed. 237, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1114. The mere ruling by the supreme court of a state that a statute relied upon to justify the taking of property from a citizen who contends that he is thereby deprived of property without due process of law, or of some privilege or immunity to which he is entitled under the Constitution of the United States, does not violate the Constitution, and is only a reasonable exercise of the police power, and does not conclude the party aggrieved from having this court determine whether or not the Federal question is well taken. Proprietors of Bridges v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 1 Wall. 116, 17 L. ed. 571. Any restraint upon the right and liberty of contract, to be valid, must appear to be for the common public welfare and equal protection and benefit of the people, not only to the legislature, but also to the courts. Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. Ε. 313. A law enacted in the exercise of the police power must be in fact a police law. If it is a law for the promotion of the public health, it must be a health law, having some relation to the public health. Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636. The mere recitation in the title of an act that it is a measure to promote the public health will not be regarded arded by this court where it is apparent that such is not the real and sincere purpose of its enactment. Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636. While large discretion is permitted to the states in the matter of legislating for their people where the public health is involved, the fundamental principles underlying all free government are not affected by this concession to legislative power. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064. Mr. E. B. Dillon argued the cause, and, with Mr. John M. Sheets, filed a brief for defendant in error: Where a state court has based its decision on a local or state question, a writ of error will be dismissed. Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 370, 37 L. ed. 1113, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131; Remington Paper Co. v. Watson, 173 U. S. 443, 43 L. ed. 762, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456. To give this court jurisdiction of a writ of error to a state court, it must appear affirmatively, not only that a Federal question was presented for decision, to the highest court of the state having jurisdiction, but that its decision was necessary to a determination of the cause, and that it was actually decided, or that the judgment as rendered could not have been given without deciding it. De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U. S. 216, 32 L. ed. 125, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1053; Beaupre v. Noyes, 138 U. S. 397, 34 L. ed. 991, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 296. Where it does not appear upon what ground the highest court of the state places its judgment, and the judgment may be supported without deciding a Federal question, this court is without jurisdiction of it in error. Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Skinner, 139 U. S. 293, 35 L. ed. 193, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 528. The legislature has the power to enact laws to prevent a simulated article of butter from being put upon the market in such form and manner as to be calculated to deceive. Such a law is the valid exercise of police power by a state, and is not a violation of the United States Constitution. Palmer v. State, 39 Ohio St. 236, 48 Am. Rep. 429; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 180; Butler v. Chambers, 36 Minn. 69, 30 N. W. 308; McAllister v. State, 72 Md. 390, 20 Atl. 143; State, Waterbury, Prosecutor, v. Newton, 50 N. J. L. 534, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 63, 14 Atl. 604; Cook v. State, 110 Ala. 40, 20 So. 360; Com. v. Huntley, 156 Mass. 236, 15 L. R. A. 839, 30 N. E. 1127; State ex rel. Weideman v. Horgan, 55 Minn. 183, 56 N. W. 688; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 32 L. ed. 253, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 1257; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 39 L. ed. 223, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 590, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154; People v. Arensberg, 105 N. Y. 123, 59 Am. Rep. 483, 11 Ν. Ε. 277. It being within the constitutional power of the legisla legislature to establish regulations for the prevention of fraud in the sale of articles of food, it is generally for the legislature to determine what regulations are needed for that purpose. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121; Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315, 12 Am. Rep. 694; Slaughter-Cooley, Const. Lim. 3d ed. 168. 238] *Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court: By a law of the state of Ohio, enacted in 1884, it was made the duty of every one manufacturing or exposing for sale any drug or article of food included in the provisions of the act to furnish, on demand, to the per239]son who should apply for and tender the value of the same, a sufficient sample to enable an analysis to be made. This law is compiled in Bates's Annotated (Ohio) Statutes, § 4200-7. By the provisions of another statute en acted in 1886, and amended in 1887, it was made unlawful to sell or offer for sale or exchange any substance purporting, appearing, or represented to be butter or cheese, or having either the semblance of butter or cheese, not wholly made of pure milk or cream, salt, and harmless coloring matter, unless done under its true name; and it was exacted that each package should have distinctly marked upon it, in the manner pointed out in the statute, the true name of the article and its constituent ingredients. And it was further forbidden, in the marking, to use any words or combination of words indicating that the article was either butter, cream, or dairy product. This statute is compiled in Bates's Annotated Statutes of Ohio, § 4200-30. In 1890 it was further provided that no person should manufacture within the state, or should offer for sale therein, whether manufactured therein or not, any substance made out of any animal or vegetable oil, not produced from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, in imitation or semblance of natural butter or cheese produced from butter, unadulterated milk or cream. The terms "butter" and "cheese,” as defined in the statutes, were declared to be articles manufactured exclusively from pure milk or cream, or both, with salt, and with or without any harmless coloring matter. It was provided, however, in this act, that nothing therein contained "shall be construed to prohibit the manufacture or sale of oleomargarine in a separate and distinct form and in such manner as will advise the consumer of its real character, free from any coloring matter or other ingredient causing it to look like or appear to be butter, as above defined." This statute is compiled in Bates's Annotated Statutes of Ohio, $4200-13-14. 490 On May 16, 1894, it was further enacted that "no person shall manufacture, offer, or expose for sale, sell, or deliver, or have in his possession with intent to sell or deliver, any oleomargarine which contains any meth[240]ly (methyl), orange, butter "yellow, annotto, aniline dye, or any other coloring matter. Bates's Anno. Stat. § 4200-16. On January 27, 1893, the plaintiff in error was incorporated under the general laws of the state of Ohio "for the purpose of manufacturing, selling, and dealing in oleomargarine and the materials and utensils employed in the manufacture, storage, and transportation thereof, and all things incident thereto." Under this charter the corporation thereafter carried on its business in the state of Ohio. of On April 12, 1898, proceedings in quo warranto were begun in the supreme court of the state of Ohio by the attorney general of that state to forfeit the franchise of said corporation, and for the appointment of trustees to wind up its affairs. The relief demanded was based on the charge: That the corporation had "continuously, since about the time of its creation, up to the present day, within this state, fended against the laws of this state, misused its corporate authority, franchise, and privileges, and assumed franchises and privileges not granted to it, and has assumed and exercised rights, privileges, and franchises specially inhibited by law," in enumerated particulars. The specifications of the petition are reproduced in the margin.t *The defendant answered, its defenses be- [241] ing reiterated under seven different headings. It suffices for the purposes of the issues now before us to summarize the answer as follows: It traversed all the facts alleged in the petition except as admitted in the answer. It expressly denied that the corporation had abused or misused its corporate powers. It admitted that the corporation had been engaged under its charter in the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine. It denied that any such product had been offered for sale First charge. Said defendant corporation has, during the times and at the places afore said, manufactured and sold an article in imitation and semblance of natural butter; which said article was made out of animal and vegetable oils, and compounded with milk or cream and both; which said article was not then and there in separate and distinct form and in such a manner as would advise consumers of its real character, and was not free from coloring matter or other ingredients causing it to look like and appear to be butter; and said article was not butter, but was an article made in imitation and semblance thereof. Second charge. The defendant corporation has, at the times and places above mentioned, manufactured, and has offered and exposed for sale and has sold and delivered, and had in its possession with the intent to sell and deliver, oleomargarine in large quantities as your relator is informed, in quantities from 10,000 to 20,000 pounds thereof daily; which said oleomargarine contained coloring matter, to wit, annotto and other coloring matter unknown to relator. Third charge. The said defendant corporation, during the times and at the places above stated, has manufactured and sold a substance purported and appearing to be butter and having the semblance of butter, but which substance was not butter, but was oleomargarine; but the packages, rolls. and parcels thereof were not distinctly and durably stamped, or painted, or stenciled, or marked in the true name thereof in the ordinary bold-faced capital letters required by the act of May 17, 1886, entitled "An Act to Prevent the Adulteration of and Deception in the Sale of Dairy Products, etc." 83 0. L. 178. Fourth charge. Said defendant corporation has refused and still refuses to deliver and fur |
