 | Massachusetts - 1895 - 1138 sider
...now under discussion. Regarded as a creature of the sovereign, a corporation has been defined to be " an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in contemplation of law." As such, it is obvious that there can be no such thing as a corporation which owes its existence to... | |
 | Alexander Mansfield Burrill - 1859 - 736 sider
...Bl. Com. 467, 469. Marshall, C. J. 4 Whcaton's R. 518,636. Thompson, J. 14 Peters1 R. 122, 129. — An artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Marshall, C. 'J. 4 Wheaton's R. 636.— A franchise possessed by one or more individuals, who subsist... | |
 | Daniel Gardner - 1860 - 740 sider
...passed the corporate property, but not the franchise. The Supreme Court of the Union have held, that a corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law, and possessing only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly... | |
 | Oliver Lorenzo Barbour - 1860 - 716 sider
...the language of Ch. J. Marshall, a corporation "possesses only those properties which the character of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence." (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 636.) It has no other powers than such as are specifically... | |
 | Richard Peters - 1860 - 836 sider
...4 Wheat. 316 ; 4 Cond. Rep. 466. 12. À corporation is an artificial being, intangible, invisible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of the law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either... | |
 | Indiana. Supreme Court, Horace E. Carter, Albert Gallatin Porter, Gordon Tanner, Benjamin Harrison, Michael Crawford Kerr, James Buckley Black, Augustus Newton Martin, Francis Marion Dice, John Worth Kern, John Lewis Griffiths, Sidney Romelee Moon, Charles Frederick Remy - 1861 - 590 sider
...is conceded by the counsel for the plaintiffs, that a corporation, "being the mere creature of law, possesses only those properties which the charter...expressly, or as incidental to its very existence." As an incident, it is contended that this company had the power to acquire, hold, and dispose of lands;... | |
 | New York (State). Court of Appeals, George Franklin Comstock, Henry Rogers Selden, Francis Kernan, Erasmus Peshine Smith, Joel Tiffany, Edward Jordan Dimock, Samuel Hand, Hiram Edward Sickels, Louis J. Rezzemini, Edmund Hamilton Smith, Edwin Augustus Bedell, Alvah S. Newcomb, James Newton Fiero - 1864 - 674 sider
...power they possess." In Dartmouth College v. Woodward. (4 Wheat., 518), the same eminent judge says: "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible,...expressly or as incidental to its very existence." Chief Justice HOSMER, of Connecticut, asserts the same doctrine in the cases of the NY Fire Insurance... | |
 | Elliott Anthony - 1865 - 320 sider
...the .company, are also parties. The corporation itself, which is the offspring of the charter, and is an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in contemplation of law, is also, in a certain sense, a party. But as the latter can only act through the medium of its trustees,... | |
 | 1898 - 534 sider
...Chief Justice Marshall, a pretty good authority in his day, defined a corporation In a dozen words: "An artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only In contemplation of law." This has never been Improved upon, and Mr. Morawetz, who has a great gift of clear statement, opened... | |
 | 1866 - 570 sider
...to show the limited power of corporations. " A corporation being the mere creature of law possessing only those properties which the charter of its creation...expressly or as incidental to its very existence." (1) " That a corporation is strictly limited to the exercise of the powers which are specifically conferred... | |
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A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law. it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental... 
