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at least upon this Committee, there are some members besides the chairman who have an opinion of their own, and who are not afraid of expressing it. But I am not disposed to enter into the discussion of this matter, at all, at present, for I do not feel any particular responsibility in connection with the resolution under consideration, and quite indifferent as to the fate of it. I will remark, however, that a provision similar to this is to be found in the Constitutions of several of the leading States of the Union. It has been urged as an objection to the resolution, that it will be difficult in some cases for the presiding officers at elections to determine who are felons. Well, it will often be found equally difficult to ascertain who are insane persons, paupers, or idiots; and yet these several classes of persons are usually excluded, the difficulty of determination, not being regarded as a sufficient reason for making no disqualifying provision respecting them. The distinction or difference between an idiot and a person with just enough of intellect to render him a responsible being and capable of exercising the civil rights of a citizen, is very slight. The dividing limit is an extremely narrow one. It is very difficult to tell exactly where daylight ends and where night and darkness begin. But all this furnishes no reason why an idiot should be allowed the important and responsible right of suffrage. Nor should insane persons be permitted to exercise this right, because it is not always easy to ascertain whether a person be of a sane or insane mind. Well, Sir, there are those who deem it equally clear, that that man who has shown himself, in a sense, morally insane by the commission of flagrant crimes, ought also to be disfranchised. But as I said in the outset, I have no intention of entering into the discussion of this subject, and shall close, with an expression of my own opinion, that the several classes of persons named in this resolution should be excluded from the right of suffrage, but whether a provision to that effect should be incorporated into the Constitution, I leave for others to decide.

Mr. WEEKS, of Harwich. I think it will be useless to discuss these resolutions any longer. If they will not answer it will be cheaper to make new ones. I move the previous question.

The question was taken, and the main question ordered to be put.

The second resolution was then rejected by the Convention.

Plurality and Majority Rule.

Mr. BUTLER, of Lowell, submitted the following Report from a Committee:

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

In Convention, June 27, 1853.

The Special Committee, to whom was referred the several Orders of the Convention concerning the rules by which the number of votes necessary to the election of the various officers of the Com monwealth may be ascertained; and also a Report of a Committee of the Convention upon the same subject, having considered the various matters sent to them, pray leave to submit the accompanying Report and Resolves :

Your Committee were not unaware or unmindful of the difference of opinion in the Convention, upon the matters submitted.

They believed, however, that all will agree that a majority rule of election was most consonant with the spirit of our institutions.

They have acknowledged the force of the objections of inconvenience and expense to the people, of too frequent elections, the evils of nonrepresentation, and elections of local officers by the legislature, thereby passing the government into the hands of the minority, which have heretofore followed a too strict adherence to a majority rule in all elections.

Your Committee, therefore, have endeavored so to combine both rules, that the good effects of the majority system might be enjoyed, with the speedy and convenient results of a plurality election.

To that end, they have provided for the officers who represent the whole people, an election by a majority; or, failing in that, an election by a concurrent vote of both branches of the legislature, from the persons having the highest number of votes. The voice of the people would thus be obtained upon whatever basis these departments of the government are placed; and, as the Convention have already nearly unanimously determined to base the Senate on population, the governor and other higher officers of State will be ultimately selected by the immediate delegates of the whole people.

To guard against the election of officers who shall represent localities, such as senators and councillors, by the legislature, for them a plurality rule has been established.

To prevent a too frequent recurrence of elections, and the necessity of trials on subsequent days, when bodies as large as counties and districts fail to elect, for all county and district officers, a plurality rule is provided. From a desire that the government may be in fact, what it is in theory, a government of a majority, and to give opportunity for the exercise of the "sober second thought" by the electors, that rule is proposed upon the first ballot in the election of representatives to the general court: still, that differences of political or other opinions may not operate either to hinder a full representation, or to protract town-meetings to such an extent as to subject them to extraneous influences, a plurality is permitted to elect on the second ballot.

Like reasons have produced like rules in the elections of city and town officers, who are the government of municipalities, and where, from the narrow limits of the constituency, no great inconvenience can be felt in a second balloting.

The annexed provisions are therefore submitted by your Committee, as a just compromise of opinion upon this perplexing subject, with an earnest hope that these results of their deliberations are not too great a departure from that rule of majority election under which the Commonwealth has hitherto so wondrously prospered.

BENJ. F. BUTLER, Chairman.

Resolved, That it is expedient to provide in the Constitution, that a majority of all the votes given shall be necessary to the election of a governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary, treasurer, auditor, and attorney-general of the Commonwealth: provided, that if at any election of either of the above-named officers, no person shall have a majority of the votes given, the House of Representatives shall, by a majority of viva voce votes, elect two out of three persons who had the highest, if so many shall have been voted for, and return the persons so elected to the Senate, from which the

[June 27th.

Senate shall, by viva voce vote, elect one who shall be governor.

Resolved, That in all the elections of senators and councillors, the person having the highest number of votes shall be elected.

Resolved, That in the election of representatives to the general court a majority of all the votes given in shall be necessary to the election at the first ballot provided, that in case of a failure of election on such ballot, the person having the highest number of votes at the second or any subsequent ballot, shall be elected.

Resolved, That in the election of all city and town officers, the same rule shall govern as in case of representatives to general court.

Resolved, That in the election of all county and district officers, the person having the highest number of votes shall be elected.

Resolved, That in all elections where the person having the highest number of votes may be elected, and there is a failure of election because two persons have an equal number of votes, subsequent trials may be had at such times as may be prescribed by the legislature.

The Report was referred to the Committee of the Whole, and ordered to be printed.

Miscellaneous Subjects.

The same gentleman, from the same Committee submitted the following Report :—

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

In Convention, June 27, 1853. The Committee to whom was referred so much of the Constitution as is contained in the first eight articles of the sixth chapter thereof, exclusive of the provisions concerning the writ of Habeas Corpus; and also an order of the Convention relating to the exemption of certain property from attachment on mesne process; and also an order concerning the propriety of permitting certain persons, conscientiously scrupulous of taking human life as a punishment for crime or in self-defence, to act under the Constitution without taking the oath or affirmation ordinarily required; and also an order to provide that no bank officer shall be eligible to certain offices under the Constitution, -having fully considered said several subjects, pray leave to report, in addition to their former Report, the following Resolves.

All which is submitted by the Committee, B. F. BUTLER, Chairman.

1. Resolved, That the first article of the sixth chapter be amended in the last paragraph thereof, by the insertion of the words "or before a Judge of the Supreme Court" after the word "Assembly," and by the insertion of the same words after the word " being," so that the paragraph as amended shall read as follows:

And the said oaths, or affirmations, shall be taken and subscribed by the governor, lieutenantgovernor, and councillors, before the president of the Senate, in presence of the two Houses of Assembly, or before a Judge of the Supreme Court, and by the senators and representatives before the Governor and Council for the time being, or before a Judge of the Supreme Court: and by the officers aforesaid before such persons, and in such manner, as shall from time to time be prescribed by the legislature.

2. Resolved, That the first paragraph of said article ought to be amended, by inserting after the word "Court," in the second line, "or Court of Common Pleas," and by adding after the last word of said paragraph, the following: "except that they may be appointed to take depositions or acknowledgments of deeds, or other legal instruments, by the authority of any other State or country; so that the same amended shall read as follows, to wit:

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No governor, lieutenant-governor, or judge of the Supreme Judicial Court, or Court of Common Pleas, shall hold any other office or place, under the authority of this Commonwealth, except such as by this Constitution they are admitted to hold, saving that the judges of the said courts may hold the offices of justices of the peace through the State; nor shall they hold any other place or office, or receive any pension or salary from any other State, or government, or power whatever; except that they may be appointed to take depositions, or acknowledgments of deeds, or other legal instruments, by the authority of any other State

or country.

Also, that the second, third, and fourth paragraphs, and article eight of the amendments of said article, be stricken out and the following inserted :—

No person shall hold or exercise at the same time more than one of the following offices, to wit: the office of governor, lieutenant-governor, senator, representative, judge of the Supreme Judicial Court, or Court of Common Pleas, secretary of the Commonwealth, attorney-general, treasurer, or receiver-general, auditor, councillor, judge of probate, register of probate, register of deeds, sheriff, or his deputy, clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court, or Court of Common Pleas, clerk of the Senate or House of Representatives; and any person holding either of the above offices, shall be deemed to have vacated the same by accepting a seat in the congress of the United States, or any office under the authority of the United States, the office of postmaster excepted. And no person shall be capable of holding at the same time more than two offices which are held by appointment of the governor or Governor and Council, or the Senate, or the House of Representatives; military officers, and the offices of justices of the peace justices of the peace and quorum, and notaries public, excepted.

And whenever there shall be a vacancy of any of the above offices, the office of governor and lieutenant-governor excepted, the same may be filled. That the filth paragraph of said article ought to be retained without alteration or amendment.

3. Resolved, That the eighth article of the sixth chapter be amended by striking out the words, "Senate and House of Representatives in," and the words "assembled" and by authority of the same," and by adding the words "of Massachusetts," so that the article as amended shall read,

ARTICLE VIII. The enacting style in making and passing all acts, statutes, and laws, shall be: Be it enacted by the General Court of Massachusetts.

4. Resolved, That it is inexpedient to make any constitutional provision relative to the subject of the order exempting a certain amount of property from attachment on mesne process.

5. Resolved, That it is inexpedient to provide that any persons may act under the Constitution in an official capacity, without at least an affirmation that they "will discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon them in such capacity, according to the best of their abilities and understanding, agreeably to the rules and regulations of the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth."

6. Resolved, That it is not expedient, by a provision of the Constitution, to render any officer of a banking company incapable of holding any office to which he may be duly chosen by the Votes of the people, or any portion thereof.

The Report was referred to the Committee of the Whole, and ordered to be printed.

Amendments to the Constitution.

Mr. NAYSON, of Amesbury, submitted the following, from a Committee:

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

In Convention, June 27, 1853. The Committee on so much of the Constitution as relates to amendments and enrolments, and to

whom was also referred various orders relating thereto, have considered the same and report:

That it is the opinion of said Committee, that provision should be made for calling future Conventions for revising and amending the Constitution, as well at stated periods, as also at such other times as the legislature might prescribe. The present Constitution is entirely deficient in this respect; and it is only in reference to single or specific amendments, that any method is designated whereby that instrument can be changed. The Committee believe that this power of revision, existing, as is universally acknowledged, in and with the people, should, at all times be available for that purpose; and to this end it is proposed to supply the present omission by a provision furnishing to the people the opportunity to pass upon all propositions for calling future Conventions, whenever and however made. And, in the resolves herewith submitted, the Committee would express the belief that this important right will be fully secured with scarcely the possibility of failure.

In the matter of specific amendments which may hereafter be suggested by the legislature, the Committee propose the substitution of the third resolve in lieu of article 9th of the Amendments to the Constitution, having reference to that subject.

All of which is respectfully submitted.
For the Committee,

JONATHAN NAYSON, Chairman.

1. Resolved, That it is expedient to provide in the Constitution that, at the general election to be held in the year eighteen hundred and seventythree, and in each twentieth year thereafter, and also, at such other times preceding or succeeding the above-named year, as the legislature may by law prescribe, the question-"Shall there be a Convention to revise the Constitution, and amend the same!"-shall be submitted to the qualified voters in State elections; and, in case a majority of the same thus voting, shall decide in favor of a convention for such purpose, the legislature, at its next session, shall prescribe by law for the election of delegates to such Convention.

2. Resolved, That it is expedient further to provide in the Constitution, that, whenever the legislature shall fail to submit to the people, at the periods designated in the foregoing resolve, the question of calling a Convention for the purposes indicated therein, the qualified voters in State elections, in the several cities and towns, may, at the next general election thereafter, and upon notice of such failure by the Secretary of the Commonwealth, whose duty it shall be to issue such notice, proceed to vote upon said question as though it had been propounded by the legislature; and if, upon a return to the governor and council, of the vote so given, it shall appear that a majority have voted in favor of the proposition, the governor shall forthwith issue his proclamation, calling upon the voters of said cities and towns, at meetings legally warned for that purpose, to elect delegates to such Convention; the time and place for holding its session, being expressed therein.

3. Resolved, That it is expedient to amend the Constitution by striking out thereof article 9th of amendments, and inserting the following:

Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed by the Senate or House of Representatives; and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the whole number of senators and representatives elected, such amendments shall be entered upon their respective journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and shall then be referred to the next general court. And if the proposed amendment or amendments

[June 27th.

shall be agreed to by a majority of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives voting thereon, the same shall thereupon be submitted to the voters qualified to vote in State elections; and if a majority of the same, thus voting, shall ratify said amendment or amendments, the same shall be deemed a part of the Constitution.

The report was referred to the Committee of Whole and ordered to be printed.

On motion of Mr. WILSON, of Natick, the Convention then resolved itself into

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, Mr. Boutwell, for Berlin, in the Chair, and proceeded to the consideration of the Report of the Committee on the subject of

Loaning the State Credit.

The question pending, being upon a motion of the gentleman from Braintree, (Mr. Stetson,) to strike out the resolve of the Committee and to substitute therefor the following:

Resolved, That it is expedient so to amend the Constitution, as to provide that no loan of the State credit shall be granted to any private corporation.

Mr. COLE, of Cheshire. As the Chairman of the Committee who made this report is absent, and the gentleman who offered the amendment is also absent, I think it would be better to postpone the consideration of it till some time when those gentlemen are present. However, if no one else makes a motion that the Committee rise I will not.

But, Mr. Chairman, if the Convention are desirous to bring this question to a vote this afternoon, I propose to make a few remarks upon the subject before us. It has been remarked by many of the gentlemen who have addressed the Convention that the subjects upon which they were speaking was one of great importance. Sir, the subject now under consideration in this Committee is one, which in my judgment, is by no means of minor importance. The question involved is, "shall the past policy of the State in regard to the loaning of the State credit to private associations and corporations continue to be carried out as the general policy of the State?" I know the sentiment has been advanced by many persons, and persons of intelligence, too, that a national debt is a national blessing, and what is true with regard to a nation in this respect, may also be true of a State. But, Sir, I entertain a different opinion in relation to this subject. I look upon the granting of the loan on the State credit as a very different matter from making a direct appropriation to a private corporation or associa tion. Were there surplus funds at the command of the Treasury of the State, I think that state of things would obviate many of the objections to assisting these private associations by the State. But it is well known that many of the corporations to which the credit of the State is granted make bad investments, and that they are unable to pay the capital borrowed to carry out these objects. Under these circumstances the State incurs all the risk and the corporation derives all the benefit, if any benefit is derived, for certainly, if the corporation never realized any profit from its investment, it would never be able to pay this money, and of course the burthen must fall upon the Treasury of the State, and ultimately upon the tax-paying people of the State.

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But there are various reasons why I, as an individual, should be opposed to granting the loan of the credit of the State to private companies or corporations, and some of these reasons I propose to present to the Committee.

In the first place, where the credit of the State is loaned it must be done by an act of the legislature, and that is a subject which, for the very best of reasons, ought not to be submitted to the legislature. It was remarked in the Convention this morning that the amount of capital already invested in the railroads of this Commonwealth was too strong for the legislature; that the influence which these railroad companies exercised over the legislature was too powerful for the safety of the State; and it is well known that the influence brought by those associations to bear upon the legislature are exceedingly powerful and almost irresistible. This is one of the reasons why this question ought to be settled by the Con

stitution.

I am aware that in presenting these remarks to this Committee I am taking the unpopular side of the question. But, Sir, I think we ought to approach a subject of this nature upon its merits. I think that the representatives of the people, assembled as we are for the purpose of revising the organic law of the land, ought to consider and determine a question of this kind entirely independent of all outside influences whatever. I think that we shall be stepping aside from the high confidence reposed in us by our constituents if we were to allow our votes or opinions upon the question now before the Committee to be biased in the slightest degree by considerations of a local character. Sir, principles are to be settled by the members of this Convention. Our duties are of a very different nature, in that respect, from the duties of a legislature. And the principles which we are called upon to consider and to settle are those which are universal in their character, and ought to be for the benefit of the whole people of the Commonwealth; and in the settlement of those principles we are to regard the interests of the whole people of the Commonwealth, and not those of any particular portion. We are to consider ourselves as the representatives of the whole State, in all its length and breadth. Local considerations may exist at the present time, in particular portions of the State, which may have a material bearing upon this question; but I think it is unwise, injudicious and unbecoming in the members of this Convention to allow ourselves to be governed, in any degree, by such considerations, in determining what are to be the principles of the organic law of the Commonwealth. I can hardly believe that gentlemen will shrink from the task of proclaiming what they all acknowledge to be just and wise principles for the government of the future policy of the State, on account of any merely local and temporary considerations.

Mr. Chairman, as I am not looking forward to any preferment in office, I shall offer the remarks I have to make upon this subject honestly, and with the fullest conviction that what I advocate will, in all coming time, prove to be for the best interest of the Commonwealth.

Now, to come right to the point at issue. Is it best to continue the loan of the State credit for the benefit of these private associations or corporations? Is it the true policy of the State? I have conversed with many individuals upon this

LOAN OF STATE CREDIT.- COLE.

subject during the few past months, and I have met very few who have differed with me as to the best policy to be pursued for the interest of the State. But at the same time, I have met with very many who have thought this a very unfortunate time for the calling of this Convention in relation to this subject. They themselves thought the only true general policy for the State to pursue, in future, was to refuse the loan of its credit to private corporations, but they at the same time expressed a very warm desire that certain things might be accomplished before that policy was adopted. They desired that there might be a departure in one instance from this policy. No one doubts the wisdom of this policy as the general policy of the State.

But, Sir, however unpopular it may be to advocate an amendment of the character of that offered by the gentlemen from Braintree, (Mr. Stetson,) I trust the amendment will prevail; and believing, as I do, that the amendment embodies the true policy of the State, I shall take this opportunity of presenting, in brief, my reasons for advocating that policy.

The subject before the Committee, namely, State loan to private companies, has become an exciting theme of remark in every section of the State. Every man feels, and without hesitation, gives an expression to those feelings, either in favor or against the principle involved, because the interest of every man is more or less directly affected by the exercise of this legislative authority. I suppose this right on the part of the legislature is predicated on a provision in the Bill of Rights authorizing that body to pass all wholesome laws and ordinances for the public benefit. I never have doubted the existence of that power in the light of our present Constitution, yet when traced to its final results, as it regards individual rights, it most evidently encroaches upon that protection secured to private property by the Constitution. That the law should provide for expenses of the government, in every respect, and for the development of all the resources calculated to advance the prosperity of the State, I admit; but it should be remembered that a marked distinction exists between making internal improvements at public expense and loaning the credit of the State to private corporations.

The great question involved in this resolution respecting the policy of the State, in my judgment, ought to be clearly defined and settled in the Constitution, because the people are to pass judgment upon, and finally settle, the principles of their own constitutional law; and if the decision of the people on this or any other subject differs from my opinions, I will most cheerfully respond to it. The history of the country furnishes the most abundant evidence that corporations often, very often, are unsuccessful, and consequences the most disastrous and unhappy are the results. The financial interests of whole communities often are seriously affected from failures of large corporate establishments, and the dependent families of the poor are reduced to suffering and want by the loss of the fruits of their labor and toil. I allude to cases of this description to show that, if corporations thus fail in the application of their own capital, who shall say they may not in the application of the capital of the State.

There are many considerations which give weight and importance to this subject, and first of all, and not least in the scale, is, that public

[June 27th.

money, thus loaned, goes directly to aid and advance the interests of corporations, which are formed for the purpose of acquiring wealth. Our government has provided for the existence of corporate organizations for the purpose of enaling men of capital to concentrate their wealth, and thereby more successfully to prosecute measures in connection with great business transactions, than individuals could do; and certain privileges are conferred, by law, to corporate bodies, not given to individuals. These privileges are conferred on the ground that the public may be benefited, and the greater prosperity of the State secured. But, Sir, I assume, that in the event of an unwise and injudicious enterprise on the part of corporations, money expended may produce no profits, and if so, the payment of the money loaned could not be met, and the final result would be, that the tax-payers of the State must pay it. When the State loans its credit to a corporation, who are the parties that run any risk? The taxable inhabitants of the State, most assuredly; for, if the investment be in a railroad, which does no more than pay running expenses, the corporation cannot refund the loan, and if paid at all, it must come from the only reliable source-the tax-paying people of the State; but if the road pays well, then the corporation is enriched, and perhaps a monopoly is created, producing public uneasiness, and furnishing just ground of complaint.

Indeed, the strong argument of the friends of this policy before the last legislature, was the fact, that the State had built up a great monopoly in granting aid to western roads. The State is urged to repeat the same thing that has given such power and influence to a corporation as ought not to exist. It is said, that in view of the concentration of so much power in one great corporation, that the people cannot endure its rule nor submit to its unreasonable exactions. If these arguments are true, where is the remedy to be found? Will the same medicine cure the disease it produced? It might do so, provided always a state of antagonism should exist; but Sir, corporations, thus circumstanced study well their own interest, either by compromise, or by one or the other obtaining a majority of capital, and consequently the control, and in either case, the public obtain no relief. I would not leave a subject, so vast in its bearings, to the legislature.

The benefits, if anything beneficial can result from such a policy, must always be relatively local. Some portions of people must receive chiefly, if not wholly, the advantages, while all the people alike are responsible to the State for the redemption of its pledges. In every instance, where claims are presented for aid from the State, an influence, almost irresistible from without, is brought to bear on the members of the legislature, not to say degrading and dishonest. If a great enterprise is necessary for the best interests of the State, I would have the State take hold of that work, and accomplish it. But, Sir, I do not believe that private capital would be wanting to execute any work, where safe and adequate returns could be reliable. More than sixty millions of dollars of New England capital is invested in railroads west of the Hudson River. The Illinois Central Railroad Company have negotiated a loan in England, on the bonds of the company, for five millions of dollars.

So in any case in Massachusetts, where a rea

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sonable prospect offers for safe investments, capital would not be wanting. Appeals to the State will be made wl ere the risk is of such a character as to prevent the availability of private capital. Is it wise to go on with this policy; are the people in favor of pursuing this policy? I think

not.

The Constitutions of most of the States have either prohibited the policy or guarded it by restrictions. I know very well, as I remarked in the beginning, that this is an unpopular subject, and I appeal to members of this Convention if it is not true, that during the whole year the most potent argument used why we should maintain this policy was, that the State had already loaned these companies their credit, and thereby had built up large corporations, by which the public was suffering, and that there should be an equilibrium produced by competition, thus to relieve the public. The influences that are often brought to bear upon a legislature when subjects of this kind are before them, are of a very unhappy character. I shall not, in the course of my remarks, allude to particular instances. I have only to appeal to members of this Convention, to bear me out in this statement, if they will reflect but for a moment. Do you not believe, that during the last two years influences liable to swerve the judgment of the legislative body, and lead them astray from the exercise of their own honest convictions, have been brought to bear upon the members of our legislature. We may not, by any policy, forbid or shut out those influences. It will ever be true, as long as loaning the credit of the State, to the amount of millions of dollars, and that to private companies and associations, shall be the policy of this State; as long as that is allowed to go on, unrestricted by constitutional law, so long you may expect that our legislation will be subjected to all the influences, right or wrong, degrading or otherwise, that can be possibly brought to bear upon them. I submit, whether, in the judgment of this Convention, assembled, as we are, as the representatives of the whole State, whether it would not be better to settle this question in the organic law, at least as far as the amendment of the gentleman from Braintree proposes. He proposes, by his amendment, that no such law shall have force, or go into operation, until it is submitted to the people, and receives a majority of their votes. Is this asking an unreasonable thing to be introduced into the Constitution of the State? Are gentlemen afraid to leave this matter to the people? We ask them nothing more by this amendment. I am opposed, as a general thing, to the idea that legislative acts shall be sent to the people for their confirmation; but in a question of this magnitude-a question that more or less directly bears upon the interest of every individual, it is but right and just, before such policy shall be carried out, and before such a law shall go into operation, that it may be submitted to the people for their approval or rejection. The reason is conclusive, in my mind, why it should, because as I remarked before, if the State should happen, under any circumstances, to fail in obtaining adequate and sufficient security, the money, when once expended, could never be recovered from the enterprise in which it was invested. I simply ask whether, in that case, the tax-paying people of the State will not be eventually called upon to pay that money. There is one other part to

LOAN OF STATE CREDIT. - COLE.

which I wish to allude. I know it will be argued here, that as far as the credit of the State has been loaned to corporations, it has been successful; that is, that securities which the State have had for it have heretofore proved to be sufficient. But does that prove that it will always continue to be so. You multiply precedents, and the cases where the State has acted upon this policy shall become so numerous, that every association that wishes to construct a railroad will come before our legislature, and petition that body for loans, and the mere precedents will become at length potent arguments. These petitioners will say to the legislature, you have loaned the credit of the State to build up a corporation, one here and another there; we belong to another locality, and now we ask something at your hands. It will become a most irresistible argument, and there will be no resisting such an application, for the credit of the State. I know it is argued, that during a few years past the State had already, in certain localities, acted upon this policy, and now a portion of the State claims that they have not been benefited; that while they, as individual citizens, have considered their own property as actually under mortgage, they have felt as if they themselves were liable, in case of an emergency, and though they say the thing has operated pretty well, and they have been subject in reality to no taxes in relation to the adoption of this policy, still they have not been benefited like other portions of the State. They present their arguments, upon the ground that they desire to see an equality in this respect throughout the State, and that they need the advantages which other sections of the State have already had. It is said, likewise, ingeniously, that this policy, by producing competition, will relieve the public from the present pressure under which they are suffering. Is that true? Is that argument tenable in all cases? Why, it might be true, if it were not possible, that in the final votes, one of these associations, perhaps, might obtain a majority of the capital, so as to control the whole matter, and it is impossible for any individual to say but we may ere long, be called upon to meet the combined influence of large corporate bodies, and the public may be brought to suffer under a pressure arising from that cause.

I have already alluded to one very great objection to this policy, and in my judgment, if there was no other objection, that alone would be sufficient to condemn it, and that is, the unhallowed influences which are brought to bear upon legislative bodies. I believe that a question of this magnitude should be submitted to the people, and if they, by having an opportunity to express their minds upon the subject, favor such a project as this, I have not a word to say. When I look into our legislative bodies and endeavor to investigate the influences which are brought to bear upon them, I cannot avoid the impression, that we are not safe under these influences. I might allude to things which have occurred during the few months past in relation to this very subject, but I forbear, as I presume they are well understood and well known to all. Men who occupied the highest positions in our legislative bodies, merely because they have acted up to the convictions of their own judgments in this matter, have been treated with the greatest disrespect, and I feel, myself, when speaking upon this side of the question, that were it not for my retirement in

[June 27th.

life, and my want of notoriety in public life, I might, myself, be subjected to like disrespect. Had I ability to present this subject upon its merits, in all its magnitude-had I the standing that many other men in our State have, I should not expect to assume the position that I do before this Committee this afternoon, without incurring the liability of being held up to ridicule. Small as my abilities are, and as little aspiration as I have for public promotion and office of any description whatever, having an internal, honest conviction to say to the people, wherever my lot may cast me, what my judgment is upon these most important matters, I take the position I have assumed to-day. I have no doubt in my own mind, if there were no subjects of great interest pending in this community, that had any relation to the subject proposed in this resolution, or to the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Braintree, (Mr. Stetson,) but what a majority of this Committee would strike hands with me this afternoon.

I have not the least earthly doubt of it ; I have the internal conviction, that while I stand here, vindicating the impolicy of the State in continuing to loan its credit to private corporations, that if men would testify their internal convictions of the policy, I should have a majority of votes on my side. But though it be so, I have not the most distant idea that I shall find that there will be a majority who will vote with me. But in taking the vote on this subject, I simply ask, are we following out the obligations of duty to our constituents, or are we swerving from establishing those principles which have ever been avowed by the democratic party, which we in our heart believe are best calculated to promote the interest of the State. Or, again, are we unwilling to submit this matter to the people for their decision? Is this democratic? Do we ask anything unreasonable when we merely say, by the amendment proposed, that before such a law shall have any force, or go into operation, it shall receive the sanction of the legal voters in the State? Is this unreasonable, to propose such an amendment?

I hope the gentlemen of this Convention will not understand me as in the least degree opposing internal improvements. I have already said that it should be the cautious care of our legislature to take all such measures, that were in their tendency and nature, calculated to promote the best interests of the State, that were calculated to develop the resources of the State; but at the same time, I would repeat again, that there is a great distinction between making public appropriations for internal improvements, and granting the loan of the credit of the State to private companies or associations. If there is any object so vast in its magnitude that individual capital could not be enlisted to accomplish that object, I for one would be willing to agree that the legislature should be empowered to grant appropriations to accomplish I would not by any means close the doors to the prosperity of the State; but I do not believe in hiring corporations to carry out these measures, because the State runs all the risk, and if money is made the corporations realize all the benefit.

it.

Many gentlemen, in the course of the debates in this Convention, have availed themselves of precedents; and I have one consolation, however unpopular the subject may be, in which I am engaged this afternoon, that the last time, until within three years, that an application was made

to the members of the legislature of the State of Massachusetts to grant this credit in a loan, there was such security offered to the State that the legislature in both branches, and unanimously, were satisfied with the security. It was but a small loan which was asked for; some $30,000, and not only the small road which was to be built, but another long railroad stepped in and offered to give security of its whole concern to secure the State. But the legislature took this view then. They were fully convinced that the policy was a bad one, and they thought that the proper time to close the door, was when there was the most undoubted security offered them. That was during the session of the legislature in the winter of 1839 and 1840, I believe.

I have another consolation; that many of our States of the Union have thrown restrictions around their legislatures in relation to loaning money to private corporations. I propose to call the attention of the committee for a few moments to some of the provisions of the Constitutions of other Sates in this particular. Many of the States have incorporated the principle of the provision contemplated in this amendment, in their Constitutions, and they have not done that without experience. The State of New York adopted the policy which we have been adopting, and which seems to meet such a general response, if I can judge anything by the countenances of the members of this Convention. After long experience, they have adopted the policy of refusing to grant the credit of the State to private corporations or associations. It is a fact probably well known to this Committee, that the State of New York has incorporated into the Constitution a provision prohibiting the granting of a loan of the credit of the State to corporations. They have had some experience on this subject. They pursued this policy of granting the loan of the credit of the State, until they had granted it in one case where the work for which it was loaned proved to be a failure. In one instance, by a legislative act, two millions of capital, I think, were relinquished to a corporation and given up, in consequence of the fact, that an application was made by the same corporation for more money; and rather than grant them further aid, the legislature chose to relinquish what had already been given. And in many other instances the terms of payment were protracted and became more doubtful, so that the legislature of New York became fully convinced, by what they learned from actual experience, that the policy was a bad one. In the Constitution of the State of New York, the clause touching this subject reads in this manner :

"The credit of this State shall not in any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of any individual, association or corporation."

I design to run through with but a few States because their prohibitions vary. In the State of Maryland the constitutional provision is :

"No money shall be drawn from the treasury of the State except in accordance with a provision made by law; and every such law shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated and the object for which it shall be applied; provided, that nothing herein contained shall prevent the legislature from placing the contingent fund at the disposal of the executive, who shall report to the legislature at each session the amount expended and the purpose for which it is applied."

In most of the States, where they have not in so many words prohibited the granting of the credit of the State, they have thrown about their legislatures certain restrictions; they have not seen fit to leave the ground entirely open, without any control. In some of the States they have required that an act of this description should receive the vote of three-fifths of both branches of the legislature. In some of them, they have required that the act should receive the vote of the majority, at one session of the legislature, in both Houses, and then that the act should be published in the newspapers, and the succeeding legislature be elected with reference to this act; and if the second legislature saw fit to adopt the act, then it became a law. And in many of the States this has been done in terms equally strong with those contained in the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Braintree, (Mr. Stetson).

Now, without detaining the Committee, as I might, by referring to the provisions on this subject, to be found in the various Constitutions of the several States, you will find this true, that in no State, after leaving New England, can there be found a solitary instance where there are not restrictions thrown about the legislature of the State with regard to appropriations to aid private companies. Massachusetts has been held up by some members of this Convention as a perfect pattern, as though perfection was to be found in Massachusetts if anywhere, and as though her organization of government was superior to that of any State in the Union. I by no means desire to say anything against the laws of Massachusetts, or her policy heretofore; but it occurs to me, and strikes my mind with much force, that there are States which, under the organization which they have adopted, according to the length of time since their first settlement, have enjoyed an unparalleled prosperity. Go to many of the new States, and you will find that their growth and prosperity, when the length of time that they have existed as States is considered, has been even greater than Massachusetts has ever had in any period of her history. There has been developed in some of the new States, a greater degree of prosperity in relation to literature, science, arts, and a general diffusion of knowledge, and all that tends to make a people happy and prosperous, than Massachusetts has ever experienced during the same period of time.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that the members of this Committee will take this subject into consideration, and all I ask of them is, to award to me that I have expressed fearlessly-and under very unfavorable circumstances, I will admit-the honest convictions of my mind. If it is the general desire of this Convention to continue this policy, so they will do; and if, in the course of twenty-five, thirty, or forty years, it should prove that my convictions in relation to this whole matter are right, it is possible that there may be individuals who will have occasion to look back to the time when this Convention was in session. Should it occur, hereafter, that an application for a few millions, for certain purposes, should be made, and that, in carrying out this policy, the legislature should grant the credit of the State for these few millions, and when that was expended-the work still being unfinished, and the application repeated for more money, and the State having become pledged-should continue to multiply these millions, and in the event it should prove

[June 28th.

that that money could not be drawn from the source where it was invested, I simply ask, in what condition the State will be? Will there not be many at that time who will say that the whole policy is a bad one? I am confident, that if we pursue this policy, the time will come when that will be the result; because the conviction having once settled down that the policy was a bad one, to retrace our steps now and commence anew in this age of enterprise, we shall be liable to be led too far.

I presume gentlemen will agree with me that there should be a limit; and I would ask those gentlemen where they would fix that limit? Can you point out a better one than that of submitting every case of the kind to the people? It was remarked by the honorable member from Taunton, (Mr. Morton,) when the subject of plurality was under debate in Committee, that he was unwilling to leave it to the legislature. And why? Because he feared the influences which are often brought to bear on the legislature. That was the reason he assigned then; and if there was force in that argument then, I ask the Committee is there not a double force in it as applied to this case, as a reason that this subject ought not to be left entirely to the decision of the legislature? I feel-and I am willing to confess that I feel-a sort of indignant resentment arising in my own mind, when legislators, in the fulfilment of their high trusts and in consequence of their official acts, shall be held up to public ridicule, and when they cannot even escape that worst of all opposition-the opposition of the women. The recent demonstrations of burning effigies needs a timely rebuke. Is there not danger that the members of this Convention may even feel some of the pressure of that influence which is brought to bear upon the members of the legislature? We live in a world where depravity has put its stamp upon everything; there is no perfection here, men are liable to be led away from what is right; there are many wicked influences brought to bear upon legislators. I would, therefore, do all in my power to fix such principles in our constitutional law as would relieve our legislators from these liabilities. How should we feel, if there was an assembly of men around us trying to influence us in our deliberations?

Without concluding his remarks, the gentleman gave way for a motion by Mr. DURGIN, of Wilmington, that the Committee rise, and the Committee accordingly rose, and the President having resumed the Chair of