You attached to your petition an internal memorandum dated
January 19, 1976, from Carl H. Builder, Director of the
Division of Safeguards of this office, to Ronald A. Brightsen,
Assistant Director for Licensing, Division of Safeguards,
entitled "Adequacy of Current Safeguards." That memorandum
expresses Mr. Builder's concern that safeguards at currently
licensed facilities may not be adequate against design threats
now being considered for future safeguards programs. Mr. Builder
has read your petition and my response to it. He concurs in
my determination that your requests for emergency and summary
action are not warranted by the evidence presently available.

The Commissioners have not participated in the making of this
determination under 10 CFR 2.206(b), which is based solely
on the investigation and recommendations of the staff, and
my judgment.

Sincerely,

Kenneth R. Chapman, Director
Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Anders

Commissioner Rowden
Commissioner Mason

FROM:

THRU:

SU JECT:

Commissioner Gilinsky

Commissioner Kennedy

Kenneth R. Chapman, Director

Office of Nuclear Material Safety & Safeguards

Lee V. Gossick, Executive Director for Operations().

REGULATORY ACTION REGARDING SAFEGUARDS

his is in response to the Commission's request that it be promptly informed whether any special regulatory action is warranted to improve safeguards protection for the regulated activities listed in the Katural Resources Defense Council's (RDC) petition for action under 10 CFR $2.206, dated February 2, 1976, prior to a determination of the cerits of the petition. Comments on the petition by interested members of the public and the affected "licensees" are to be filed by February 20, 1976. As quickly thereafter as these comments can be raviewed and conclusions drawn by the staff, I will report to you on Thithe merits of the NRDC petition, with recommendations for any actions to be taken. In the interim, if our continuing review, public responses to the petition, or any other information indicates the ned for immediate specific action, I will take such action and informa yx immediately.

of the affected "licensees" listed in the NRDC petition are rating under safeguard plans reviewed and approved by the staff and all are in compliance with the present regulations in 10 CFR Parts 70 and 73. The regulations in Part 70 provide for material accounting and control requirements with respect to facility organization, material *catrol arrangements, accountability measurements, statistical controls, imentory methods, shipping and receiving procedures, material storage practices, records and reports, and management control. The Commission's current regulations in 10 CFR Part 73 provide requirements for the pysical security and protection of fixed sites and transportation 10volving strategic quantities of nuclear materials. Physical security rcuirements for protecting fixed sites include the establishment and taining of a security organization (including armed guards), provision Physical barriers, establishment of access controls, use of intrusion arms, arrangemer.ts for communication with response forces, and estabtenment of response plans.

With regard to continuing to meet regulatory responsibilities, we have been making and will continue to make during our ongoing activities, changes in plant procedures on an individual facility basis to improve safeguards even when those changes transcend technical compliance with wisting regulations. We are in this sense looking for the most flective arrangements possible at each facility under current safeguards concepts.

Over the past year the staff has had underway, through numerous avenues,. a review of current safeguard regulations. This review has involved several major studies, extensive contacts with other federal agencies ard individual experts, and nuclear facility visits. The purpose of

s activity has been twofold; to judge the effectiveness of present safeguard arrangements, and to evaluate the merits of and need for new concepts in our future treatment of safeguards for special nuclear materials. For example, we are examining the merits of increased emphasis on physical containment procedures in our approach to material controls. Mr. Builder's memorandum of 19 January, cited by the NRDC, reflects our development and examination of new conceptual approaches that would involve threat-specific criteria for the evaluation of safeguards. Our analyses are not yet complete; they have not been offered for public comment; nor have they yet been approved by me. These new pproaches, different from our current regulatory approach to safeguards, ave neither been validated or adopted. This staff activity should not be construed as evidence that current safeguards are inadequate. Our efforts to examine new safeguards concepts have been accelerated the preliminary conclusions reached may in part contribute to my cccideration of the NRDC petition.

ich respect to any immediate threat to the affected facilities, a Liber of which are providing services essential to the national Lecurity, we are aware of both current intelligence information and a wide variety of expert opinion. Based on knowledge derived from these sources, our review of current safeguard regulations, our ongoing Studies in the safeguards area, and the results of our continuing rspection of the affected plants, I perceive no reasonable cause for exing actions beyond the prompt and thoroughgoing ones that have Mireacy been initiated.

Origirel Signed by

1

Kenneth R. Chapman, Director
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards

capable of rendering assistance to